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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis investigates the issue of co-production; that is, the joint provision of 
services involving residents, the local government and private providers. Co-
production is a commonly used approach to facilitate access to basic services in 
informal settlements in the developing world. But, rigorous micro-econometric 
evaluation of its causal effects is rare. This study uses a ‘natural experiment’, 
possible due to strict technical reasons involved in the provision of gas energy to 
informal neighbourhoods in the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area, to estimate the 
effects on the social and physical dimension of residents’ investments. Estimates 
are created at three co-production stages: an initial social interaction stage to 
introduce the service; the connection stage, and; an impact stage several years 
after programme completion. The research measures effect on housing 
improvements, participatory involvement associated with the internalisation of 
benefits, and suggests the presence of collective capacity for furthering 
collaborative efforts. The latter can be associated with the significant improvement 
in the residents’ reported trust in neighbourhood organisations at the different 
implementation stages. Importantly, the research measures residual effects by legal 
tenure conditions. Co-production has contributed to an incremental effect only for 
informal residents’ reported level of trust in the local public sector. Trust in the 
family, rather than generalised trust, appears as a significant residual effect of the 
intervention that is positively correlated with the undertaking of housing 
improvements.   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1. INTRODUCTION 
I became interested in the issue of informal land development and the process of 
settlement consolidation more than a decade ago. At that time, my motivation was 
not much concerned with mainstream policies, since in countries such as Argentina 
most housing policies fostered by the State have focused on addressing the 
quantitative side of the housing deficit through the construction of new housing 
units (Di Virgilio, 2012). The important and persistent demand for improvements to 
neighbourhoods, public service provision and the qualitative deficit of the housing 
stock remained largely neglected. Furthermore, in the context of concerns with 
urban informality, there has only been sporadic attention to programmes that have 
aimed at regularising settlements formed through invasions on public land, and 
which have consistently failed to gain scale on the vast areas of privately owned 
land developed and sold informally to the low-income population (Clichevsky, 
2002).1 From both a research and policy viewpoint acquiring a better understanding 
of the process of informal settlement consolidation constitutes long-standing need 
in academia and beyond.  
The relevance of informal neighbourhood consolidation is important from a 
number of different perspectives. First, and most vital, it has direct effects on 
residents’ quality of life. Second, it takes into consideration that a guided effort to 
support a sustainable consolidation of these settlements - now located in the 
intermediate rings of Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area (BAMA) - can mitigate the 
low density extension through informal land occupancy by leap-frog development 
(Clichevsky, 2012).2 The present pattern of growth increases the costs of 
                                                             
1 Land legally owned by the initial developer that was illegally developed, not conforming to 
planning subdivision law, land use zoning and infrastructure requirements.  
2 BAMA configuration is defined by the City of Buenos Aires and two surrounding rings of 
municipalities. The first ring is the more populated - 4,726,311 inhabitants - and 3,839,726 
inhabitants live in the second. A third ring is included when Buenos Aires Metropolitan Region 
(BAMR) is identified as a functional entity that does not enjoy any political power as a single 
administrative jurisdiction (Pirez, 2002). That ring has significant population growth and 804,095 
inhabitants (INDEC, 2001).  Population density gradient decreases from the city centre to the 
municipalities of the outer rings.   
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infrastructure extension and the distributive impact on accessibility (including time 
and transportation costs), access to services and job opportunities. Settlement 
consolidation may contribute to improve urban efficiency.3 
Despite their scale, informal settlements have been largely ignored in the urban 
policy agenda in Argentina.4 Once I realised the extent of the limited understanding 
combined with the lack of rigorous empirical information on these settlements, 
attention to these neighbourhoods became the base of my academic work. At the 
beginning of 2006, I set up the Neighbourhood Development Observatory (NDO) to 
collect and process robust, systematic information about these settlements that 
could contribute to informing and improving both public and private decision-
making. This activity was intended to overcome one of the main limitations faced 
by researchers; namely the lack of information about areas of informal urbanisation 
and the inexistence of rigorous assessments of those interventions that do 
occasionally and inconsistently target them. I hoped that having these data and 
studies could help improve decisions that concern urban policy (Arnott, 2008: 27). 
The NDO covers the area delimited by several municipalities in the second BAMA 
ring, an area characterised by a fragile social conditions and a need for 
improvements to living conditions in terms of quality of housing and basic 
infrastructure, amongst other deficiencies.  
Even though one of the principal limitations faced by informal settlements in BAMA 
is their lack of public services, the privatisation of public utilities in Argentina since 
19935, has reinforced the perception that the private sector, especially profit-
seeking institutions, cannot play a role in providing services to the poorest 
                                                                                                                                                                            
 
3 Quantitative evidence on the patterns of urban extension from 1990 to 2000 based on Landstat 
satellite imagery (Goytia and Pasquini, 2012) indicates that less than 30 percent of average 
territorial growth in Argentinean municipalities was due to infill, while 65 percent was due to urban 
extension, and the rest corresponds to leapfrog development.  
4 The Latin American Housing Network (LAHN) is currently addressing this issue conducting studies 
in different countries. http://www.lahn.utexas.org/  
5 The State Reform Act (N° 23696/1989) allowed the National State to implement an extensive 
programme of privatizations of the public companies, which included the state monopoly of natural 
gas and water distribution. The provincial public sector accompanied this process and granted in 
concession to the private sector the electricity distribution company, as well as the water and 
sewerage services of the of Buenos Aires. 
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segments of the population. The emphasis on market-led policies of these 
programmes that fostered the “modernisation” of the legal and institutional 
framework were motivated in the efficiency of markets (Bromley, 1990), stressing 
the benefits of market mechanisms and private property rights to solve conflicts 
over the use of scarce resources (Kessides, 2005: 95). Market-supporting 
institutions are enabled by changes in urban policy that includes decentralisation, 
privatisation of utilities, and deregulation of markets, as well as the greater 
attention paid to property rights (Jones, 2003; Jones and Ward, 1998). Indeed, since 
the mid-1980s, the importance of enabling markets – removing the impediments 
for the smooth action of the market – has been emphasised, while there has been 
little discussion of housing policy and infrastructure provision as a redistributive 
tool (Arnott, 2008). Indeed, the social dimension of utility provision under a private 
system was not considered in depth during discussions of regulatory framework 
reform (Foster et al., 2003). Rather, the process of utilities privatisation was 
encouraged on the basis of fiscal considerations together with the need to improve 
the efficiency and quality of the services. Besides the informal legal status of the 
house or plot, the absence of information regarding expenditure patterns, living 
conditions, resident preferences, served to increase the perception that these 
neighbourhoods represented high commercial risks in the provision of services.  
As markets failed to get organised the only solution to service deficits was a 
reliance on public sector intervention. Nevertheless, in Argentina, as with many 
Latin American countries, the public sector has failed to provide services to this 
segment of the population. The reasons often cited are the absence of evidence of 
legal ownership that is a mandatory requirement for connection (ERSI, 1993), 
budget constraints (Galiani et al, 2009), a lack of managerial skills (Paladino and 
Blas, 2005b), poor intergovernmental coordination, especially following 
decentralisation (Acuña, 1994; Cetrángolo and Jiménez, 2004; Pirez, 2002), and a 
lack of political will. Thus, neither the private sector nor the State ends up 
facilitating access to services for these residents.  
Gaining access to a networked service, such as a piped gas supply, which forms the 
central case of my research, may be extremely attractive for residents in informal 
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neighbourhoods since they often end up paying more for services compared with 
residents of formal urban areas (Galiani et al, 2009; UN-Habitat, 2006). In short, as 
De Soto pointed out, informality has its costs (1989: 155). Paying these higher 
prices may be an indication that these households have both the resources and the 
willingness to pay for networked public services that provide benefits in quality of 
life and cost savings, especially when infrastructure programmes are designed 
according to their financial needs. Importantly, even the poorest households in the 
most informal and marginal settlements, such as Villa Inflamable (Flammable City) 
complain about the costs of substitute goods, in the case of piped natural gas this 
would be the gas tank that is significantly more expensive (Auyero and Swistun, 
2008: 124).  
There are a number of important characteristics of public goods and services 
acquisition in informal neighbourhoods. First, most services cannot be obtained 
through progressive individual efforts. Second, a networked service cannot be 
obtained individually in the marketplace.6 Thus, the consolidation stage where 
(networked) services are extended and connected requires public sector 
determination and support, and/or private utilities motivated to serve the lower 
income families. In addition, some degree of resident coordination is generally 
needed. This coordination – or collective action – may be undertaken in the form of 
bargaining strategy to gain attention or resources from the State or it may well be 
channelled to project implementation to drive down management costs – 
mitigating against these is the need for individual household negotiations – or to 
reduce installation costs through labour contributions. In many cases, programme 
delivery requires a participatory channel through which logistic and governance 
issues are framed (Joshi and Moore, 2004).   
For households the benefits may include reduced costs with economies of scale, 
avoiding moral hazard of providers striking deals with some households, streets or 
communities, that are detrimental to others, and oversight of contracts and quality 
of work. In some cases, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), community-based 
                                                             
6 Mitlin (2004: 342) calls this an “individualized (or household) market-based strategy“, as opposed 
to “collective self-help”, “dependency-based strategies”, or “social movements”.  
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organisations (CBOs) and other local organisations might back household 
organisation in order to dissipate the aversion risks experienced by private firms 
(McLeod and Mullard, 2006). At their best, these efforts to ‘co-produce’ services 
build or enhance innovative institutional arrangements that may further aid 
infrastructure provision, management (including affordability) and on-going 
governance (Almansi, 2010; Hardoy et. al., 2005). 
My research interests motivated consideration of how the co-production of a 
normally expensive service can enhance delivery, provide savings to households, for 
example through the substitution of an expensive and less effective service, and 
thereby operate as an incentive to programme enrolment as well as deliver 
measurable household and neighbourhood effects. The service scheme at the 
centre of my research is the extension of natural gas supply to an area of low-
income neighbourhoods. Residents are obliged to contribute to the financing of the 
scheme by means of savings generated through the substitution of energy supply. 
Importantly, what the research shows is that such internalisation of savings 
constitutes a greater motivation for resident investments in physical and social 
improvements that extend beyond a rigid capitalisation view prompted by formal 
legal title incentives, as savings internalisation applies to residents that hold both 
formal and informal rights to property. 
 
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS   
The main questions guiding my research concern the two dimensions of individual 
investments, the physical and the social. Considering the first, I argue that 
capitalisation through savings generated by the substitution of services constitutes 
a significant determinant for enrolment in the co-production programme, while 
spillover effects on non-participants provide incentives to improve their housing. 
The second dimension, initially, was a consideration of how social capital affects 
service acquisition and settlement consolidation. However, having observed the 
ambiguities surrounding definitions and uses of social capital (Dasgupta, 2009a; 
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Durlauf, 2002; Portes and Landolt, 2000), I decided to focus on two constitutive 
elements. Thus, for the purposes of my research social capital is unbundled into 
participatory involvement in a programme or other collective action, and the role of 
trust (generalised and particularised) to the building of collective capacity. The 
examination of trust is an especially original aspect of my research. In considering 
it, I intend the research to investigate the role and importance of an informal 
institution to the process and effects of settlement consolidation. Trust should 
operate as an incentive to physical investment. 
The research analysed the causal effects of co-production through means of a 
natural experiment. While experimental treatments in social science research are 
complex, I used a situation that was likely to mimic random assignment to a co-
production intervention due to the technical nature of gas network grid extension. 
The different stages of programme implementation allowed the research to define 
the treatment and control groups and test the hypothesis of effects at three 
different stages: 1) the social interaction stage, 2) the service connection to the 
house and 3) the residual effect of the programme after the service had ‘bedded 
in’. The research design assumes and measures how trust, through reciprocity or 
experience, takes time to develop.   
2.1. PHYSICAL DIMENSION EFFECTS   
The academic controversy on whether and how legal or tenure security incentives 
induce physical investment effects prompts my consideration of whether 
connection to the gas network assisted housing investments. Conceptually, we 
might hypothesise that the process operates through capitalising savings from 
service substitution in the case of participants (those who signed up to the 
programme) or by neighbourhood effects for non-participants. The complicating 
factor for the field research is the extent to which tenure and legality are associated 
with programme involvement.   
At this point it is necessary to describe the incremental process of housing 
construction that characterises occupancy in Buenos Aires neighbourhoods. It starts 
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with the acquisition of a plot developed by informal developers, usually at the 
urban periphery and paid for through monthly instalments (Clichevsky, 2000, 2002).  
For most neighbourhoods there is a mixture of tenure conditions, although most of 
the residents, including those that have no legal rights, enjoy de facto tenure 
security. After the acquisition of a plot without services, the house is built 
progressively, to help spread the investment costs. Once a core unit is built, the 
house can be enlarged and upgraded. Another unit might be added for other 
household members or for rent, with the strategy to balance savings and needs of 
housing transformation through time (Ferguson and Navarrete, 2003; Ward, 2012c; 
and Di Virgilio el al., 2012, for Buenos Aires).     
There is no consensus among academics on the sources and intensity of this 
progressive investment in house construction and improvements. Under the 
property rights approach, the process is associated with the possession of legal 
rights to property (De Soto, 2000). But, tenure security is considered by others to 
be more complex, incorporating perceived (De Souza, 2001) and psychological (Van 
Gelder, 2009) security. Such views can favour the process of investment even when 
legal rights are not present, so long as rights are defined and enforceable (Migot-
Adholla et al., 1991). A crucial element to these positions is the presence or 
promise of services that provide a valuable incentive to investment, either with the 
potential to accelerate decisions to investment and/or to raise the sum invested 
(Strassman, 1984). In turn, it is argued, services reinforce feelings of security of 
tenure. As expressed by Arnott, 2008 the provision of infrastructure services to an 
informal neighbourhood gives it “quasi-legal status” (2008: 31). 
Many researchers, however, have expressed caution about the security to 
investment relationship. They note, for example, that residents require resources 
for investment desires to be executed (Varley, 1987). A particular line of research 
has considered whether and how appropriate finance mechanisms might assist the 
incremental housing process and lower housing final costs (Datta and Jones, 2000; 
Ferguson and Smets, 2009). Consequently, it is feasible to hypothesise that, added 
to the possibilities made available by a networked source of energy the savings 
introduced by the substitution of more expensive service sources by natural 
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pipelined gas can contribute to accelerate the incremental housing process. Aligned 
with previous views from Strassman (1984), I argue that the provision of services in 
informal commercial settlements is central to the incremental process that has 
characterised the dynamic of settlement consolidation through time. 
The contribution of this study is to assess the particular effects on those connected 
as well as the existence of spillover effects on those that do not enrol in the 
programme. The empirical part of this study asks: Does the energy co-production 
intervention have an effect on housing investment? Is this an incentive effect 
provided by the connection to the service for those residents that have received 
the service connection? Or, is there a spillover effect on non-adherents as well? 
Measuring these processes is difficult. Service provision provides households with 
use values that might be capitalised in perceptions of house value, but the energy 
cost savings might provide resources for investment, and services might provide 
actual or perceived sense of security. Conversely, tenure may not be a limit to 
investment if rights are secure and enforceable, while the age of the house or its 
physical permanence can be relevant for the likelihood and number of changes 
undertaken.  Nevertheless, those people that enrol in the service programme may 
not be the only ones that invest in the housing unit. Through neighbourhood effects 
the availability of a networked service may provide positive externalities, driving 
incentives for housing investment for non-participants, even if their savings through 
substitution do not offset the costs of enrolment.  
Finally, the study seeks to elaborate upon whether, how and to what extent 
investment is associated with involvement in co-production. Does enrolment 
influence the likelihood, number and extent of housing improvements? Are these 
effects discernible from direct involvement in the programme or due to a wider 
generation of trust between neighbours, an indirect effect of their participation? 
Specifically, I enquire on the association between trust and housing investment and 
on the dimensions of trust that count on people’s investments prompted by 
intervention.    
20 
 
2.2. SOCIAL DIMENSION EFFECTS  
2.2.1. PARTICIPATORY EFFORTS  
Community participation in informal settlements has been widely studied in 
developing world cities. A fuller review will be undertaken later in the thesis. For 
now, it is necessary to identify a couple of important points. First, the level of 
participation has been found to be low in most circumstances and to decrease once 
services are obtained (Gilbert and Ward, 1984b). The expectation, therefore, is that 
participation will fall significantly after programme implementation; with 
implications for service infrastructure maintenance, if relevant, and sustainability of 
trust. Second, the expected marginal return from active involvement - either during 
the implementation or finance phases of an intervention – may not offset costs 
(Gilbert and Ward, 1984b; Portes and Walton, 1976). Thus, participation may be 
necessary, indeed a requirement, of a programme but it may be neither time nor 
cost effective for households with precarious livelihoods.  
In the case examined in this research, the infrastructure programme is co-produced 
and is based on resident interaction and participation. Moreover, exogenous 
changes in social interactions driven by the programme have an economic 
motivation related to the requirement that solidarity contributes to finance the 
extension and connection to the grid. In order to get the pipeline and individual 
connections, a minimum number of residents must be enrolled within each block. 
Through what is called the “social infrastructure” of resident and neighbourhood 
organisations, people are encouraged to become active subjects at different stages 
of programme organisation and financing (FPVS, 2013).  
Co-production, therefore, implies a different form and degree of resident 
involvement among people with a genuine interest in neighbourhood improvement 
(Abers, 1998; Almansi et al., 2010; Bovaird, 2007; Mitlin, 2008). In this process, 
community organisations and NGOs are central to channel resident demands that 
facilitate operative relations with State institutions and other organisations in order 
to satisfy local service demands, allowing for the development of a means through 
which residents in low-income neighbourhoods may interact and even 
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negotiate outside of clientelistic relations (Mitlin, 2008). Thus, the scope for 
individual and collective efforts through the neighbourhood consolidation ladder is 
presented with new demands for house upgrading, retrofitting infrastructure (Ward 
et al., 2011b) and provision of urban facilities (equipamiento urbano).  
This study provides evidence that the participation in organisations and activities 
aimed at improving settlements, the enrolment in a co-production programme to 
obtain public services and the willingness to collaborate in further neighbourhood-
enhancing activities is associated with the internalisation of the benefits provided 
by them. Since residents have the possibility of choosing their levels of investment 
in community-enhancing or community-neutral social capital, factors that 
encourage individuals to internalise general welfare will increase investment in 
community-enhancing social capital. Homeownership induces this internalisation 
since the home is an asset the value of which is tied to the improvements of the 
neighbourhood.7 Importantly, once they acquire and consolidate a home, this is the 
most important financial legacy from one generation to the next. Not only is 
housing the main asset for most residents but its progressive construction 
constitutes a fundamental mode of wealth formation during the course of 
generations.  The house represents more than use value or an asset for future sale 
but in countries with weak pension systems, such as Argentina, it serves as security 
for old age, and a hedge to cope with unemployment or illness (Ward et al. 2011b; 
World Bank, 2007b).  
This means that the participation in community-enhancing activities will increase as 
far as the investment costs required (e.g. in time and coordination with others), are 
inferior to long-term benefits. Yet, tenure or legal status of the housing unit should 
provide differentiated investment payoffs for participation. The empirical part of 
this study answers the following questions: Does a co-production scheme for the 
delivery of infrastructure services – such as gas - have an effect in driving 
participatory efforts of residents in informal commercial settlements? Are these 
collaborative efforts sustained over time or do they cease once the service has 
                                                             
7 This effects of homeownership has guided the provision of subsidies in formal housing markets as 
elicitor of  social capital externalities (Arnott, 2008). 
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been obtained? Is there any effect of co-production intervention in eliciting a 
“collective capacity” seeking to further participatory involvement in neighbourhood 
consolidation efforts? Is this capacity affected by resident’s tenure condition and 
contextual effects of neighbourhood heterogeneity?  
 
2.2.2. TRUST 
The research is interested in the notion of trust for two reasons. First, many 
academics believe that trust is a central feature that determines investment 
behaviour. Considered a “social virtue” by Fukuyama (1995), it facilitates economic 
transactions (Arrow, 1969, 1972), encourages economic development (Arrow, 
1972; Dasgupta, 2009b) and complex transactions (Fukuyama, 1995) or affects the 
rate of investments (Zak and Knack, 2001). Second, development practitioners and 
academics from Argentina have argued that shared committed efforts through 
resident involvement in informal neighbourhoods may be able to elicit what is 
called “generalised trust” (Paladino and Blas, 2005a, 2007; Zavalia Lagos,2005). 
Nevertheless, we do not know with much certainty how trust is built, nor to what 
extent the different dimensions of trust (generalised or particularised) might be 
prompted by exogenous factors such as social interactions.   
The conceptualisation of trust adopted in this study is based on the rational choice 
strategic type that prevails in most economic studies (Dasgupta, 2009a). It can be 
based on familiarity (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002) and experience (Hardin, 2006). 
From the literature, three considerations emerge that frame an understanding of 
how trust is relevant as an outcome when new social interactions purposely 
oriented to achieve networked service provision are brought about. First, through 
cross sector collaboration, new “invited spaces” may be created (see Cornwall, 
2008). These spaces “bridge” diverse sectors such as the municipal local 
government, utility firms and residents. Second, the intervention requirement of 
purposeful socialisation to build agreements within neighbourhood blocks, with 
other residents and neighbourhood organisations, that take on management and  
consultation on issues of day to day co-production activities. Third, family 
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enrolment decisions and sharing of family responsibilities demanded as part of 
intervention conditions. The last two are expected to affect what Sahlins (1974) 
called “diffused” reciprocity that links family members.  
The differentiated intervention stages of programme implementation create 
different determinants for trust that can be empirically tested. First, expectations 
induced before the programme started. Second, new forms of 
familiarity/reciprocity elicited among all intervening parties and the service 
connection attainment driven by association. Based on these considerations, the 
study addresses a number of questions that focus on the process of eliciting trust 
through an exogenous change in social interactions. Does the intervention have an 
effect in eliciting generalised trust? What dimensions of trust are affected, if any, by 
programme implementation? Is trust conditioned by tenure directly, are 
households with secure/legal tenure more trusting, more trustworthy, or is there 
no tenure influence? 
The research aimed to demonstrate what dimensions of trust can be associated 
with physical investment in informal settlements. It, therefore, tackles an 
informality literature that dealt with the effects on housing investment exclusively 
in relation with formal institutions, particularly property rights. My motivation was 
to assess whether the trust elicited through the new spaces generated by the 
intervention might allow improved information and a decrease in transaction costs 
that might affect housing investment. The building of trust may have an effect on 
housing improvements. The social capital “standard” explanation associates 
generalised trust to investments. Nevertheless, other dimensions of trust, including 
trust in the municipality, neighbours and the family, may be more relevant at a time 
when residents undertake a decision for housing transformation. 
 
3. THE PARTICIPATORY MODEL FOR CO-PRODUCING SERVICES  
During the two past decades, governments and firms have been looking for 
innovative ways to meet challenges in the provision of public services, involving 
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residents and social organisations (Brandsen and Pestoff, 2006). Based on these 
considerations co-production has been relevant when budget limitations and/or a 
lack of coordination among diverse public bodies have constrained the public 
provision of services (Ostrom, 1996). These new arrangements consist of the 
contributions from the state, citizens and local organisations, together with the 
private sector. There is something in common in all these arrangements: residents 
are not just “user/clients” and “passive receptors” of the services, but are now 
encouraged to have an active role in the production of public goods and services 
that have an effect on them (Ostrom, 1996: 1073).  
The co-produced programme called “Redes Solidarias” (Solidarity Networks) was 
implemented in the locality of Cuartel V, Moreno, in the BAMA, to provide access to 
low-income households living in informal neighbourhoods to the gas network.  It 
was based on a novel co-produced institutional logistic. The private company that 
managed the concession for natural gas services worked together with an NGO, 
Fundación Pro Vivienda Social (Foundation for Social Housing; FPVS), in cooperation 
with the local municipality, neighbourhood organisations, including  residents of 
the target neighbourhoods.  As stated by the main NGO in charge of the overall 
management of the co-production scheme, “The working approach of the FPVS is 
based on a scheme of communitarian participation designed to overcome 
coordination problems between demand and supply, and simultaneously, build 
social capital” (FPVS, 2011:3).  
According to the co-production for services intervention (CPSI), the financial plans 
(up to five years) and the amount of each instalment are both adapted to each 
household’s capacity to save and repay. The programme established that 
households connected to the new service would pay a monthly amount 
approximately equal to the previous monthly expenses so that the income 
generated in excess of the cost of new gas service is used to finance the capital 
expenditures of the network expansion. The cost for each household is calculated 
on the assumption of a high level of participation. That is intended to propitiate 
joint efforts aimed at increasing enrolment. Importantly, by bringing more 
households into the scheme, the average cost that each participant will have to 
25 
 
confront is reduced. Nevertheless, as a risk of default is present, the programme 
put in place a team of residents to help deal with payment interruption.  
The co-production approach also differs from conventional mechanisms to gain 
access to services in other ways. Under conventional conditions, works are carried 
out under “the public interest”, payment is compulsory and involvement requires 
legal ownership and use of the property as collateral for debt.8 The public sector in 
such circumstances will issue certificates of debt that may be charged, even against 
those who have not signed the agreement for the gas connection, since the 
involvement of 60 percent of potential beneficiaries allows a scheme to claim 
“public convenience and obligatory payment”. Furthermore, finance is granted to 
those who have proven income only (which means formal workers), and repayment 
usually starts early and often before service connection.    
In contrast, in the case of the CPSI, lack of collateral is substituted in two different 
ways, based on household and neighbours solidarity. This means that the access to 
the service does not require residents to hold a property title, but relies upon 
agreement among peers and the household or family. The members of the family 
are involved in the decision to enrol and every member of adult age signs an 
agreement under the law to become a co-guarantor.9 What is relevant to 
underscore is that the debt is owed by individuals and is not attached to real 
property. Furthermore, proof of income is obtained through labour references, 
which stresses the relevance of social networks in addition to their function as 
safety nets.   
Importantly, a financial trust, Fideicomiso Redes Solidarias (The Solidarity Network 
Trust, FRS), is set up as a collective guarantee for the payments. It is a contract 
which unites beneficiaries, administrators and creditors, and covers eventual 
breaches in resident repayment.10 The instrument makes possible the consolidation 
                                                             
8 Municipal Ordinance N 165, from Moreno Municipality. The same type of ordinance is enacted to 
finance infrastructure extensions by public contributions in most BAMA municipalities.   
9
 Eighteen years old or older, Law 26.579, under the Civil Code.  
10 It binds together the neighbours of Cuartel V, the FPVS, the National Fund of Social Capital 
(FONCAP) and the utility Gas Natural BAN S.A. According to the legal regulatory provisions 
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of the flow of public and private resources entering into the programme, together 
with the funds generated by the beneficiaries’ payments once they have been 
connected to the service and started to pay for their share in the total debt. In that 
way, the trustees share responsibility for the network extension total costs. In 
addition, every family that participates contributes to a guarantee fund , specially 
set to cover problems of default. In case the fund is not used, it will be made 
available for future neighbourhood projects (FPVS, 2006). 
From the perspective of the research design, it is important to note that the unit 
cost of connection is determined by the final number of programme participants. 
Moreover, since the debt is collateralised by family members and neighbours 
signing the trust agreement, there is some certainty about other people’s 
behaviours (and the consequences of those choices).  Importantly, in a context 
where long term financial commitments may have future consequences, such 
information is gathered at the first stage of programme implementation, by means 
of social interactions that contribute to share information among partners.   
In a conventional service distribution mechanism the interaction between the 
company, municipality and each user-client takes place individually. Under the co-
produced model, to assure the financial sustainability of the project, it is an 
essential requirement that at least 65 percent of ‘housing units’ in each block 
express their interest in receiving the service.11 When less than that proportion of 
housing units gives consent to participate, the whole block is denied access to the 
gas service. This requirement guarantees the necessary economies of scale that 
help the profitability of the scheme. Indeed, the sequential order in which blocks 
are connected to the network is conditional to the order in which agreement is 
reached among neighbours in each block, and blocks compete among themselves 
to reach the necessary percentage of residents (Forni and Coniglio, 2003).  
                                                                                                                                                                            
(ENARGAS, 2003) the company made its economic contribution – a bonus of 1,000 m3 of gas for each 
house on completion of the connection stage.  
11
 The housing unit, or dwelling in vernacular terms, is usually a single household resident in a single 
house, but may also include more than one household if these are resident in the same building. 
Households living in separate buildings on the same plot are counted as separate ‘housing units’.  
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To facilitate this task, the NGO (FPVS) has implemented an organisation model for 
the enrolment process. Neighbours have been grouped in areas that covered both 
blocks and neighbourhoods, as spaces of social interactions and decisions. Then, 
neighbours interact through the block unit and at the neighbourhood scale. 
Promotion activities take place with the coordination of the neighbourhood based 
organisation (NBO) and the NGO. The neighbourhood organisations contribute to 
“bonding” tasks among residents, since all the works that are carried out are based 
on the residents’ involvement within their blocks. Numerous meetings and 
voluntary activities are organised by residents, and also some pressure on 
neighbours - and within family members - might exist in order to define their 
enrolment and qualify for the connection.  
Interactions are also encouraged on a wider neighbourhood scale. The reason for 
that is that there are benefits for bringing more participants, since the average 
costs that each household may face should be contingent on the total number of 
blocks and housing units that may decide to enrol in the programme. As a 
consequence, residents are motivated to interact with residents from other blocks, 
rather than just with the ones in their blocks. The NGO “Technical Team” 
coordinates the enrolment process, organises the activities locally and supports the 
building of wider “linking” interactions with different actors outside the 
neighbourhoods. Neighbourhood organisations support such tasks. For example, 
the local CBO, the “Comunidad Organizada” (Organised Community, CO) helped 
manage the interactions with local and external actors during the co-production 
intervention; the members of this organisation represent residents in their 
interaction with the NGO that is in charge of the programme management (FPVS), 
and also with the municipal authorities and the service utility firms. 
Information is a key component of the scheme. In addition to regular meetings, 
several additional activities took place. First, a cadastral map was produced to 
monitor changing enrolment. The map was displayed in the neighbourhood’s shops 
to provide information related to the number of enrolments already attained by 
each block and those needed to obtain the gas connection. These data help to 
make clear to residents the likelihood of obtaining the connection.  Second, as part 
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of the dissemination strategy, and again to motivate residents to join, a monthly 
newspaper was published. Third, a community celebration was held once a certain 
percentage of enrolments had been reached, and to indicate other significant 
programme dates, such as the first connection.  
The study considers that people’s experiences of social interactions may play a 
central role for determining consolidation efforts. There are three stages that can 
be distinguished. The first is when information is shared and programme 
characteristics are made explicit. The second stage is defined by the attainment of 
the connection in the neighbourhood; the so-called point of “complete experience” 
when people’s participation has ‘paid off’. A third stage, designated explicitly for 
the research, is four years after the connection when the residual effect of 
programme implementation can be gauged. 
 
4. THE NATURAL EXPERIMENT   
In order for the research to contribute to empirical econometric studies, this study 
assesses the effects of a co-produced intervention for the provision of energy on 
house and neighbourhood consolidation. The study advances on the existing 
literature by considering whether the exogenous change in social space introduced 
by the co-produced intervention assists the physical and social dimensions of 
consolidation in these settlements.  
Ideally, one would like to design the evaluation of co-production intervention 
effects by using a randomised procedure, drawing from a sample of 
neighbourhoods which want to participate in the programme and then choosing at 
random a subgroup of participants –comprising the treatment group-, and the 
other set of non-participating neighbourhoods that constitute the control group.12 
Although it is not feasible to conduct a randomisation trial in that way, the 
                                                             
12 Such as the Moving To Opportunity programme, in which participants are randomly assigned to 
treatment and control groups. http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/programdescription/mto   
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allocation mechanism of the energy co-production model does allow the possibility 
of establishing a treatment and a control group that mimics a random assignment.    
In order to identify the causal impact produced by the service programme, the 
empirical strategy takes advantage of a geographical discontinuity in its allocation. 
For technical reasons, the initial network extension had to be implemented in a 
group of neighbourhoods that were closer to the existing main gas pipeline and 
leave other similar neighbourhoods to a second extension stage. The allocation 
mechanism can be considered exogenous with respect to the characteristics of the 
household receiving “treatment” (connection to the gas network). These facts 
contribute to frame a “natural experiment”. 13    
The exogeneity in the allocation of the service is related to strict technical reasons 
determined by the gas distribution company as to how the line gas should be 
extended. These technical considerations involve the distance of the 
neighbourhoods to be served by the low-pressure distribution mains of the gas 
energy grid. The temporary obstruction of the road network – notably Argentine 
National Route 24, President Hipólito Yrigoyen Avenue - caused by the construction 
works and the effects that this would have on circulation were carefully evaluated. 
It was decided to start with the first stage of the programme - the extension of the 
gas network - in an area that would not affect traffic flow and that would be closer 
to the trunk network.   
Consequently, the gas programme was made available to one group of 
neighbourhoods with a subsequent group offered the programme upon completion 
of the first phase. The treatment group is formed from those neighbourhoods 
where the programme is offered and the control group is made up from members 
of adjacent neighbourhoods where the extension is delayed for technical reasons.14 
 
                                                             
13
 Then, this feature allows an evaluation of its causal effect   to be made without any possible 
selection biases. 
14Residents located in those neighbourhoods have given consent to join the programme.  
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5. CHAPTER OUTLINE   
The thesis is organised in seven chapters. Chapter 2 outlines the different 
disciplinary contributions and theoretical approaches to informality in order to set 
out a frame for the empirical analysis. A discussion on urban policy institutional 
agendas in Latin America forces us to draw attention to the qualitative housing 
deficit (IDB, 2012) and deficient approaches to neighbourhood consolidation over 
time (Ward, 2012a; 2012b). In doing so, the theoretical “institutional” framework of 
the study underscores the significance of widening the “legal view” that is 
characteristic of most empirical econometric studies concerned with urban 
informality. I argue that the focus on institutions requires moving away from the 
economics argument centred on a formal institutions approach. It follows on from 
North (1990: 4) for whom the relevance assigned to both formal and informal 
institutions,15 and emphasises the controversies among disciplinary approaches to 
informality and institutions. Importantly, since urban and development studies, as 
well as economics research broadly overlap in their interest on informality, this 
study underscores three central controversies in the academic literature.  
First, the “legalising” and “upgrading” approaches, reflected in the prominence 
given to each in research and in policy circles. By reviewing the institutional political 
agendas addressing urban informality, I examine the existing controversy between 
the legal approach - supporting the allocation of property rights - and the tenure 
security view framed by a wider spectrum of conditions that include service 
provision. This discussion leads to the second controversy that is centred on the 
dominant role attributed to property rights and its effects, and which emphasise 
the low prominence attributed to infrastructure provision in empirical studies as 
well as in policy. My argument here is that the legal conceptualisation has occupied 
much more attention than the infrastructure or service dimension of informality, 
leaving it to the working of the market – or arbitrary public sector intervention- to 
address the conditions of informal urbanisation. Nevertheless, market 
                                                             
15 The systematic structure of rules, which shape the configuration of incentives - and des incentives 
- for human behaviours and exchanges, are framed by formal and informal institutions (North, 1990: 
3). 
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opportunities may be framed in such a way that can provide benefits despite legal 
tenure considerations (see Gilbert, 2007 for the Bogotá example). Services may 
induce another suitable development path as considered in the early studies 
conducted by Strassman (1984). 
The chapter concludes with the outline of the third academic controversy. It 
underlines that urban economics studies of homeownership in formal housing 
markets have contributed to widen theoretical and empirical scholarly debates on 
the internalisation of benefits. Homeownership has been central to scholarly 
debates on social capital, drawing on conceptualisations already well known in 
sociology (Portes, 1998) that extend to the internalisation of social behaviours. 
Importantly, this strand of the literature formulates the notion of a “better citizen” 
– itself an attribute of homeownership - through its greater investment in 
community-enhancing social capital (Di Pasquale and Glaeser, 1999; Hilber, 2010).16 
In contrast, empirical econometric informality studies have usually been biased 
towards formal institutions, such as property rights, and their physical investment 
effects. Interestingly, since a significant fraction of homeownership’s effects  on 
investment in formal housing markets are due to the length of community tenure, 
these studies can open up a dialogue with the critical literature focussing on 
security of tenure (through permanence) as a driver for internalisation from the 
physical and social dimension of investments. Therefore, I argue about the 
relevance of bridging bodies of research, widening the options associated with 
internalisation of benefits for individual investment by including formal and 
informal institutions in this type of analysis.  
Chapter 3 frames the theoretical structure of both social and physical investments 
that work to knit together the consolidation efforts in informal neighbourhoods. 
The main explanation considers that the internalisation of benefits obtained by the 
interactions may contribute to secure more and lasting effects on investments. It 
                                                             
16 What this literature indicates is that homeowner’s motivation for involvement in neighbourhood 
activities and community affairs presents two competing arguments based on internalisation of 
benefits. The first one, capitalisation effects are likely to encourage local public good provision (Di 
Pasquale and Glaeser, 1999; Hilber 2011; Hilber and Mayer, 2009). The second one is permanence 
due to higher transaction costs of moving that affects homeowners. 
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builds on theoretical development models, such as the asset creation within the 
sustainable livelihoods framework, that underscore  the significance of 
strengthening physical, social, financial and human capital (Moser, 1998). I 
introduce the association of the social and physical dimensions linked to the 
internalisation of savings through energy substitution as conceptual matters 
framing the potentiality of co-production as a promoter of individual and 
neighbourhood’s consolidation efforts.   
In this chapter I discuss two essential facts that determine physical and social 
investment. First, the internalisation of benefits requires extending the bundle of 
rights beyond a legal conceptualisaiton (see Feder and Feeny, 1991; De Soto, 2000).  
Security of tenure extends to service provision.17 Importantly, the public, civil 
society and private sector involvement in the co-produced programme legitimises 
the achievement of greater security through investments. Second, in line with 
homeownership studies in formal markets, the savings made through the provision 
of a piped gas supply become internalised. Savings arise from the substitution of 
cheaper fuel for more expensive forms of energy, the enhanced use value of 
networked over other forms of fuel, and indirectly through capitalisation of the 
improved value of the housing unit which arises from general neighbourhood 
improvements. The internalisation of benefits may constitute a strong motivation 
for social investment, possibly stronger than ownership of legal rights. The main 
contribution of my approach is reconceptualising the benefits of interventions, 
considering how several dimensions of trust may reinforce complementarities 
between the social and physical dimension of investments.  The chapter concludes 
by presenting the explanations that inform the empirical strategy of this research 
study, outlined by the natural experiment framed under the sequential 
implementation of the co-produced programme. It presents some avenues, to 
                                                             
17 From economics (Besley, 1995; Brasselle et al., 2002; Migot-Adholla et al. 1991; Place and Hazell, 
1993; Sjaastad and Bromley, 1997) and from urban studies critical constructive literature (De Souza, 
2001; Gilbert, 2002; Fernandes and Varley, 1998; Gilbert, 2002; Gilbert and Ward, 1985; Razzaz, 
1993; Payne, 2002a; Van Gelder, 2009; Varley, 1987, 1998) among others. Finally, Berry (1993) and 
Lanjouw and Levy (2002) provide evidence on the positive association between social networks or 
patronage, with security and investments.  
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extend previous knowledge on investments and considers the association between 
both physical and social dimensions.  
Chapter 4 outlines the methodology for the research.  The guiding idea of the 
evaluation consists in estimating a counter-factual scenario for assessing the causal 
effect of the energy programme. I describe the estimation method that focuses on 
the identification of programme impact on housing investments, participatory 
involvement, trust and collective capacity building. Importantly, since all the 
households in the treatment group were offered the programme, but not all 
accepted to enrol, in order to avoid a self-selection bias, all residents (those who 
were connected and those not), are incorporated in order to estimate what is called  
“the intention to treat effect”, i.e., a measure of the effect of being offered the 
programme. As an alternative, I estimate the effect on those who enrolled in the 
programme.18  
In chapters 5 and 6 the results for the co-production effects on the social and 
physical dimensions are discussed. Chapter 5 focuses on the social dimension of 
investments. It indicates that those incentives that encourage voluntary 
participation go well beyond the strict approach to legal rights capitalisation. The 
results support an internalisation effects explanation associated with permanence 
rather than legality of rights. This means that residents with titles, declared formal 
owners, and non-titled residents display an increase in involvement.  Neither 
occupation – with or without permission – nor rental status allows residents 
internalisation of benefits that would have offset participatory costs and efforts. 
The results reinforce the notion of residents’ participation “as a means” of 
achieving the provision of public services where effects are consistent with tenure 
security and service capitalisation. 
The individual determinants for effective enrolment complement this analysis. 
There, I discuss four significant findings. First, the distribution of adherent families 
is almost perfectly along quintiles of income. Second, the savings generated by 
                                                             
18 I explain the intuition behind both estimators, while leaving the econometric models as 
complementary information in Appendix 1. 
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energy substitution seems to be of paramount importance for driving resident 
enrolment and participatory involvement. Third, residents above a certain 
consumption threshold will be more likely to internalise the benefits from 
substitution through savings, regardless of current per capita income. Finally, I 
argue that the direction in the association between legality and services is inverted 
from normative approaches since in practice services operate as a means for 
cadastral registration, when the utility bill serves as confirmation of an address and 
is paid on a monthly basis.  
Importantly, after the implementation of the connection, all tenure groups display 
higher willingness to collaborate than their counterparts in the control group. 
Residents that enrolled and were connected to the service (treated) display the 
highest disposition to be actively involved. Yet, heterogeneity among the contextual 
environment of nearby residents is still a significant determinant framing the 
marginal benefits from individual efforts (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000; Baland and 
Platteau, 1997). The high level of willingness to collaborate reported several years 
later and for all groups (treatment and control) can be explained by the demand for 
attention to needs that are not covered by the local government.  
Trust in the utility firm is higher for residents located in the neighbourhoods where 
the connection was granted and higher still for those that were enrolled in the co-
produced intervention. Complementing the idea of “weak links”, it is expected that 
the level of trust in the municipal public sector should be positively associated to 
the co-production implementation. This seems to have been the case before the 
intervention started, indicating a possible expectation effect. After the intervention, 
the results suggest the opposite effect especially for residents that hold formal 
property rights. The results are indicative of a differentiated effect of resident 
relations with the municipality, indicating trust-building for those people holding 
informal rights to property. They benefited most from the scheme, since none of 
them would have received the service without the co-production framework. The 
study provides evidence that this upsurge in the level of trust in the public sector - 
during and after the connection stage- is positively associated with investments in 
housing by people holding informal rights.  
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The empirical evidence provides support for a localised process of building 
generalised trust.  Considerable time is required to support the building of 
generalised trust through increased familiarity and reciprocity (Bjornskov, 2006; 
Hilber, 2010). The positive effect on the level of generalised trust reported after the 
connection was granted provides suggestive evidence pointing to the relevance of 
“experience” developed through time. Qualitative insights from people’s 
perceptions of the programme contribute to substantiate the notion of a slow 
process of trust construction. Notably, four years after the service connection was 
granted, non-participants report higher incremental effects on their average level 
of generalised trust (and trust in neighbours, CBO and NGOs) compared with 
counterparts in the control group.    
Importantly, the evidence related to trust indicates that family decisions for 
involvement in long-term financial commitments – sharing responsibilities among 
family members and with neighbours – oblige families to face complex decisions 
that affect their level of trust among all members. The informal character of 
occupations and the instability of income may explain families’ fears of affordability 
risks that will lead to negotiations among members. Nevertheless, the chapter 
explores a second plausible explanation is related to the substitution effect 
between generalised trust and trust in the family. Previous evidence indicates that 
there is a causal association between the strength of family ties and the level of 
generalised trust (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011; Ermisch and Gambetta, 2010), which 
is associated to the degree of “outward exposure” (Ermisch and Gambetta, 2010). A 
broader contact and interaction with “others” decreases an individual’s reliance on 
the family. I explore how the rise in generalised trust during the initial intervention 
stages might be indicative of this type of substitution through the availability of the 
co-production scheme. 
Chapter 6 analyses the residents’ ability to invest in housing improvement.  The 
evidence provides strong support to the service co-production programme boosting 
housing transformations. The results support arguments in the literature, 
concerning infrastructure as an incentive for investment (Strassman, 1984) and 
adds empirical evidence that these effects are not constrained by the lack of legal 
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ownership rights. The chapter considers results that the programme does not affect 
title-holders’ incentives to invest alone, as one might argue from a strict property 
rights perspective. Instead, the programme induces a positive incremental effect on 
house changes that involves people holding diverse tenure and ownership rights. In 
addition, the chapter looks at two other side effects. First, the evidence shows that 
the co-produced intervention is associated with a higher probability of informal 
(tenure status) residents undertaking housing reforms when compared with reports 
by residents in a control group (for whom service connection was not made 
available). This effect is greater for residents with the individual service connection. 
The situation for tenants is discussed to consider whether tenant savings through 
energy substitution complement landlord capitalisation incentives. Second, the 
presence of non-participant neighbours making more changes to their houses than 
members of the control group suggests the presence of neighbourhood effects. 
Both sets of findings indicate higher social returns than is usually measured from 
interventions in informal neighbourhoods.  
The last section on this chapter is intended to shed light on the effect of trust on 
housing transformation. Trust in this context is considered an asset that provides 
utility to residents through the reduction of transaction costs (Durston, 2003). 
Increasing the level of generalised trust may affect economic performance, when 
the reduction of transaction costs increases the rate of investment. The results 
indicate how investments and trust work together when residents lack legal rights 
but are not positively associated for legal owners. Nevertheless, it is important to 
note that one of the main assumptions drawn from the social capital literature 
when I started the research, that generalised trust was related with economic 
development, seems not to hold. The results support arguments associating 
particularised dimensions of trust to physical investments.  
Chapter 7 presents the main research conclusions. First, the thesis indicates that 
the programme induced savings -from energy substitution- positively frame the 
internalisation of benefits that affects the incentives to invest in physical and social 
change. The indirect path to capitalisation transcends legality constraints, and 
contests the legality-illegality distinctions made by much of the literature. Rather, 
37 
 
effects are determined by permanence considerations. Second, the co-production 
programme provided a boost to housing changes in low-income neighbourhoods of 
BAMA. The natural experiment contributes to demonstrate that the co-production 
for service provision had a higher social return than would have been estimated by 
considering physical investment benefits for legal beneficiary households only. 
Furthermore, it introduces the presence of “neighbourhood effects”, a missing 
topic in the literature. The study, therefore, challenges the rigidity of disciplinary 
conceptualisations of tenure, the dimensions of investment and its effects.  
The third finding concerns the incipient path of institutional change. The research 
indicates that it is determined by the macro institutional considerations guiding 
service provision and, as such, it shapes the configuration of individual incentives 
that favoured neighbourhood consolidation. Through encouraging participatory 
involvement in implementation and finance, self-help ideals are combined to 
market mechanisms for service provision. Relations of reciprocity are transformed 
in different directions, strengthening trust in local organisations, and selectively 
reinforcing the confidence in the local government, only for those that benefit from 
the internalisation of their efforts. The new interactions among parts are 
internalised by non-legal owners, to contribute to secure more lasting effects on 
investments. Housing transformations are speeded through the changes in trust in 
the family and the municipality. However, these policies should not contribute to 
promoting more confidence in the public sector, particularly among those residents 
that hold formal rights to their properties. 
And fourth, the evidence contributes to making clear that the emphasis on 
collaborative schemes and self-help in policy may help in the basic task of providing 
services. Collective capacity is forged as a way to revert the inefficiencies of local 
government when the internalisation of benefits may offset the costs of such 
efforts, even though the balanced complementarity in the roles between the State, 
residents and organisations may become blurred, if residents are willing to jointly 
undertake duties that should be under the orbit of the local government.  
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CHAPTER 2: INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS AND THE INSTITUTIONS 
DEBATE  
1. INTRODUCTION   
The recognition that informal neighbourhoods constitute a significant proportion of 
urban economies in Latin America has alerted researchers and policymakers about 
the need to take new directions in urban policy (Rodgers et al., 2012: 264).19 One of 
the ways in which research might contribute to framing new policy directions is by 
improving the understanding of the developmental process of informal 
neighbourhoods over time (Ward et al., 2011b). Some scholars have recently also 
highlighted the added value generated by other disciplinary perspectives for the 
development of an in-depth analysis of the urban condition, particularly the 
academic approach to informality (Rodgers et al., 2012). According to Rodgers et al. 
(2011), informality is a complex issue; understanding it requires sharing knowledge 
and the strengths of each discipline. They underscore the value of bringing together 
a diversity of knowledge related to homeownership and informal urbanisation using 
a wider interdisciplinary perspective. Then, econometric research may be enriched 
by insights from other social sciences (Rodgers et al., 2012), especially the narrative 
critical constructive urban studies approach.  
This chapter complements the literature on informality and settlements by 
underscoring three existing controversies. First, the legalising and upgrading 
approaches to consolidation efforts; second, the un-serviced dimension of 
informality, which is also linked to finance and investments; and finally, the role 
that the internalisation of benefits has on both physical and social capital 
investment efforts associated with tenure and legal status considerations. In 
general terms, the chapter argues that the social and physical dimensions of 
investment in co-production and services are underexplored. I also propose that 
the empirical econometric literature on housing informality has been more 
attentive to emphasising formal institutions, discussing property rights as incentives 
                                                             
19 Informal housing is today “part and parcel of Latin American modernity”, and most current urban 
programmes are described as “sporadic”, “piecemeal” and “disconnected” (Rodgers et al., 2012:17). 
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to invest for example, and thus adopts a narrow concept of institutions. This 
chapter presents institutional insights from across strands of the academic 
literature. 
The outline of the chapter is as follows. Section 2 underscores the relevance of 
addressing the consolidation of informal commercial settlements as a specific 
objective of research and policy. The discussion of institutional agendas in urban 
policy is proceded by stressing, in Section 3, how little recent attention has been 
paid to the quality of housing and neighbourhood deficiencies in Latin America 
(IDB, 2012). This review is important to the focus of the thesis on neighbourhood 
consolidation which I seek to understand as generated by more than legal title or 
tenure security. Robust research is still needed to challenge several assumptions of 
the, now conventional, “legal” policies of development planning, and to introduce 
other dimensions of investment.  
Section 4 addresses the conceptual issues that inform the academic debate on 
urban informality that underlines the prominence of new institutional economics in 
social science research and policy. It emphasises that a rigid conceptualisation of 
institutions that has centred on the formal-legal and paid little attention to 
understanding the effects that informal institutions have on settlement 
consolidation. The section argues for the inclusion of a broader definition of 
institutions, to model the configuration of incentives (North, 1990: 4).  
Section 5 develops this idea from an outline of the main institutional approaches in 
public policy that underscore the importance given to property rights (North and 
Thomas, 1973; North, 1981). It contrasts this perspective with a wider view of 
informality through upgrading interventions and emphasises that the legal 
conceptualisation has displaced attention from the services dimension. This section, 
therefore, introduces the second controversy that underlines how the un-serviced 
dimension of informality is not well considered in some academic literatures, such 
as urban economics. I take a cue from writings on, for example, livelihood asset 
frameworks that stress more holistic views of poverty and policy. I also emphasise 
two additional factors – savings through substitution and increased security – which 
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constitute central elements for the internalisation of benefits that participatory 
efforts in services programmes may provide.20 
Reinforcing views on institutional agendas, the macro-economic context for service 
provision and the service reforms in Latin America are explained, and service co-
production is introduced.  I note how participatory approaches as a “gold standard” 
in development policy, that promotes residents’ participatory involvement in 
implementation and their contribution to finance, centred under efficiency 
objectives, acts to reconcile the utility company need to increase their commercial 
base with the unmet service demands of the populations living in informal 
settlements. Finally, this section introduces  a discussion of social capital which has 
run in parallel to the upsurge in interest on institutions in social sciences. The 
discussion provides a conceptual base for explaining economic development 
embedded in informal institutions, especially networks through membership of 
organisations and trust. I note the intersection of debates concerning  
“participatory urban governance” and civic engagement, “community participation” 
and co-production . 
Section 6 addresses the bias towards property rights effects on physical investment 
in empirical econometric studies. It picks up how studies have widened to include a 
social dimension of incentives attributed to homeownership. The Section 
introduces homeownership as an institution for the internalisation of benefits that 
are central to social capital empirical econometric studies. Importantly, this 
literature formulates the notion of a “better citizenry” attributable to 
homeownership, through its greater investment in community-enhancing social 
capital (Di Pasquale and Glaeser, 1999; Glaeser et al., 2001; Hilber, 2010). By 
including formal and informal institutions in analysis, I argue the relevance of 
bridging both bodies of empirical econometrics and narrative studies. In a little 
more detail, the final sub-sections outline how studies on informality and 
investment effects have mostly focused on legal approaches and rural contexts, and 
                                                             
20 Multilateral organisations focus on poverty reduction, emphasising access to secure land (UN-
Habitat, 2003), strengthening the rights to land (World Bank, 2003b), provision of adequate shelter 
(UNCHS, 1996), housing finance (World Bank, 2003b) and infrastructure services provision (GNESD, 
2008; OECD, 2006; UN-Habitat, 2003; UNDP, 2007; World Bank, 2004). 
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discusses conceptualisations of tenure security. Both constitute a central difference 
between empirical economics and narrative critical approaches.  
 
2. INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS   
A first approach to the analysis of informal settlements should start by defining 
their specific features. These are settlements that began to develop more than five 
decades ago in peri-urban areas and that constitute a particular sub-market of 
informal urbanisation (Ward, 1982; Abramo, 2003a, 2003b, 2012; Ward, 2012c). 
Very recently, the academic literature has encouraged the inclusion of the specific 
characteristics and demands of these long-standing neighbourhoods into research 
and policy (Jiménez and Cruz, 2011; Ward et al., 2011a, 2011b; Ward, 2012a, 
2012b). Due to a combination of residents’ self-build and progressive housing 
strategies, these settlements have developed into neighbourhoods that are now a 
prominent part of the conurbations in most Latin American metropolitan areas 
(Ward, 2001; Ward et al., 2011b; Ward, 2012a, 2012b). 
A consistent remark in the literature is that most low-income households can only 
have access to land through a varied set of informal practices (Gilbert, 2002, Marx, 
2009).   Informality, manifested as a segment of the land market, includes multiple 
arrangements and exchanges, and is defined by very different sub-markets with 
different physical and spatial characteristics, from informal commercial subdivisions 
to squatter settlements.21 This study is focused on informal commercial 
urbanisations. The legal/illegal dichotomy is particularly challenging when analysing 
the origin of these neighbourhoods, since they are not equivalent to squatting. The 
main difference is that residents have paid a developer for the plot of land rather 
than having invaded it; the land having been originally legally owned either by the 
developer or his client. It is the lack of compliance with one or several laws, 
subdivision standards and zoning, and servicing requirements, that reduces 
transaction costs for this type of market exchange. 
                                                             
21 The latter are often referred to as villa miseria, favela or barrio de ranchos. 
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While informal practice has been able to make land available and mostly affordable 
for the poor, it does not provide adequate public goods and services – such as 
paved streets, public lighting, waste collection and security. Nevertheless, many 
scholars have argued that it may be better to use terms such as “informality” or 
“irregularity” (Gilbert, 2002) rather than “illegality” because the basic norms that 
guide ownership are followed, and unlike in the case of land invasions some legal 
rights exist that provide a degree of security of tenure (Fernandes and Smolka, 
2004: 13; Durand Lasserve et al., 2009).  
Although city peripheries across Latin America have extended areas of these 
informally developed low-income neighbourhoods, urban policies have been biased 
against these settlements. Settlements originated by invasions and centrally 
located on public land have been regularised more easily and have even obtained 
more resources than settlements as the urban peripheries where residents have 
been exposed to the rigours of living on un-serviced plots (Ward, 2012c).22 In 
Buenos Aires specifically, these neighbourhoods were built progressively – through 
self-help – from the 1950s and 1960s onwards and have been outside the scope of 
public interventions since. Land titling and urbanisation programmes have 
consistently been more attentive to settlements located in central areas, despite 
the technical difficulties of dealing with highly irregular urban layouts and high 
population densities (Clichevsky, 2002; Goytia and Lanfranchi, 2009; World Bank, 
2007b). 
 
3. THE (UN-RESOLVED) HOUSING QUALITATIVE DEFICIT  
A long-time unresolved issue in Latin American low-income settlements concerns 
the rehabilitation of the existing housing stock. Despite titling programmes and the 
provision of infrastructure through urban upgrading programmes (sometimes 
together), studies demonstrate that the qualitative deficit remains a neglected 
issue in urban policy (IDB, 2012). In 2001, the lack of formal tenure affected 11 
                                                             
22 Informal urbanisation in Latin American countries ranges from 30 to 60 percent of the residential 
areas in the largest cities (UN-Habitat, 2006). 
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percent of households in Latin America and the Caribbean, while low quality 
construction materials affected 12 percent and a lack of infrastructure affected 
almost 21 percent of housing units (IDB, 2012). 
Beyond these indicators of a lack of policy attention, other studies point to housing 
as a critical component of household livelihood strategies (Rakodi, 1999; Moser, 
1998) and their main asset that can grant security to reverse vulnerability (Moser, 
1998). Secure housing provides implicit savings through avoiding the cost of 
occupying rented property (Gasparini and Sosa Escudero, 2004). And improved 
housing provides opportunities to generate income in the form of rents or space for 
small enterprises (Moser, 1998). The (self-help) progressive process of 
improvement draws can go some way to attend to household needs. But, the poor 
(starting) condition of the housing stock and problems of settlement layout, even 
after regularisation and the provision of services is a matter of concern (Ward et al., 
2011b). Self-help is limited in scope since major improvements – such as 
infrastructure – require coordination of effort.  
 
4. INSTITUTIONS AND THE INFORMALITY ACADEMIC DEBATE  
It is well accepted that “institutions matter” (Hall and Jones, 1999; North, 1990; 
Rodrik et al., 2004).23 Nevertheless, some institutions have been thought more 
appropriate than others to particular circumstances and, to adopt the conventional 
distinction, formal institutions have been given more attention as affecting human 
behaviour than informal (Aghion and Howitt, 2009; North, 1990). In abstract terms, 
however, the new institutional economics literature argues that institutions provide 
the incentives, or disincentives, to channel a diverse set of social and economic 
outcomes (North, 1990: 3). By setting “the rules of the game” institutions give a 
predictable structure to human interactions, which can constrain discretionary 
actions by providing a determined set of choices for individual behaviours (North, 
                                                             
23
 In this study, the term “formal” institutions is used to refer to “legal and normative” ones, while 
the term “informal” is used to refer to “socially embedded” ones. Organisations are the players 
defined by the rules (North, 1990). 
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1990: 11). In other words, institutions provide “the structure that guides everyday 
life” (North, 1990: 4). In particular, one main contribution from the field of 
institutional studies has been the understanding of the “nature of human 
coordination and cooperation” (Poteete and Ostrom, 2004: 212). This considers 
non-market mechanisms that may include the sharing of information and activity 
coordination, besides the role of markets and the State (Poteete and Ostrom, 
2004).  
Consequently, this study intends to move towards a more comprehensive 
understanding of the institutions that may be present in informal neighbourhoods, 
shaping housing transformations. The narrow conceptualisation of institutions 
(their formal dimensions) in the empirical econometrics literature in relation to 
housing informality, can be contrasted with other bodies of academic literature 
that have conducted research suggesting that socially embedded institutions – 
norms, trust and networks, have an influence on a wide range of economic, social 
and political outcomes (see, for example, Putnam, 1993, 1995; Coleman, 1988; 
Fukuyama, 1995). The relevance of including social “informal” institutions in the 
analysis is certainly emphasised in the development studies literature, which points 
to the fact that analysis is generally biased towards the structure of formal 
institutions that support behaviours rather than focused on informal ones (Brett, 
1996; Cleaver, 1999; Uphoff, 1992a, 1992b).  
 
5. INSTITUTIONAL AGENDAS ON URBAN POLICY  
This section discusses the institutional agendas in urban policy related to 
informality. Policy in different countries reflects the particularity of context but the 
broad frameworks are similar; from the structuralist paradigms of the 1970s and 
mid-1980s, neo-liberalism and globalisation (Ward, 2012a), and including 
decentralisation, institutional strengthening and good governance in the last 
decade (Campbell, 2003). With respect to informality the overall normative 
framework has been based on the same institutional pillars; strengthening property 
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rights and the consolidation of neighbourhoods through upgrading interventions. 
Sub-sections consider the merits and critiques of each before turning attention to 
institutional framework reform in Latin America, which sets the opportunity 
structure for new institutions such as co-production. The final sub-sections discuss 
how this opportunity for co-production fits in with debates on informal institutions 
and social capital, which in turn support participatory approaches.  
 
5.1. PROPERTY RIGHTS IN URBAN POLICY  
It is important to emphasise that both codifying and enforcing property rights are 
currently accepted as absolutely necessary to support economic development 
(Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Johnson et al., 2002; North and Thomas, 1973; 
North, 1981). Based on this notion, property rights have been regarded as a 
powerful instrumental institution to alleviate poverty (World Bank, 2000, 2003). 
The claim is supported by three bodies of academic literature that have been 
developed over the last 40 years: the tenure security approach, the property rights 
school and institutional economics. 
The first element of the argument for property rights as a response to informality 
has origins in the tenure security approach. The observation of influential early 
researchers was that either legal or de facto security of tenure was of critical 
importance for the progressive development of houses in informal settlements. 
Turner advocated the provision of a secure tenure as a key policy instrument to 
resolve the housing difficulties of the urban poor (Turner, 1976). The rationale 
behind the conceptualisation of consolidation through self-help has been that 
residents will be encouraged to invest their savings and labour in housing 
improvements only if they do not fear a future eviction. Housing consolidation 
efforts will therefore achieve what neither public housing programmes nor the 
formal private sector has been able to do for lower-income groups (Angel, 1983).  
The “self-help ideal” is broadly accepted as a significant change in the 
“conventional wisdom” on urban informality (Doebele, 1987) and determined a 
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shift away from evictions or demolitions of informal settlements. Turner (1976) and 
Mangin (1967) considered those settlements a solution to difficult social problems, 
“supporting a process of social reconstruction through popular initiative” (Mangin, 
1967: 67). The adoption of these ideas in public policy was backed by the belief that 
both the resources and the technical capacities of governments can be directed to 
complement the strengths of the poor, supporting their rationality and capacities in 
construction (Mangin, 1967; Turner, 1976; Turner and Fichter, 1972). Self-
construction and the progressive development of the housing units became two 
essential characteristics in the housing process for low-income households.  
The second argument comes from the “property rights school”. It supports the 
allocation of property rights, emphasising the likelihood of underinvestment when 
the result produced by individual investments may be grabbed by others (Demsetz, 
1967; Alchian and Demsetz, 1973). Therefore, any kind of uncertainty in tenure 
rights should reduce the scope of an individual’s investment.24 
The third argument follows on from the second. The institutional economic 
literature emphasises the role that institutions play in development (Acemoglu and 
Johnson, 2005; De Long and Shleifer, 1993; McMillan and Woodruff, 2002; North 
and Thomas, 1973; North, 1981) and has become influential in urban policy (Jones, 
2003). Poverty is seen as determined by political or economic institutions that 
discourage productive activities (North, 1990). The concept is well established in 
the economic literature that provides theoretical arguments focused on markets 
and transaction costs: so that for example negotiating, monitoring and enforcing 
exchange contracts is dependent on the institutional framework (Coase, 1960; 
North, 1990). The implication is to promote “the efficiency of markets” through 
property rights that permit the enforcement of exchange and lower transaction 
costs.  
                                                             
24 Nevertheless, the absence of rights to property may reflect a lack of demand rather than a 
constraint in supply (Buckley and Kalarickal, 2004: 236) because, as Demsetz (1967) argues, property 
rights should develop only when the benefits provided by the internalisation of externalities 
outweighs the costs of not doing so. 
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Based on theoretical support from new institutional economics that suggests 
property rights can make markets work better, urban policy has been attracted to 
find ways to allocate rights to property (Baharoglu, 2002; Binswanger et al., 1995). 
Taking a rather unacknowledged cue from institutional economics, De Soto was 
able to rephrase Turner´s ideas about security of tenure to suggest that supporting 
property rights produces a “consolidated market-based economy” that will 
explicitly favour the poorest (De Soto, 2000: 223). In the De Soto version, 
formalisation of assets and their integration into land registers can provide 
incentives to invest through tenure security and constitute an essential market-
supporting institution (Durand Lasserve and Royston, 2002; Fernandes, 2006).25 In 
De Soto’s conceptualisation, the answer to informality is focused on substantial 
changes in law and regulation to support the development of markets (Gilbert, 
2002: 2), through legal instruments that “allow the poor to prosper in a capitalist 
society”, providing them with the necessary confidence to save, invest and produce 
(De Soto, 1989: 167-168 and 257). Likewise, the legal property system provides 
more than just elementary security through ownership (De Soto, 2000: 235); it 
offers the possibility to allow the expansion of markets, through the release of the 
underutilised (dead) capital that lies in the assets of the poor. Under this view, 
rights affect the development of secondary markets, “particularly credit markets, 
where assets are pledged against default” (Besley and Ghatak, 2009).26  
Despite the promotion of property rights, and more especially registration and 
titles, there has been no consensus that this approach delivers the expected 
benefits (Buckley and Kalarickal, 2004: 26; Fernandes, 2006, 2009). More precisely, 
the significant benefits predicted by De Soto are not confirmed by researchers who 
have attempted to analyse the effects of legal approaches (Arnott, 2008; Buckley 
                                                             
25 De Soto’s arguments have gone through two stages. In his first book, The Other Path (1989), he 
says that basic institutions must be created in order to achieve efficiency and social peace; in 
addition noting that the barriers that constrain access to formal activity should be eliminated, 
reducing the costs of legality and increasing access to capital markets (De Soto, 1989: 259). In The 
Mystery of Capital (2000), the argument is centred on the importance of property rights -and the 
legal system, and on the actions that states should take (Woodruff, 2001). 
26 Therefore, the formalisation of rights is praised for its ability to reverse the limited scope of 
transactions – in closed circles of relationships – that are characteristic of informal exchanges when 
constrained by transaction costs (and asymmetric information).  
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and Kalarickal, 2006; Durand Lasserve and Selod, 2009; Field and Torero, 2003; 
Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2010; Payne et al, 2009). First, studies present evidence 
to reject the view that property rights serve as a shortcut to economic development 
(Carter and Olinto, 2003; Field and Torero, 2003; Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2008; 
Schargrodsky, 2009), mainly because its benefits, coming from a single, central 
mechanism within a poverty reduction strategy aimed at reversing informality, are 
severely questioned (Ahiakbar, 2008; Buckley and Kalarickal, 2004, 2006; Calderon, 
2007; Durand Lasserve and Selod, 2009; Fernandes, 2006, 2009; Gilbert, 2002; 
Marx, 2009; Mitchell, 2004; Payne et al., 2009; Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2010; 
Royston, 2006; Woodruff, 2001).  
Second, critics draw attention to the analytical oversimplification of the rights 
approach, with an emphasis on a single determinant for economic growth and 
poverty reduction (Sjaastad and Cousins, 2008). In fact, obtaining full legal title 
provides little difference in households’ propensity to use their homes as collateral; 
an argument made from research in Texas (Ward et al., 2004) and Bogotá (Gilbert, 
2002). Legal rights seem to make no difference to people’s engagement with formal 
finance. In fact they eschew formal credit mechanisms due to the lack of elasticity 
on payment conditions and requirements (Varley, 2002). 
The basic message from the critical literature is that “no mysterious, 
straightforward capitalist panacea can address all of the shelter problems faced by 
low-income families in developing countries” (Buckley and Kalarickal, 2004: 26). The 
caution in terms of ‘shelter problems’ can be extended to titling programmes as the 
sole solution to address urban poverty (Marx, 2009). Overall, even promoters of a 
legal approach to informality request a more cautious approach to titles as a 
mechanism within policy (Durand Lasserve and Selod, 2009; World Bank, 2007: 12, 
2009). 
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5.2. THE UN-SERVICED DIMENSION OF INFORMALITY  
In practice, the lack of titles has been used as a screening scheme to regulate the 
flow and number of beneficiaries of infrastructure despite, quite often, the length 
of time an informal settlement has been in existence (see Henderson and Feler, 
2010). Yet, in much of the academic literature and in urban policy, property rights 
approaches and upgrading strategies have tended to be regarded as competing 
positions or at least unconnected (Ward, 2003; Fernandes and Smolka, 2004). From 
the De Soto perspective, for example, property rights enforcement is linked with a 
“law and order” duty of the state, while services should be provided by the market 
(De Soto, 2000). Hence, intervention is very often limited to the granting or 
registration of deeds, dissociated from service access (Fernandes and Smolka, 2004: 
13). The main rationale is that land information – through the registration of 
property – should grant the opportunity for the market to provide low-income 
households with infrastructure services (Deininger and Feder, 2008). It is perhaps 
unsurprising therefore that evidence on regularisation interventions suggests that 
granting title to property alone has not enabled improvements in public (and 
private) service provision to settlements. Based on research in Brazil, Smolka and 
Biderman (2009) reveal that changes in tenure rights have had no effect on access 
to sewer systems; only five percent of municipalities show a high level of progress 
at providing sewerage systems and tenure rights, while the municipalities 
experiencing a large reduction in untitled households had the worst access to sewer 
services. In Lima, less than 50 percent of titled owners in regularised settlements 
have been supplied with water and sanitation services (MVCyS Peru, 2011).  
The point is that the relation between legal formalisation programmes and 
provision of services has not been considered strongly enough in the institutional 
framework for urban policy. In other words, the provision of services in conditions 
of urban informality has been given too little consideration by the attention 
afforded to property rights despite the role of both rights and infrastructure in 
poverty reduction (World Bank, 1993, 2003, 2009; UN-Habitat, 2003, 2006; UNDP, 
2007). Although a case has been made that services can have an impact on poverty 
reduction and economic growth (Estache, 2008; Raj, 1993; Willoughby, 2004), it 
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needs to be strengthened with conceptual thinking and empirical research.  
Moreover, rather than being assessed in isolation from property rights change, as 
either titling or gaining security of tenure more generally, the case for services 
needs to be developed in relation to and combination with changes to rights. 
 
5.3. SERVICE INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS IN LATIN AMERICA  
The widespread institutional reforms of infrastructure provision carried out during 
the 1990s in Latin America did not take poverty, or poverty alleviation, as a 
significant issue (OECD, 2008: 26, Batley, 2006). Most reforms were committed to 
safeguarding investment rather than the social impacts that might be obtained had 
the poorest been provided with greater service access (Haselip, 2004). As stated by 
Ward (2012c: 568), during this last decade of fiscal sustainability and increased 
citizenship responsibilities, urban programmes for the installation of services were 
mainly based on the expectation that consumers could (or soon would) afford the 
service charges, leading to self-sustainability of provision. Yet, several basic 
determinants constrain the access of residents living in informal neighbourhoods to 
infrastructure, under regulation reform conditions or otherwise. These involve 
financial matters, the restricted view that requires mandatory legality, the 
characteristics of the low-income market, and the constraints of the regulatory 
framework and logistic capacities. 
First, one of the main arguments for exclusion is that poor neighbourhoods are 
considered less secure for the new, privatised or concession operators. The 
financial capacity of residents is limited and not everybody is thought capable of 
covering the full costs for improved services (Carrera et al., 2004). Consequently, 
when tariffs are established to fit within socially acceptable limits, the financial 
returns may be too low for investors in relation to the high risk they have to assume 
(Banerjee and Somanathan, 2005). But, if tariffs are not kept low then affordability 
is severely impacted and households may default. Lower or subsidised tariff rates 
have been implemented in some countries (such as Chile), while in others (such as 
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Argentina) special conditions have only been applied for the most basic service such 
as electricity. This means that the institutional framework is extremely relevant in 
relation to the needs of the poor, to compensate for the economic interests of the 
private sector (Nickson and Franceys, 2003; UNDP, 2006), which remain dominant 
in the utilities market.  
Second, infrastructure provision has been inhibited by legality requirements. 
Residents in many informal neighbourhoods do not have the mandatory legal rights 
to property. Even when utility firms have been contractually enforced into a 
progressive extension of coverage, informally urbanised areas have not been 
targeted for provision. And third, serving lower-income neighbourhoods might be 
constrained by limits on large-scale forecasting, institutional and technical efforts, 
which lag behind capacity in relation to engineering and grid capabilities (Estache et 
al., 2001; Iwanami and Nickson, 2008; Prud’homme, 2005).  
These shortcomings have empowered advocates of alternative measures for service 
provision. As discussed below, these promote institutional innovation to relax legal 
constraints, means to involve residents to contribute finance to service network 
extension, and mobilisation of social organisations to support coordination to solve 
logistic constraints.  
 
5.4. SERVICE CO-PRODUCTION 
The argument is often made that shifts in contextual politics have the power to 
modify the opportunities for action (Newman et al., 2004; in Taylor, 2007). The 
privatisation of public utilities during the 1990s, combined with decentralisation, 
created the conditions for an institutional change to affect the process through 
which public goods and services are produced and distributed (Ostrom, 1972, 1995, 
1996; Parks et al., 1981; Whitaker, 1980). This new mechanism is the co-production 
for service provision interventions (CSPI).  
Based on concepts originally developed in the late 1970s, co-production promotes a 
decentralised approach where beneficiaries become actively involved in the 
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production, design and implementation of their own services (Ostrom, 1996). In the 
academic literature, scholars as diverse as Tendler (1995), Ostrom (1996) and Mitlin 
(2008) contribute to challenging the idea that there should be a strong dividing line 
between the public and the private realms – the state/market dichotomy – or 
between government and civil society, rather than a “blurred” line (Tendler, 1995). 
Most importantly, in this new political context, awareness is raised about the way 
in which strong limits derived from rigid disciplinary visions about institutions 
hinders the potential for synergetic outcomes involving public, private and civil 
society organisations (Ostrom, 1996). Co-production focuses on the potential 
complementarities between the “regular” producer of services and those seeking to 
benefit from them. Three particular dimensions can be identified. 
First, co-production subverts the mainstream approach that is organised around a 
single producer and many consumers (Ostrom, 1996). The institutional innovation is 
related “to the inputs used to provide a good or service”, which are now supplied 
by “individuals who are not from the same organisation” (Ostrom, 1996: 1073). 
Second, co-production emphasises complementarities as the essence of synergistic 
production (Ostrom, 1996: 1079) that changes the scope of the efforts made by 
actors from the public and the private sector, but especially those of residents and 
local CBOs, when their involvement is included in the organisation of demand, 
project design, financing and maintenance of the service. Co-production is broadly 
justified by analysing whether the production of a service would be best if jointly 
produced by the public and the private domains – rather than entirely produced by 
either the public or private spheres. The answer is contingent upon the inputs that 
each provides production process (Parks et al., 1981; Ostrom, 1996). 
Finally, co-production takes advantage of new urban governance structures, 
notably the greater role of municipal governments via decentralisation efforts that 
have shifted responsibilities for resource collection and expenditures (UN-Habitat, 
2006). The joint production of public services might also involve NGOs that have 
assumed a central role between the State, individuals, and other associations 
(Mitlin, 2004; Taylor, 2010), and the participatory involvement of citizens (Ostrom, 
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1996). Thus, both a new form of governance and new logistics for service provision 
are enabled (Joshi and Moore, 2004: 41). 
Low-income residents in informal settlements in Buenos Aires, who seek access to 
services, are involved in this institutional framework, and this makes their access to 
pipelined services possible. Development scholars point to the fact that by initiating 
CPSI, the State accepts the need for micro-level collaboration to address resource 
or financial constraints, but also considers this collaboration with the State as 
desirable.  
 
5.5. INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL CAPITAL 
In parallel with the institutional approach, the concept of social capital has been a 
central issue of research across the social sciences since the 1990s. It provides 
economics and political science studies with the conceptual bases embedded in 
socioeconomic behaviours, already known in sociology and transposed into these 
other disciplines (Portes, 1998). It has also been widely spread in development 
practitioner circles as a required component to achieve a great variety of 
socioeconomic and developmental outcomes, either as a property of individuals 
and families or aggregated as a feature of communities, cities, and countries 
(Grootaert 1998; Portes, 1998; Putnam et al., 1993). Importantly, it gained 
attention in the form of community participation in development interventions, as 
part of urban governance notions of the 1990s (Campbell, 2003) and within 
institutional frameworks that sought efficiency and sustainability through social 
capital building and empowerment. 27 
The social capital concept has drawn attention because of seminal works developed 
by Putnam (1993, 1995), connected to the mechanisms of civil society (Putnam, 
2000; ., 1993). It refers to “features of social organisation such as networks, norms, 
                                                             
27 The discussion on whether social capital’s attractiveness is due to its intrinsic value as a 
complement to markets and the state (Bowles and Gintis, 2002) or because it works as a powerful 
low-cost strategy that is able to  address a variety of social and development aims (Portes, 1998).  
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and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” 
(Putnam 1995: 67; also Coleman 1990; Portes, 1998; Schuller et al., 2000).28 
Putnam’s evidence supports the notion that community interactions through 
organised activities or clubs foster the formation of social capital.29 In this view, 
participation is at the heart of civic life (Schuller et al., 2000). Other researchers, 
such as Coleman (1988) have provided evidence on the functional role of social 
capital on human capital accumulation, associated with lower school dropout rates, 
made feasible by family and neighbourhood relations. Nevertheless, other studies 
have been more ambiguous at identifying assets constituted by social relationships, 
either noting access to benefits or the reproduction of inequalities (Beall, 2001; 
Moser, 1998; Portes, 1998).  
Researchers have raised concerns about the conceptualisation and measurement of 
social capital, and the potential pitfalls of conceptual overstretch, becoming a kind 
of “one size fits all” concept that embraces a variety of issues, from local problems 
to wider development issues (Durlauf, 2002; Portes and Landolt, 2000). Some key 
conceptual problems underscore the way in which different objects like beliefs, 
behavioural norms and interpersonal links (networks) are gathered together 
without a clear philosophical or practical reason to include them in a single 
definition (Dasgupta, 2000: 327). In order to help eliminate conceptual vagueness, 
this study unbundles social capital to two of its main components: membership of 
organisations and participatory involvement and trust. Trust and participation are 
considered productive assets in different strands of the development economics 
(Besley et al., 1993; Ostrom, 1996) and urban livelihoods literatures (Moser, 1998).  
Networks generated by social interactions and participatory involvement through 
membership in organisations can help improve income and access to assets (Di 
Gregorio et al., 2008; Moser, 1998). Networks can also help build reciprocity among 
different members and may act as a channel through which some benefits can be 
                                                             
28 There are other definitions of social capital, such as “the ability of actors to secure benefits by 
virtue of membership in social networks or other social structures” (Portes, 1998: 6). 
29
 The choice of indicators to measure social capital is a matter of debate (Fukuyama, 2002: 12). For 
example, Poteete and Ostrom (2004) discuss whether should be measured at an individual or 
community level.  
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internalised, for example if members become a source of loans (Lourenço-Lindell, 
2002; Moser, 1998) or collective savings (Beall, 2001), both of which can help the 
improvement of housing (D’Cruz and Satterthwaite, 2005). Social networks enable 
access to information, for example, about employment opportunities or resources 
and services provided by the State (Beall, 2001).  
Trust has been associated with economic outcomes in the academic literature. 
Arrow (1972) argues that trust constitutes a necessary input in all economic 
exchanges and acts to reduce transactions costs (Arrow, 1969, 1972), thus 
facilitating transactions that encourage economic development (Arrow, 1972; 
Dasgupta, 2009b). In low-trust environments the rate of investment is significantly 
reduced (Zak and Knack, 2001). The channels for trust enhancement may include 
sharing information, but also improved coordination and group formation (Durlauf 
and Fafchamps, 2005).  
Research has adopted three conceptualisations of trust. In Fukuyama’s view (1995) 
trust constitutes a relevant “social virtue” – equated to social capital – that helps 
improve the economic performance of any community, from the family to the 
nation. This conceptualisation of trust is associated with shared moral norms which 
are derived from culture, institutions and religious heritage. Trust, in this form, 
constrains opportunistic behaviours and enhances the capacities for the 
development of more complex relations, transactions, and governance processes 
among different actors and organisations. In societies where generalised trust is 
low, any trust behaviour is limited to close groups, such as the family or immigrant 
communities, and there is a strong hierarchical and centralised organisation of 
society and less participatory involvement in horizontal links and “club-like” 
organisations. Therefore, low growth performance characterises countries where 
the average level of trust is low (Fukuyama, 1995).  
The second view, associated with political scientists such as Uslaner (2002, 2008a; 
Uslaner and Brown, 2005) goes even further towards the conceptualisation of 
generalised trust as a moral dimension, which assesses “unconditional” values 
(“altruistic trust” in Mansbridge, 1999: 290). Rather than a rational attitude, in this 
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conceptualisation trust reflects the moral standards of society. Scholars that 
support the conceptualisation of generalised trust in its moral dimension, highlight 
the sense trust conveys of “optimism and control” (Erikson, 1968; Uslaner, 2008a: 
291). It is interesting to see that in this approach, trust is referred to as “a sense of 
individual well-being and supportive community” (Uslaner, 2002: 34). Of relevance 
is the idea that meaningful life experiences should determine an individuals’ level of 
generalised trust, including negative events such as “a lifetime of disappointments 
and broken promises [that] leads to distrust of others” (Uslaner, 2002: 35). The 
main difference between the moral value conceptualisation and a rational view of 
trust is that, as a value, trust is considered stable over time and depends neither on 
reciprocity nor on personal interactions. People do not expect it to vary due to 
circumstances over time; a condition which applies only to particularised 
dimensions of trust (Uslaner, 2002; Uslaner and Brown, 2005)  
The third conceptualisation of trust, and the one adopted in my research, involves a 
rational risk calculation. Trust is understood as a "rational" response to the 
perceived trustworthiness of others’ behaviours. It can be based on familiarity 
(Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002) and experience (Hardin, 2006) and it is the one that is 
most commonly used in economics (Dasgupta, 2009a). According to this view, social 
interactions and interpersonal networks that elicit reciprocity may have an effect 
on economic outcomes when members develop and maintain trust. Nevertheless, 
despite experimental games (see Berg et al., 1995; Glaeser et al., 2000), the 
underlying process in which trust is built (and dissipated) is empirically under-
examined (Dasgupta, 2009a).  
My research focused on the local level aspects involved in the forging of trust as a 
result of the implementation of a co-production intervention and, second, the 
association of trust and housing investment. Building a purposeful oriented 
network through the process of acquiring services in informal settlements could 
become an “experience”. So, trust in this case can be an “active matter” through 
reciprocity links in different social instances (and distances) presented in the 
“invited spaces” of co-production. It is argued that social interactions and face-to-
face contact help in the generation of trust and reciprocity, a factor that 
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contributes to the reduction of transaction costs (Collier, 1998). It constitutes a key 
element for cooperation because promises are kept by “mutual enforcement” 
mechanisms for agreements (Dasgupta, 2009a). Furthermore, it enables the 
existence of transactions that involve a synchronicity between the purchase and 
the delivery of the goods. This is the case of credit schemes or the beginning of 
partnerships.30 Based on these concepts the following sections present the 
institutional agenda based on participation and outline the association between the 
internalisation of social behaviours and homeownership.  
 
5.6. PARTICIPATORY APPROACHES IN DEVELOPMENT AND URBAN 
PROGRAMMES 
The theoretical conceptualisation of participatory approaches responds to different 
ideological views, often dichotomised into participation as an end in itself, 
supporting efficiency and effectiveness, or as a means of advocating views of 
empowerment and a more equitable sharing of power, particularly as regards the 
inclusion of the most poor or socially/politically excluded (Hickey and Mohan, 2007; 
Mohan, 2007). The latter also supports a higher level of political awareness for 
disadvantaged groups leading to social transformation.31 Indeed, some view 
participation as a means to support “participatory citizenship” (Hickey and Mohan, 
2007), people’s potential to be “active subjects” (Taylor, 2007) and to shape the 
government (Morison, 2000: 119). 
Although gaining a growing profile in development studies, the concept of 
participation is well known in urban policy. It was popularised in response to 
shortcomings of top-down development efforts. In the 1960s and 1970s, 
“community participation” ideas emerged. In the words of UN-Habitat, 
participation represents “the voluntary and democratic involvement of people in 
                                                             
30 It is important to note that the use to which the networks are put will determine the quality of 
their expected effects, since other types of effects, such as exploitative or hierarchical ones (i.e. 
patronage, street gangs or clientelism, in Dasgupta, 2000; Gambetta, 1993) are also possible.  
31 In contrast, participatory schemes in the UK such as the ‘Big Society’ have been about civil society 
replacing the state but with no pretence to social transformation or mobility for specific groups 
(Ishkanian and Szreter, 2012).  
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the decision-making, execution and maintenance of projects which directly affect 
their lives” (UN Habitat, 1984: 10; also Narayan, 1995; Chambers, 1997). People 
were now to assume responsibility for the improvement in their living conditions, 
through sharing decisions and even power and finance (UNRISD, 1979). The 
concept and practice of participation constituted the “good practice approach” 
across a range of development interventions (Bamberger, 1991; Mansuri and Rao, 
2004; Paul, 1987). Multilateral financed projects promoted the expansion and 
institutionalisation of participation into the development agenda (Paul, 1987). This 
mainstream approach combined several objectives: building beneficiary capacity 
and the sharing of costs through input of work or money; participation to better 
design; aid post project maintenance through users taking ‘responsibility’; and raise 
implementation efficiency by ‘crowding in’ groups that might oppose programmes 
(see Gilbert and Ward, 1984a; Mansuri and Rao, 2004).32 
Critiques often pointed to the tokenist “rubber stamping” or functionalist motives 
for participation in both development and urban contexts (Cooke and Kothari, 
2001; Rahnema, 2010).33 Participation tended to be controlled by the State or 
others, and rarely involved self-initiated mobilisation that disputed wealth and 
power distribution (Rudqvist and Woodford-Berger, 1996 in Cornwall, 2008). In 
such spaces, the residents’ participation is support for the achievement of project 
objectives such as reducing costs. Even so, some observers argued that 
participation in itself could be empowering, regardless of the actual activity 
undertaken, because individuals’ contributions (i.e., of labour) facilitate developing 
ownership and responsibility (Cleaver, 1999).  
By the 1990s and through 2000s, the support for participation extended beyond 
projects and communities to broader “participatory development” and notions of 
“participatory urban governance” (Mitlin, 2004). At the same time, an agenda for 
social capital and poverty reduction, especially in Latin America, was framed 
(Fukuyama, 2002). Under the increased roles for markets within neo-liberal 
                                                             
32 Titling programmes, which had not involved participatory efforts, later adopted guidelines to 
improve implementation and sustainability (World Bank, 2006a). 
33 Adapted from Arnstein’s ladder of participation (1969), which includes non-participation, 
tokenism and power control; then refined by Pretty (1995) using a typology of participatory spaces. 
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economics, the State adopted the role of “enabler” rather than “provider”. NGOs, 
CBOs or GROs took greater responsibility for welfare and service delivery, and all 
three were understood, theoretically at least, to promote democratised and 
accountable practices (Chant and McIlwaine, 2009; Lewis and Kanji, 2009). Public 
policies have increasingly included many more and different organisations, drawing 
upon interaction and bonds established by residents in informal settlements and 
their organisations (Mitlin, 2008; Satterthwaite, 2008), as well as more formal 
partnerships, and with the poor as either “client’s” or “citizens” (World Bank, 2000). 
Concerns have been raised about whether participatory approaches merit the 
support it has acquired in some development circles.  Cornwall (2008), for example, 
notes that setting out participatory spaces may be welcome but it may not be 
enough as to use of them people will have to overcome a numerous constraints. 
Age or gender – including expectation on women to uphold productive and 
reproductive roles - may frame individual ability to participate (Cleaver, 1999). The 
poorest may lack the time or resources for effective participation, even in those 
programmes that concern meeting basic needs (Cleaver, 1999; but see Avritzer, 
2006; Osmani, 2008 for cases of better resource allocation reaching the most 
disadvantaged and residents from informal settlements.  
Others have raised caution about the way that some forms of participation 
emphasise an idealised concept of “community” that appears to possess a bundle 
of desirable values, forms of organisational structure and social, economic, cultural 
and political homogeneity (Cleaver, 1999). Consensus building and solidarity may 
therefore seem natural ingredients of everyday social frameworks (Taylor, 2010). 
Such a view refuses to acknowledge the heterogeneity and asymmetries that 
prevail among actors (e.g., gender or ethnic relations, tenure status, income 
inequalities, education etc.) and how these distinctions may influence willingness to 
participate and decision-making (Cleaver, 1999; Mansuri and Rao, 2004). Low levels 
of participation are reported in settings characterised by ethnic or racial 
heterogeneity, income inequality and high mobility (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; 
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Glaeser et al., 2000, 2002).34 Existing patterns of exclusion will affect participation 
processes and outcomes, and participation itself may produce or reproduce further 
exclusion of the most vulnerable (Cleaver, 2001).  
Based on theoretical and empirical concerns, the promotion of participation as a 
necessary but often rather vague and occasionally rather “modest” initiatives 
within development has provoked some observers to liken it to a “tyranny” or a 
rhetoric that should be abandoned (Craig and Mayo, 1995; Cooke and Kothari, 
2001). My research does not set out to go support or dismiss participatory 
approaches per se. Rather, it takes the concrete example of participation – the co-
production of services – and in the light of the above critiques considers its effects 
on low-income households’ investment decisions and confidence in their 
neighbours and others across different tenure and housing conditions. 
 
6. HOMEOWNERSHIP AND THE INTERNALISATION OF 
BENEFITS  
Econometric studies on housing informality have been focused on the effects of 
formal/legal institutions on physical capital investment incentives. In contrast, the 
homeownership literature in urban economics explains incentives to invest as 
associated with the internalisation of benefits. The main arguments that explain the 
association between the role of homeownership and the participation in 
community-enhancing social capital and local goods provision are benefit 
internalisation through capitalisation effects and the transaction costs from moving 
which tend to encourage permanent residence in the property. This literature 
presents theoretical and empirical evidence of incentives given to owner-occupiers, 
rather than renters, to maintain their properties (Hilber, 2003, 2010; Rohe and 
Stewart, 1996). As the house is the most substantial item of wealth for a typical 
                                                             
34 The economic literature shows theoretically and empirically that imbalances associated with the 
costs and benefits to which different groups are exposed, and the kind of internalisation of benefits, 
including issues of elite capture (Hildyard et al., 2001; Platteau, 2004), that income inequality can 
sometimes prompt greater incentives to participate (Bardhan, 2007).  
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household and most people’s portfolios lack diversity they have a greater incentives 
to at least maintain property values and protect wealth from risks (Dietz and 
Haurin, 2003). Residents are motivated to be "home voters"; they vote in 
accordance with their concerns about house values (Fischel, 2005), and community 
enhancing investments (Di Pasquale and Glaeser, 1999; Hilber, 2010; Hilber and 
Mayer, 2009). They are also likely to support actions that are intended to provide 
either individual or neighbourhood benefits (Rohe and Stewart, 1996), prevent free 
riding (Di Pasquale and Glaeser, 1999; Hilber, 2010; Hilber and Mayer, 2009) and 
encourage reciprocal cooperation and trust that reinforce social capital build-up (Di 
Pasquale and Glaeser, 1999; Hilber, 2010).  
To some extent, homeowners are described as “better citizens”, when compared 
with renters, because of homeownership’s potential to elicit greater community-
enhancing social capital investment incentives (Di Pasquale and Glaeser, 1999). The 
empirical evidence shows that in the USA, homeowners are more likely than 
renters to engage in local activities and participate in voluntary organisations. Di 
Pasquale and Glaeser (1999) found a positive correlation between homeownership 
and votes in local elections, involvement in the solution of local problems or being 
acquainted with the head of the school board, all of which is recognised as 
community-social capital enhancement.35 In contrast, renters do not have such 
incentives since they are not able to reap the benefits from increased house values 
because they may be forced to pay higher rents. 
Permanence is often raised in the economic literature as an argument for 
homeownership investment incentives. Homeowners differ from renters because 
of their greater permanence, which is prompted in part by greater transaction costs 
they must face for purchasing elsewhere and vacating the house (Haurin et al., 
1996; Rohe and Stewart, 1996). This stability argument, explained in Dietz and 
Haurin (2003), sees transaction costs as the major barriers for mobility that 
homeownership rights create (Di Pasquale and Glaeser, 1999; Dietz and Haurin, 
                                                             
35 Evidence indicates that homeowners are more likely to be involved in local political activities 
(Rossi and Weber, 1996) and more committed to their neighbourhood (Austin and Baba, 1990). In 
addition, the high level of social capital of homeowners helps them raise their children better 
(Coleman, 1988, 1990).  
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2003). Such enhanced permanence in the neighbourhood, elicits a greater 
willingness to invest in building relationships, and increases their involvement in 
the activities of the neighbourhood.  
This means that “permanence in the neighbourhood” is a highly significant fact to 
explain homeowner’s involvement in community efforts. Therefore, the direct 
effects of a greater involvement in social and political affairs attributed 
indiscriminately to homeownership requires nuance. A great part of the positive 
influence of homeownership in the formation of community-enhancing social 
capital occurs because, in such markets, homeownership increases permanence 
(tenure). Both Di Pasquale and Glaeser (1999) and Aaronson (2000) isolate the 
stability effect of homeownership affecting households’ behaviour. Di Pasquale and 
Glaeser provide causal empirical evidence, stating that “a significant fraction of the 
effect of homeownership occurs because homeownership is associated with longer 
community tenure” (1999: 383). Importantly, the authors have argued that any 
limits to a resident’s mobility may cause similar effects to those of homeownership: 
increasing the level of investment in community-enhancing social capital and the 
voluntary participation in the provision of local amenities. This factor can be 
associated with the low residential (social) mobility that is specific to residents in 
informal neighbourhoods.  
Empirically, there are still some concerns related to the robustness of econometric 
methodological approaches and whether these results can be generalised to 
different housing markets. First, establishing causality through longitudinal data, 
including before and after observations, has led to doubts over some of the 
findings. For example, longitudinal data has indicated that homeowners are more 
likely to participate in neighbourhood and block associations, but not in other types 
of community organisations (Rohe and Stegman, 1994), and an experimental, 
empirical identification strategy found no impact of homeownership on social 
capital or on local amenities (Englehart et al., 2009).  
Second, this strand of the urban economics still has to address the differences in 
housing markets, which would provide meaningful differentials to the 
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homeownership analysis. One of the few findings about the distributional effects 
concerning different income groups in formal markets provides evidence of a minor 
impact of homeownership on the social capital investment made by residents who 
are at the bottom end of the income distribution. Therefore, for low-income 
people, when compared with those on high-incomes, homeownership has no 
influence on organisational membership (Di Pasquale and Glaeser, 1999). 
Speculatively, therefore, we might propose that low-income residents who ‘own’ 
informally might participate as much as better-off homeowners in formal.  
The homeownership issue also involves two contextual features that need to be 
considered in relation to individual, social and physical investment. First, is the 
presence of “neighbourhood effects” affecting individual investment decisions, an 
argument discussed and reviewed by Dietz (2002) and Haurin et al. (2002). There is 
evidence of local homeownership rates affecting individual investment in the 
provision of amenities (i.e., such as gardening). Peer pressure and neighbour-to-
neighbour monitoring explain the greater individual provision of local amenities 
when homeownership rates are high (Hilber, 2003). As with other studies of social 
capital investment, socio-demographic heterogeneity can support or constrain 
individual incentives to participate or to invest in community efforts, unless the 
benefits of such efforts offset their costs (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000, 2002).  
Second, housing transformations may be influenced by neighbourhood effects. 
Ioannides and Zabel (2008) found that housing improvements can be partly down 
to individuals following the behaviour of their neighbours. This neighbourhood 
effect has also been acknowledged by Park (2008) in his study of the determinants 
of housing valuation, where he argues that the decision to make improvements is 
influenced by the attitude of neighbours, imposing both costs and benefits in terms 
of real appreciation of properties. The trends and attitudes of neighbours can 
influence the way people make decisions about their own houses. In this case, the 
resident’s decision to invest in his/her house may be affected by improvements in 
the neighbourhood, which provide an indirect measure of trustworthiness in the 
neighbourhood development.  
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What can we take away from these studies that might be relevant to a study of 
investment in Buenos Aires under conditions of informality, service deprivation, 
and social and economic exclusion? Broadly, the benefits attributed to 
homeownership, materialised in greater investments in community-enhancing 
social capital, are not considered in empirical studies of informality. Indeed, the 
permanence in a place over time, a characteristic situation of most informal, 
commercial settlements, may, without the need of holding any legal title, cause 
effects on the type of incentives for investing in community-enhancing social 
capital. These effects may be similar to those attributed to having low residential 
mobility due to high transaction costs in formal housing markets. As a consequence, 
residents’ involvement in participatory efforts might not be correlated to the 
presence of formal titles. Rather, it is possible that support for neighbourhood 
enhancement is associated with the internalisation of benefits that residents might 
obtain from their involvement. The “property rights effect” is extended to include 
the social dimension whereby tenure conditions associated with informal 
ownership motivates housing improvement.  
Nevertheless, conditions “on the ground” are more complicated with informal 
settlements covering a range of different occupancy arrangements – from full rights 
ownership, rental to rooming – and property holding that ranges across legal to 
‘illegal’ occupancy. The following section outlines the range of empirical studies on 
the relation between property holding and physical investment under broadly 
‘informal’ conditions. I raise conceptual and methodological issues.  
6.1. TENURE SECURITY IN EMPIRICAL STUDIES  
Academic debate about the legalisation of land tenure initially focused on rural 
land, and mostly centred on agrarian institutions in developing countries. Most of 
these studies are based on the legal aspects of institutions and none of them 
considers infrastructure and property rights together (Deininger and Feder, 2008; 
Durand Lasserve, 2009). The literature in economics has examined collective action 
and cooperative efforts in rural communities, based on the management of 
common-pool resources and the provision of public goods (Baland and Platteau, 
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1996; Bardhan, 2000; Ostrom, 1990). Theoretical and empirical studies have 
additionally provided evidence on institutions or “rules of the game” to encourage 
cooperative actions. Among them, well-defined rules specify the costs and the 
benefits, and there is a well-balanced match between the share of the 
costs/expenses and the share those beneficiaries undertake individually (Baland 
and Platteau, 1996; Ostrom, 1990). Socio-demographic characteristics determine 
the incentives and constraints to cooperate; richer agents tend to play a leading 
role in collective action (i.e., taking the initiative in the mobilisation of labour to 
manage common lands and in undertaking of measures of conservation), since their 
internalisation of benefits will be greatest (Baland and Platteau, 1997: 452). 
The conceptualisation and measurement of tenure security and insecurity in 
empirical studies forwards two considerations. First, there is a focus on the number 
of rights that are held or, second, on the presence or absence of key land rights, 
such as the right to alienate. For example, the conceptualisation of security in the 
economics scholarship on informality has been constantly related with the 
possession of registered title deeds (Feder et al., 1986), or to the legal evidence of 
rights (Deininger and Feder, 2008); security is therefore generally seen as only 
involving legal rights. On many occasions, the lack of a legal title is matched to 
tenure insecurity, not considering other informal sources of rights that may provide 
tenure security (but see Migot-Adholla et al., 1991 for a more flexible definition of 
security).  
Importantly, transferability may be valuable to increase the ability to transact and 
to obtain some benefits, and this attribute of legal titles is not substituted by other 
specifications of the bundle of rights. Yet, several empirical studies on rural 
property have found that even limitations in transfer rights do not affect 
investment decisions and productivity (Place and Hazell, 1993). Even where rights 
are in dispute, physical investment in the house may also be a driver to achieve 
greater security (Sjaastad and Bromley, 1997; Brasselle et al., 2002). This means 
that households may increase the security of their bundle of rights through their 
investment. Furthermore, social networks and patronage are linked to the rights 
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held over land and resources. Thus, security will be contingent on the residents’ 
participation in the relevant networks (Berry, 1993).  
In contrast, the literature in urban studies presents a different approach to tenure 
security. Many scholars are inclined to define irregular-informal tenure as a 
continuum involving different rights (Razzaz, 1993; Payne, 1997, 2000, 2001; 
Fernandes and Varley, 1998; Varley, 2002; Durand Lasserve and Selod, 2009). This 
vision is based on the anthropological literature from Peattie and Aldrete-Hass 
(1981). Rather than a discrete choice, the notion of rights is based on a spectrum of 
choices that depend on idiosyncratic circumstances. The continuum ranges from 
the most informal, such as rights of possession, to full ownership when land has 
been registered and is protected by a legal title. Other tenure categories are more 
limited in the bundle of rights enjoyed in relation to the use and transaction of the 
land and the house. According to this view, a proxy for security is described as a 
group of several elements that contemplate the duration and assurance of rights 
(Place et al., 1994), such as freedom from external interference, use value, and the 
aptitude to internalise the benefits of labour and capital investment that is done.  
The ideal experimental setting allows for a comparison of residents enjoying equal 
security in their rights. In my research the neighbourhoods considered only differ in 
the provision of services through the exogenous allocation of the co-production 
intervention, while residents enjoy a sense of security provided by the original 
ownership of the land. In most cases, residents have rights over what is built on the 
plot. Furthermore, informal developers have often been paid for the plot, in an 
informal commercial subdivision. As a result, residents consider themselves owners 
because they have certainly assumed the monetary cost of such a transaction.  
 
7. CONCLUSION 
This Chapter has outlined four issues that are central to this thesis. At the start, it 
underlined the informal neighbourhoods’ consolidation challenge and elaborates 
points that contribute to frame the scope of my research. One is the qualitative 
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housing deficit and the way in which institutional approaches to urban policy 
consistently failed to include housing improvements. It also underscores informal 
neighbourhood consolidation as a specific issue that deserves particular attention, 
despite the legalisation of rights and the upgrading of urban layout. The second 
issue is the un-serviced dimension of informality. Services are essential for house 
and neighbourhood consolidation. The relevance of this point is obscured by the 
strength given to the legal view of informality in literature. Hence, services are 
presented in this thesis as a missing topic in informality studies, which are more 
typically centred on formal legal institutions effects on physical investments. The 
thesis gives new strength to services key role to support house and settlement 
consolidation efforts, includes them paralleling the legality and tenure security 
determinants for investments, and provides some clues that will allow for an 
assessment of the effects on informal neighbourhoods.  
The third issue underlined in this chapter is the institutional changes in urban public 
policy that generate opportunities for the rise of new mixed market/social 
institutions, such as services co-produced interventions. Importantly, this means 
that service provision subverts mainstream legal views of informality in public 
policy, when services are only provided to formal (legally) urbanised areas. The new 
institutional approach to co-production brings together privatised utilities 
requirement for extending commercial opportunities to new markets and the –
unattended and long-standing – service demand in informal urban settlements that 
municipal government cannot afford alone. Importantly, it collects the impetus of 
participatory approaches in development policy, to reformulate the mainstream 
view for service provision through residents’ contribution to finance and 
implementation.  
Finally, the chapter outlines some theoretical arguments that extend the formal 
institutions approach to residents’ investments, calling for widening the 
conceptualisation of institutions that frame resident’s incentives in two ways. First, 
it provides conceptual arguments to extend the internalisation of benefits from the 
legal strict considerations to capitalisation, emphasising the relevance for formal 
and informal institutions and the broader internalisation of benefits from 
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investments.  This discussion bridges research in urban economics and 
development studies. It outlines some conceptual matters from “homeownership” 
in urban economics that stresses the importance of internalisation of benefits as 
drivers for social capital and physical investments. In this way it underlines the 
association between the social and physical dimensions of investment. Importantly, 
it challenges the definition of informality made in legal and property rights 
frameworks that conceptualise the household’s internalisation of benefits 
motivation for physical and social investment, at the time when services are co-
produced in informal settlements.   
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CHAPTER 3: THE PHYSICAL AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF 
HOUSING INVESTMENT  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 2 outlined the gaps and controversies in the knowledge base related to 
urban informality. Whereas that chapter focussed on shortfalls of existing evidence, 
this chapter considers ways to construct robust research on investment in informal 
settlements. It considers the physical and social dimensions of investment, and sets 
out to frame the association between them. The argument is built around three key 
points. 
First, the essential determinants of physical and social investment based on the 
residents’ internalisation of benefits require extending the bundle of rights from a 
strict legal consideration. Security may be one driver for investment but services 
also contribute. Second, the provision of services introduces the internalisation of 
savings obtained from the substitution of lower quality and highly expensive 
alternative energy sources, increasing the use value for those that obtain the 
connection to the grid. Moreover, both those connected to services and non-
participants will benefit through capitalisation from neighbourhood transformation. 
Third, the low mobility characteristic of residents located in informal 
neighbourhoods may constitute a strong motivation for social investment that is 
equivalent to ownership, following the theoretical conceptualisation framed by the 
homeownership urban economics literature.  
In order to identify the social and physical dimensions of household investment, 
and the potential of co-production, the chapter addresses three groups of effects: i) 
participation and effective enrolment, ii) trust and collective capacity and iii) 
housing transformation and its association with services and trust.  
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2. FRAMING THE INVESTMENT INCENTIVES  
The emphasis given to legal formalisation or upgrading approaches suggests that 
policymakers and academics do not have a single policy vision. From one viewpoint, 
conventional institutional wisdom grounds the causal association between legal 
title and security as encouraging housing transformation (Galiani and Schargrodsky, 
2010; Jiménez, 1984; Malpezzi and Mayo, 1987). From the other, the strength of 
property rights as a requirement for investment is challenged. Development studies 
emphasise that tenure security is at least equally relevant in driving 
transformations (Doebele, 1987; Razzaz, 1992). Instead, security of tenure may be a 
precondition for investment but does not have to be interpreted as legal title 
(Payne, 2000: 6). The provision of infrastructure may boost housing transformation 
and progressive upgrading (Hirschman, 1984) as well as improve people’s quality of 
life (Amis, 2001). Strassman found evidence that the earlier infrastructure is 
acquired, the more likely other improvements will follow immediately (1984: 744). 
But, it is not well identified whether tenure or legality of rights affect physical 
investments when a service connection is offered.  
As outlined in the previous chapter, co-production of services is considered in the 
literature to be more than an instrumental framework. Rather, it allows for the 
provision of services by underlining the requirement for resident and local 
organisation participation to facilitate programme implementation (Mitlin, 2008). 
Therefore, besides the efficiency in service provision, it affects the social 
organisation of the urban poor (Almansi et al., 2010; Hardoy et al., 2005; Mitlin, 
2008; Satterthwaite, 2008). It is argued that learning to work with other 
organisations within the neighbourhood strengthens civic engagement, where 
organisations channel citizen needs, even functioning as political actors (Moore, 
2003 in Mitlin, 2008). As a result, the participation of residents and their 
organisations under efficiency objectives goes beyond the enhancement of civil 
society skills for “collective practice” (Abers, 1998; Mitlin, 2008).  
Little is known, however, about the incentives faced by actors to become involved 
with co-production in conditions of informality. Importantly, we do not know 
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whether incentives to invest in community-enhancing social capital differ in cases 
where residents hold different tenure status. This study underlines the savings from 
substitution effects as a driver for enrolment in a co-production programme. The 
suggestion from my research is that (exogenous) change in social distance 
introduced by CPSI may further reciprocity, which facilitates trust-building in two 
different spaces and levels of interaction. First, interactions with neighbours, local 
associations, and within the family, where obligations turn from personal and moral 
to economic, where there is a strict (tacit) obligation to repay (Sahlins, 1974). 
Second, exchanges in wider social spaces, with unknown others, such as the 
municipal public sector or the utility firm, where links and exchanges among those 
involved contribute to the construction of new knowledge across institutional 
boundaries (Mitlin, 2008).  
 
3. PHYSICAL INVESTMENT AND THE SERVICES EFFECT: 
BETWEEN LEGALITY AND SECURITY  
A key concern is whether “legality” is important to the determination of resident’s 
behaviour towards investment. On the one hand, some approaches reduce the 
notion of settlement consolidation to a legal dimension based on the promotion of 
property rights. This approach is characterised by a strong conceptual boundary 
between what is legal and illegal. Transformation of a settlement will be most 
effective when illegal tenure status is changed to legal (Azuela and Duhau, 1998; 
Jones and Ward, 1994; Varley, 1985, 1987, 2002). This view also assumes that a 
“virtuous” status of citizenship will arise from the allocation of full legal rights. But, 
on the other hand, scholars have questioned whether a formal, legal title is 
necessary, citing evidence that residents improve their homes even without legal 
ownership (De Souza, 2001; Gilbert, 2002; Gilbert and Ward, 1985; Payne, 1989; 
Razzaz, 1993; Varley, 1987). That is particularly true when “informal sources of 
rights” confer many of the same advantages as formal rights (Lanjouw and Levy, 
2002:986). The issue of documents such as certificates of use or receipts of 
purchase for example can give a sense of security (Payne, 2001: 421). The mode of 
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land access and the length of occupancy may also generate a sense of security, 
even in circumstances where time does not bring formal rights (Durand-Lasserve 
and Selod, 2009; De Souza, 2001; Friedman et al., 1988: 196; Payne, 1989: 44; Van 
Gelder, 2009). Government actions, such as the provision of services, can reinforce 
the notion of security (Arnott, 2008). Investment, therefore, depends less on exact 
legal status and more on settlement characteristics and contextual factors (Gilbert, 
2002; Payne, 2002; Van Gelder, 2009).  
Taking these proxies for security in to the study neighbourhoods, data from the 
fieldwork show 77 percent of residents declared ownership of the house and plot, 
two percent defined themselves as renters, 19 percent as informal ‘owners’ 
(including owners of the house only and occupants with permission of owners), and 
four percent described their status as squatters (occupants without permission). A 
self-declared ownership status does not indicate the legal condition of the house. 
Only 34 percent of the residents that declare homeownership have a title deed as 
proof, while 40 percent possess a conveyance document36 or a receipt, and six 
percent of houses have been granted legal titles through a regularisation 
programme. Many residents hold conveyance documents, receipts, or other 
undefined claims to rights that may have originated from informal transfers. 
Exceptional cases are related to the undivided domain of rural plots never 
registered as formal subdivisions, which include two percent of the houses. Only 
vacated plots or those shown as abandoned are occupied by squatters, who 
certainly enjoy less secure rights. Finally, 17 percent of the housing units do not 
have any document as a proof of their tenure status.37  
 
3.1. PERMANENCE OF RESIDENCE 
Informal settlements in BAMA are characterised by relatively low rates of mobility. 
Based on 2006 residence survey data, the population of the study settlements is 
shown to be stable: the mean value for length of permanent residence is 18 years. 
                                                             
36 Preliminary purchase agreement of their housing unit, not legally registered. 
37 All data refer to 2006. 
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More than one-half of respondents (53 percent) had been living in the 
neighbourhoods for more than 15 years and 24 percent arrived more than 30 years 
ago. Fifteen percent were newcomers who arrived in the last five years, adding to 
the reproduction of informal patterns of tenure as these transactions usually took 
place outside formal rules (Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2012). In terms of the housing 
age, most were built over 15 years ago (64 percent), 28 percent were built between 
six and 15 years ago and eight percent were built within the last five years. 
The low mobility (high permanence) of the households is determined by the 
improper operation of the market segment, which means low elasticity of housing 
supply, high transaction costs when somebody does need to move. The experiences 
from elsewhere in Latin America underscore that even when residents hold legal 
rights to property; the likelihood of leaving the neighbourhood remains relatively 
low. Over time residents consolidate their own homes, adding rooms or new units, 
which may be used for housing grown-up children staying with their families, or 
tenants (Ward et al., 2011b). In Latin America, and in Argentina also, 
homeownership provides security for old age (particularly in countries with weak 
pension systems); a hedge against unemployment, sickness, and other risks of the 
low-income environment; and the most important financial legacy from one 
generation to the next (World Bank, 2007). Later, a household will aim to pass the 
house, in whole or parts, to the next generation (Ward et al., 2011b). If 
consolidation has been successful then residential mobility may be affected by the 
high relative values (prices) compared with real incomes of potential buyers, 
making a property difficult to sell (Ward, 2012b).38 A house, therefore, might 
represent a household’s most important asset but it is often an asset that is hard to 
capitalise.39  
                                                             
38 The level of turnover in informal settlements in the cities of Colombia and Mexico was assessed by 
a longitudinal study comparing data from the 1970s, collected as part of a previous study (Gilbert 
and Ward, 1985) and 2007. The data showed that over 80 percent of the original families still live in 
the same plot as when they arrived (Ward, 2012b). 
39
 In many Latin American cities, the first generation of irregular settlers has succeeded in forging 
valuable assets through subsequent undertakings that extended over one generation of the 
residents’ life (Ward et al., 2011b). 
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Among the housing characteristics of the neighbourhoods studied, there are 1.25 
housing units per plot, and one plot can hold up to six housing units. Plots, 
therefore, had been subdivided and multiple family members shared the same plot. 
There are 4.6 family members per housing unit, the average number of rooms is 
two (a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 8) and 29 percent can be classified as 
overcrowded if compared with Unsatisfied Basic Needs (UBN) indicators. 
Nevertheless, housing quality is good - using the definition for housing type from 
the census (INDEC, 1984) - 87 percent of housing units are ‘satisfactory’, five 
percent are precarious (ranchos) and eight percent are shacks (casillas).40  
 
3.2. FINANCE AND ADJUSTED BEHAVIOUR 
Progressive housing faces many financial constraints (Datta and Jones, 1999). 
Studies emphasise the efforts that are required for securing the plot and then 
construct a house when mechanisms for credit are limited and probably non-
existent (Datta and Jones, 2000). The upfront costs that may be charged with the 
potential introduction of services, therefore, can distort investment behaviour. As 
discussed in the urban economics literature household behaviour may be ‘adjusted’ 
to the predicted impact of a planned investment (Haurin et al., 1996; Dietz and 
Haurin, 2003). For example, prospective homeownership distorts saving rates 
and/or consumption of other goods (Engelhardt, 1996), and it may increase labour 
supply (and amount of hours worked) and increase female labour supply, before or 
during the year of purchase (Haurin et al., 1996; Dietz and Haurin, 2003; Higuchi, 
1980). Therefore, it seems reasonable to expect that a decision to invest in the 
provision of public goods – in settlements that lack services at their foundation - 
may have an effect on other household decisions, especially on housing 
expenditures. Programmes which require a financial contribution may motivate an 
‘adjustment’ in behaviours. Such adjustments may distort the cycle of housing 
transformations and lower participation in activities at the time such interventions 
are promoted.  
                                                             
40 Based on own data (2006).  
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The judgement on investment behaviour, however, is more subtle than the above 
discussion at first pretends. Studies have documented that the poorest families 
living in neighbourhoods lacking basic infrastructure services must assign a 
significant proportion of their income to the acquisition of substitute goods 
(Estache et al., 2001). Consider the example of a prospective installation of a gas 
network to settlements in BAMA. Many households faced relatively high prices for 
bottled gas despite a programme called garrafa social (‘social’ gas, or bottled gas) 
which sets a special lower price for gas consumption; it is still more expensive and 
delivery is uncertain. Costs mean households can afford to eat only one hot meal a 
day, with all the consequent impacts that this can have on nutrition and health. 
Hence, the idea of the co-production programme was to induce households to 
finance their connection to the gas network with savings generated from the 
substitution of bottled gas consumption with the new lower-cost network gas. The 
programme established that once housing units were connected to the new 
service, they should pay a monthly amount similar to the previous energy bills so 
that funds in excess of costs would finance the capital expenditures of the network 
expansion.41  
The savings are significant. A first insight indicates that for families connected to 
piped gas through the programme, the cost represents an average monthly 
reduction of 35 percent in gas expenses, only from substitution of the bottled gas 
used for cooking, without including other uses such as heating and hot water. For 
families connected to piped gas, the cost of this service represented 1.9 percent of 
total household income, whereas for families that were not part of the programme, 
the cost of bottled gas represented 5.2 percent of total monthly household income. 
Not only is the replacement of the bottled gas with the new energy source paid for 
with the savings generated by the substitution, but future savings derived from the 
substitution may provide possibilities to internalise savings as home investments. 
The research considers to what extent residents benefit from savings provided by 
connecting to natural pipelined gas, regardless of tenure.  
                                                             
41 These resources were deposited in a dedicated fiduciary fund which was administrated by a board 
on which neighbourhoods, the FPVS and the gas company had representatives.  
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4. THE SOCIAL DIMENSION AND HOUSEHOLD INVESTMENT  
The point of departure for this section is the proposition that we do not have a 
theory to explain the social dimensions of household investments in informal 
settlements. As noted in Chapter 2, research suggests that homeowners are more 
involved than non-homeowners in neighbourhood activities and community affairs. 
And as discussed above, capitalisation effects may encourage public goods 
provision, at the same time that residential permanence, due to higher transaction 
costs of moving, explains the internalisation of benefits from investment. The 
section explores the incentives that determine people’s intervention in 
participatory and trust-building efforts. 
4.1. PARTICIPATORY INVOLVEMENT IN INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS  
The Latin American literature outlines a long but uneven history of participatory 
efforts in informal settlements. Studies referring to the 1960s described widespread 
collective and individual efforts to improve quality of life (Portes and Walton, 1976; 
Goldrich et al., 1970 in Gilbert and Ward, 1984b). Later studies, however, showed 
lower levels of participation than expected (less than two-fifths of the residents 
were actively involved) (Gilbert and Ward, 1984b.  Nevertheless, it is possible to 
discern how the internalisation of potential benefits supports residents’ 
involvement in participatory efforts.  
First, there is a marginal calculus of success that drives efforts. This calculation will 
be affected by the perceived role of the State in the provision of services. There 
was no need for mobilisation to put pressure on the authorities in Bogotá or 
Santiago de Chile, for example, where the public sector has a history of support for 
service provision regardless of tenure conditions.42 Residents are also much less 
likely to contribute to finance services when the public sector should be responsible 
                                                             
42 Nevertheless, water, electricity and sanitation were not provided in Bogotá’s settlements unless 
residents paid over 30 percent of the cost to the respective delivery agency (Gilbert and Ward, 
1984b). 
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for their provision (Gilbert and Ward, 1984b). Hence, the nature of the State will 
affect residents’ predisposition to either assist the State through contributing to 
finance co-produced services or to substitute for the State by their own means.  
Second, people’s individual considerations, such as tenure status, may affect 
participation (Gilbert and Ward, 1984a, 1984b), although the studies only 
discriminate between owners’ and renters’ preferences. As will be explained later, 
the level of inequality or heterogeneity within a settlement (i.e., in terms of income 
or nationality) affects the individual cost of cooperation, making reaching 
agreements less predictable. Third, the provision of services is a determinant for 
resident participation. Demand for water and electricity generally increase levels of 
participation, for example attendance at community meetings, provision of labour 
or lobbying officials (Gilbert and Ward, 1984b). Fourth, tenure plays an important 
role (see Lall et al., 2004: 20). The literature indicates that improvements will be 
capitalised in the price of the house, which benefit owners rather than renters 
(Durand-Lasserve et al., 2009). Hence, renters have few incentives to participate to 
gain services that benefit owners. But, as ‘ownership’ in informal neighbourhoods 
refers to a bundle of rights, each household is likely to internalise the benefits from 
service co-production in different ways.  
The contribution of the research in Buenos Aires is to assess empirically effective 
participatory involvement, rather than willingness to participate, and the financial 
contribution of residents. The study considers tenure but also seniority (measured 
by length of residence) as contributing factors to participation. Recalling the point 
that high transaction costs involved in moving may be a good reason for residents 
to support community-enhancing social capital, and invest in neighbourhood 
improvements, allowing the benefits of savings to be capitalised in the house. 
  
4.2. THE UPS AND DOWNS OF PARTICIPATORY EFFORTS 
The argument emphasising the internalisation of benefits from participation may be 
traced by analysing the cyclical trend for residents’ involvement. This literature 
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argues that situations are highly dynamic, and either involvement in, or indifference 
to collective efforts may alternate at different stages within the same community 
(Mangin, 1970). Portes and Walton (1976) state that community participation does 
not exist in a continuum and either phases of interest and willingness to collaborate 
or periods of “individualism and apathy” are identified (Gilbert and Ward, 1984b ; 
also Cleaver, 1999; Mansuri and Rao, 2004).43 Importantly, studies have 
acknowledged that involvement in community efforts and mutual contributions 
weakens, and even disappears, once tenure status is secured and an acceptable 
level of services has been achieved (Varley, 1987). It is at that point that individual 
investment in the neighbourhood, in terms of time or money, becomes elusive, and 
residents focus on upgrading their own house (Gilbert and Ward, 1984b).  
These observations underscore the relevance of following the analysis through the 
stages of programme implementation. Indeed, although sustained involvement of 
the residents may not be common, a relative interest in collaborative efforts (i.e., 
for the improvement of services) may remain. Two types of participatory efforts are 
central to CPSI. Residents’ involvement includes devoting their time and even 
labour, but they are also involved in the co-financing of the project. Some co-
production theorists such as Ostrom, point to a low opportunity cost in using local 
“underutilised” resources, such as knowledge, skills, and time of the residents, for 
the creation of valued public outputs (i.e, infrastructure and services) (Ostrom, 
1996: 1080). Such ideas are liable to over-appraise residents’ availability, over-
emphasising residents’ time and energy to gather and process all the information 
that is needed. These resources are usually constrained by obligations and duties. 
In short, participation is not cost free (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011: 218). 
The decision to be involved is not a simple one. First, self-employed residents who 
work on a casual basis (i.e. temporary employment) are not able to count on a 
reliable and regular monthly income. This lack of predictability of constrains the 
ability to make long-term investment decisions and obliges careful judgement 
                                                             
43
 The decline in community participation over time may not be inevitable. During the 1980s, 
neighbourhoods in Mexico where leadership and left-wing ideals were strong allowed high levels of 
participatory involvement (Gilbert and Ward, 1984b). 
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whether they will be in work when commitments have to be paid (Banerjee and 
Duflo, 2011). Second, investment implies a trade-off, where individuals have to re-
allocate their resources and time from other activities. The ability to trade-off or 
combine participation and domestic duties will be especially onerous on women 
(Chant, 1996, 2007; Varley, 2007). Finally, any long-term commitment jointly shared 
with neighbourhoods involves the presence of caution and risks, when a diffused 
reciprocity is turned into a balanced one, with strict economic obligations 
substituting for moral ones.  
4.3. THE COLLATERAL BENEFITS OF CO-PRODUCTION: BUILDING 
COLLECTIVE CAPACITY AND TRUST? 
“Co-production builds on social relations” and practical collaboration among 
people, their organisations and the public and private sectors (Mitlin, 2008: 358). 
According to Mitlin (2008), “co-production offers a chance to address systemic 
weaknesses in service delivery to identify new solutions that support local 
democratic practices as well as improved services”. Co-production, therefore, 
suggests possibilities for efficiency in service provision and the beneficial effects on 
“social infrastructure” that drives a process of democratic participation and 
representation (Mitlin, 2003; Muller and Mitlin, 2007).44 Unlike conventional public-
client arrangements, co-production promotes a reciprocity model.  
Two forms of reciprocity are potentially nurtured in co-production activities. First, 
bonds among the residents are supported by encouraging participation in activities 
dealing with daily local needs. This facilitates the construction of further links 
between residents (Abers, 1998: 524; Bovaird, 2007: 856) and with local 
organisations (Mitlin, 2008: 358). The engagement means that  “practical” 
purposeful interactions elicited by the institutional framework may be considered  
facilitators for the building of more robust bonds among residents with community-
based local organisations and NGOs (for example, at local events) which are not 
within the realm of political activism, but driven by a genuine goal of 
                                                             
44
 Others have been more suspicious about participatory benefits as a path for a “growing control by 
poor people over the resources and institutions that determine their quality of life” (Gilbert and 
Ward, 1984b:921).  
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neighbourhood enhancement. As one resident commented when the Argentine 
president visited the neighbourhood at the start of the installation works: 
[President] Kirchner*‘s presence+ might have given a little push for this to get 
completed or to say “do go ahead with this”. With or without Kirchner, this 
would have been done the same. The benefit is for us, white, black, Catholic 
or Protestant, Peronist or whatever; this is a good for everybody in general 
(Maria P., 2006). 
A second form may involve new spaces of interaction facilitated by the scheme.45 
Organisations play a key role, not only to support the needs of residents, but also to 
“legitimise the potential contribution of their members in State programmes 
through demonstrated capacity” (Mitlin, 2008: 349). Consequently, some form of 
“collective capacity” develops and is supported by the consolidation of local 
organisations, which represent resident interests. Activities organised with local 
organisations should lead to other activities where the existing built-up capacity is 
used (Almansi et al., 2010; Mitlin, 2008: 349), supporting the sustainability of 
efforts.46 The literature emphasises the importance of such participation in contexts 
of distrust of political parties (Abers, 1998: 526) or a lack of political activism 
(Bovaird, 2007: 856).  
The evidential support for these claims – including in Buenos Aires - have mostly 
relied on qualitative insights (Paladino and Blas, 2005a; Forni and Coniglio, 2003; 
Mitlin, 2004; Zavalla Lagos, 2005).47 My research takes a more structured and 
quantitative approach. Nevertheless, it is useful to consider how resident actions 
can create trust, the dimensions of that trust and its sustainability once the 
intervention has ceased. 
 
                                                             
45
 It is argued that the nature and depth of an active, collective organisation also elicits a positive 
response from politicians who need support – and votes – from groups that are neither politically 
aligned nor secure (Mitlin, 2008). 
46 Resident engagement in co-production goes beyond its functional aim. It also contributes to a 
“progressive social change”, by which residents become aware of the relevance of their contribution 
and involvement (Mitlin, 2008: 358). 
47
 In this view, co-production is a novel approach to service provision in environments where 
deficient infrastructure settings added to the lack of attention of the public sector to people’s most 
pressing needs have led to high levels of distrust (Paladino and Blas, 2005: 2). 
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4.4. DETERMINANTS FOR TRUST  
The best-known work on trust in the social sciences is Sahlins’s Stone Age 
Economics. Sahlins (1974) identified three types of links in reciprocity (generalised, 
balanced and negative), each with differentiated social distances between actors 
and motives that varied from moral to economic. For the research in Buenos Aires, 
generalised and balanced reciprocities are the most relevant. Generalised 
reciprocity implies a tight social group where a flow of resources or gifts is shared. 
Obligations are moral rather than economic, and so are diffused. In contrast, 
balanced reciprocity is introduced by the CPSI. It involves equals who have a strict 
(tacit) obligation to repay through exchange. These obligations are less personal or 
moral than within generalised reciprocity. Knowing others in the group is not as 
important, making these groups less intimate and much more analogous to a wider 
social space. 
Detailed empirical evidence of the determinants of generalised trust are provided 
by Alesina and La Ferrara (2002), using individual level data from US localities. 
Importantly, survey measures of trust are associated with individual and 
community characteristics. Although I acknowledge the different contexts for 
residents living in formal areas of cities and residents resorting to informal housing, 
the general aspects of their analysis provide a valuable insight into the topic. 
Importantly, among those determinants, familiarity, reciprocity and experiences are 
mentioned as significant for trust behaviours.  
First, the “familiarity-reciprocity” argument refers to the degree of social 
interaction as a predictor for the level of trust among individuals. The essence of 
this notion is that, in common parlance, “familiarity breeds trust” (Coleman, 1990) 
and social interactions in general –that is, not necessarily through joining a group – 
may help promote trust (Putnam, 2000). Experimental games have validated these 
studies, finding that familiarity and increased interactions can build trust (Greif, 
1993; Glaeser et al., 2000; Karlan, 2005; Feigenberg et al., 2009). 
Second, membership of a group, by virtue for example of race or gender might 
affect trust. People who have been discriminated against, particularly, the 
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“economically unsuccessful in terms of income and education”, may have reduced 
levels of individual trust (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002).  
Third, community homogeneity, particularly ethnic and income (Alesina and La 
Ferrara, 2000, 2002; Putnam, 2007; Rothstein and Stolle, 2008), are associated with 
the levels of trust.48 Inequality should discourage trust because individuals are less 
likely to perceive a “common stake” with others or share “common values and 
norms”, which makes it harder to ‘‘predict’’ others’ behaviours (Hardin, 1992).  
 
5. EXPLANATIONS AND PREDICTIONS  
5.1. PROGRAMME SEQUENTIAL IMPLEMENTATION  
As was explained at the end of Chapter 1, the empirical strategy in this study is 
based on a natural experiment. Three groups of neighbourhoods were selected for 
the field research. Two are identified by the CBO created to manage the gas 
network extension programme: Comunidad Organizada (OC), also referred to as 
Group 1, was offered and connected to the network; Union de Vecinos en Accion 
(UVA), Group 2, was offered and accepted to join the programme but was not 
connected at time of the research. The programme had not been implemented in 
Group 3, the control group, therefore had no dedicated CBO and is referred to by 
the general area name, Primavera.  
In order to explain and justify group selection it is helpful to describe the 
chronology of programme implementation and to explain the hypothesis for 
programme outcomes. The implementation of the programme has two phases. 
Phase 1 is the initial stage of implementation and corresponds to the moment 
when the exogenous source of variation in social interactions is introduced. This 
stage is “the social interactions phase” when neighbours interact and have to 
organise themselves within their block in order to reach consensus on whether to 
                                                             
48 Although ethnic origin and religious beliefs per se do not have a significant effect on trusting 
behaviours (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002). 
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participate in the programme or not. Enrolment can only happen if more than 65 
percent of housing units in each block decide to be part of the “connection phase”, 
which means fulfilling all the necessary requirements in order to get the service.49 
The 65 percent cut-off means that in Phase 1 social networks and bonding activities 
play an extremely important role. In terms deployed by Sahlins, there is a shift from 
“generalised reciprocity” among neighbours, where obligations are moral and 
“diffuse” (not time-restricted), to a “balanced reciprocity” between structured 
equals who are involved in exchanges and assume strict (tacit) obligations to repay. 
Obligations are now economic rather than personal and moral.  
In addition, this stage involves interactions in a wider social space, building 
networks with less intimate groups, such as neighbourhood organisations and 
NGOs, where gathering the right information to make decisions with less-well-
known parties are vital. The provision of information through social interaction may 
help develop trust. In some short, qualitative interviews complementing the 
fieldwork, people talked about their initial fears at this stage, mostly concerning the 
sharing of private information and giving property documents to other neighbours 
who were in charge of the programme administrative duties. People expressed a 
sense of vulnerability based on the difficulties of predicting what other people’s 
behaviour would be like.50  
In Phase 2, the connection to the energy grid became effective and participant 
households were provided with a domestic service. The outcomes at this stage of 
“complete experience” were related to the benefits associated with having gas -- 
health and nutrition conditions were set to improve along with comfort due to 
better indoor temperature control and quality of the air. At this point, residents not 
only started using the service but also had to make payments for the connection 
and consumption, and it is now that people expected to benefit from the significant 
savings in service costs. In essence, the ability to realise these savings would 
                                                             
49 In addition to the minimum number of residents that should be enrolled in each block to get the 
service, enrolment requires the completion of a set of documents by each adult dweller (FPVS, 
2004). 
50 The types of informational problems involve in unobservable actions, such as moral hazard, 
hidden information, or adverse selection (Dasgupta, 2009). 
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provide the means to consolidate their housing progressively: the greater, more 
obvious and more timely the savings, the greater the expectation of improvement. 
One can propose the hypothesis that a high degree of participatory involvement is 
to be expected in Phase 1 of the programme when social interactions and the 
gathering of information occur. But, reciprocity and trust triggered by the 
programme might take longer to appear, and be less easily quantifiable, and 
expected outcomes in terms of housing improvements might take considerable 
time to be measurable. Hence, the research design included a longitudinal 
dimension to gauge programme effects four years after the energy connection was 
obtained.  
5.2. PARTICIPATION  
We might expect to see differences in participatory involvement between residents 
located in neighbourhoods where the co-produced programme is implemented, 
Group 1, and those in the control group neighbourhoods. Individual participation, 
however, is likely to be affected by the ability to internalise (expected) benefits, and 
this will vary according to implementation stage, individual determinants and 
contextual effects. The research design, therefore, focuses on the determinants for 
enrolment in the energy programme, the causal effect of the programme on 
participatory efforts and, finally, the building of collective capacity. To take each in 
turn. 
First, one might propose that the drivers to enrol in the programme might include 
socio-demographics, income, and length of time in the neighbourhood or tenure 
status. We might also consider that savings from gas service substitution acts as a 
determinant for enrolment decisions. Thus, data on socioeconomic and socio-
demographic conditions at the household level were collected to complement 
explanations associated with internalisation of benefits related to permanent 
residence or legality of property rights.  
Second, individual participation in voluntary organisations and activities may occur 
when such activities are expected to provide a positive payoff (Glaeser et al., 2002). 
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Due to the internalisation of benefits, residents may choose to participate in or to 
allocate their efforts toward neighbourhood activities, or to alternative activities 
that may be “neutral” as far as neighbourhood improvements are concerned, but 
which mostly generate individual returns (i.e., leisure organisations). The ‘payoff’ is 
expected to vary with each phase of the programme. Initially, social interaction is 
part of the institutional framework of the co-production; and may vary with 
individual (i.e., tenure conditions) and group determinants (heterogeneity of the 
interacting group). Participation might be expected to increase for enrolment in the 
fiduciary scheme. Although this effect is anticipated, attention is placed on the 
residual effect of the intervention. The estimation of effects after the connection 
has been granted calls attention to the “means-end dichotomy” and sustainability 
of participatory efforts, assessing the “cyclical effect” on participatory involvement 
due to internalisation of benefits. An alternative explanation, associated with the 
building of a “collective capacity” is also plausible. Even if social interactions were 
scarce or ceased, its effects could persist in the form of collective capacity, as an 
externality produced by social interactions.51  
The explanation for participation in organisations and activities aimed at 
neighbourhood progress, and the willingness to collaborate in further 
neighbourhood-enhancing activities, are both associated with the internalisation of 
the benefits provided by these activities. Hence, factors that encourage individuals 
to internalise the welfare of their communities will increase investment in 
community-enhancing social capital. Homeownership induces this internalisation 
since the value of the house is strongly associated with neighbourhood 
improvements. If one adopts a legal property rights view then this observation 
should be robust for owners who are more able to reap the benefits from their 
investment. The contrasting security of tenure view suggest gains should be more 
even as property serves as a hedge to cope with unemployment or illness, and as 
an asset in old age, even when legal rights are contested or non-existent (World 
Bank, 2007a).  
                                                             
51 Once a programme is over, a greater willingness to undertake other collaborative efforts can be 
considered an indication of sustainable collective capacity.  
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A third explanation for investment proposes a reverse causation; investment as a 
means to increase security of rights. Hence when rights are limited, services can 
increase the level of security. Importantly, the co-produced programme inverts the 
title to services link and provides services as a means for cadastral registration. 
Therefore, programme implementation will support investment even for informal 
owners whose rights to the plot are either non-documented or weak.  
Finally, the literature stresses that tenants are the only group who cannot 
internalise the benefits from their investment. This is certainly true when 
investments are capitalised in the value of the house, increasing rents. 
Nevertheless, the co-production programme has certain specificities that help 
challenge the universality of such an assumption. Tenant and landlord may both 
accrue benefits. The savings generated by substitution, which should represent a 
significant share of household expenditures, provide incentives for tenants to enrol 
into the programme. If they remain in the property then the tenants will internalise 
the savings from the substitution. For the landlord, this enrolment may be required 
to pass the required minimum participation threshold when both share the same 
plot or block, and the scheme should contribute to securing landlord rights through 
cadastral registration.  
5.3. TRUST  
There is scarce empirical knowledge of whether exogenous changes in interactions 
affect the development of particularised and generalised trust in real world 
situations. In my research, participatory involvement and interactions have an 
economic motivation: to reach the minimum number of programme participants 
per block and to enhance “solidarity” to finance the pipeline service. In short, co-
production should affect the social distance between residents, which in turn might 
help further reciprocity, and facilitate the building of trust in two different spaces 
and levels of interaction: i) an inner circle of family members, neighbourhoods and 
local organisations, and ii) exchanges in a wider social space, with unknown others, 
such as the municipal public sector or the energy utility firm. The predictions for the 
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research are based on whether the programme intervention is capable of 
promoting particularised and generalised trust. 
The first explanation for the generation of trust is based on the potential of the 
intervention to support familiarity and reciprocity. It considers that the “new 
invited spaces”, framed by the programme, can be a channel through which 
familiarity may increase. In this way, a balanced reciprocity among actors can be 
established and sustained, leading to increased levels of trust. For the extension of 
the gas service numerous meetings and voluntary activities were organised by 
residents, and some pressure was placed on neighbours and family members in 
order to secure their enrolment and qualify for the connection. Interactions were 
also encouraged on a wider neighbourhood scale in order to bring in more 
participants as the average costs faced by each household was contingent on the 
total number of blocks and housing units that decide to enrol in the programme. As 
a consequence, residents are stimulated to interact with people from other blocks 
rather than just their own.  
The new interactions with neighbours and local associations turn personal and 
moral obligations to economic ones (Sahlins, 1974). For example, in the case of 
neighbours and family members, they have to agree on being jointly accountable 
for the economic commitments originated by the connection. This way, “diffused” 
obligations turn to a “balanced reciprocity” in exchanges (Sahlins, 1974). 
Importantly, since the debt is collateralised by family members and neighbours 
signing a financial trust, the exogenous change in interactions that affects the links 
of reciprocity may have impact on the levels of trust among parties. Being cautious 
could be considered a rational response at a time when residents are encouraged 
to interact and share efforts with others whose behaviours are not well known. 
Importantly, in a context where choices may have future long term consequences, 
having some certainty about other people’s behaviours (and the consequences of 
those choices), constitutes a rational strategy. Such information is gathered at the 
first stage of programme implementation, by means of social interactions that 
contribute to share information among parts.  
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The interactions among residents and the CBO and NGO, entail the enforcement of 
commitments as regards all intervening parties. On one hand, it requires loyalty to 
their local constituency, and at the same time, to manage the interaction with 
outside partners effectively. Neighbourhood organisations support such a task. For 
example, the local CBO, Comunidad Organizada, helped manage the interactions 
with local and external actors during the co-production intervention; the members 
of this organisation represent residents in their interaction with the NGO that is in 
charge of the programme management (FPVS), and also with the local municipal 
authorities and the service utility firms. The provision of information through social 
interaction may help develop trust.  
Furthermore, the intervention introduced a change in the way in which interactions 
with the municipal public sector are handled, which may contribute to increase the 
levels of trust in this particularised domain. The informal neighbourhoods, 
neglected by municipal authorities due to irregularities in land subdivision, become 
the target of a programme in which the municipality is one of the main actors 
legitimising its implementation and providing the necessary support for its 
development. If these explanations hold true, we can expect to see higher levels of 
trust in each of the above-mentioned domains.  
Then, the first explanation is based on the “familiarity” hypothesis for trust. It 
considers that social interactions, determined by the exogenous change in social 
distance, are able to generate trust. By introducing an exogenous source of social 
interaction, face-to-face, purpose-oriented interactions among residents and the 
organisations are encouraged. Weak ties that may lead to familiarity with municipal 
public administrators and the utility firm may be forged. Social interactions (i.e., in 
activities or organisations) and networks are considered by the “social capital 
school” as instances of socialisation that support the building of trust and 
reciprocity, and which can contribute to encouraging cooperative attitudes. The 
fact that all residents are exogenously prompted to interact due to the intervention 
makes the self-selection issues of more trusting or socially interested residents a 
less relevant circumstance, since the interaction with others is not determined by 
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socialisation aims, but based on economic needs: reaching “economic” consensus 
for service provision.  
The second explanation considers trust as a result of the whole co-production 
experience. Critics of the “familiarity” approach argue that significant experiences 
are what contribute to generate trust, pointing to matters that are not based on 
associational interactions (Uslaner, 2002, 2003, 2008a, 2008b). The definition of 
experience includes the effective completion and execution of the co-produced 
scheme. It relies on the conceptualisation of a significant experience because it has 
reversed the long-standing, under-served status of the neighbourhoods. If this 
explanation holds true, trust as the outcome of the whole co-production 
intervention will be reported once the intervention is over.  
Nevertheless, there are two different stages that will be considered for this 
explanation. The first one includes the accomplishment of the programme and its 
symbolic and functional relevance for residents. Now, neighbourhoods can count 
on a reliable source of networked gas, and those who had enrolled into the 
programme are now able to benefit directly from it. However, neighbourhoods still 
face economic commitments that may last for at least two or three years after the 
programme ends. This fact can develop greater demands related to the strategies 
families will have to employ in contexts characterised by informal or discontinued 
sources of employment and occupation. In this case, enrolment determines 
transactions that are conducted over a period of time. The time element introduces 
the issue of asymmetric information among the parties involved and a certain 
uncertainty regarding the future. The signing of the financial trust that binds 
neighbours and multiple parties in a legal agreement during the whole scheme 
represents an attempt to mitigate the problem of asymmetric information and 
uncertainty. However, the fears over others’ trustworthiness to honour their 
commitments in a context of economic instability due to informal occupations may 
still exist. Besides, they fear that they may not be able to comply themselves, for 
similar reasons. Two qualitative insights from residents help frame this notion. First, 
Julio N. (2009) a resident from Barrio Alem, stated:  
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But they are not going to pay for it! Not for using, nor for the connection! 
Here you come and sell, everyone is going to buy, but nobody will pay you ... 
this is a cock-and-bull story. 
Added to that view, Mario, A. (2009), a resident from San Norberto, a 
neighbourhood from Cuartel V, in Moreno, argues: 
The problem is that work is unstable, and it’s always going to be like that, 
and what if there comes the moment to put AR$50 and we don´t have it? 
Consequently, the second explanation related to experience is associated with the 
residual effect of the programme several years after its implementation, when the 
financial commitments of the residents are completely honoured. The main 
predictions consider that not only adherents, but also non-participants will be 
benefited by the overall effect on the neighbourhoods.  
The third explanation includes the concept of expectation as a motivator of trust, 
which means that the level of trust may depend on the “anticipation” of how 
effectively the other party will carry out its tasks, the judgment of trustworthiness. 
This dimension of trust might be attributed to expectations raised by the 
prospective effects of the implementation. Therefore, it is neither based on 
experience nor on social interactions, but in the perception that residents have 
when considering whether others’ actions should be trusted.  
These different explanations are tested for the particularised and generalised levels 
of trust. Average effects are considered for the whole group of residents, which 
means those that effectively enrolled and those that did not, but is also 
disaggregated in order to differentiate what are the causal effects on each group.  
 
5.4. PARTICULARISED AND GENERALISED TRUST  
The answer to the question on how particularised trust and generalised trust are 
related to each other is not theoretically formulated. The “social capital school” 
considers that trust elicited at a particularised level can be extended. Hence, the 
experiences of cooperation and individual trusting behaviours to “particularise” 
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others may be extended to the society as a whole (Stolle, 1998; Boix and Posner, 
1996). For example, trust in the government is associated with generalised trust 
(Rothstein and Stolle, 2008). Then, it may be expected that an increased level of 
trust involving “weaker ties”, which means trust in less-known parties such as the 
CBO and NGO, the municipality or the utility firm, could expand to generalised 
trust.  
In contrast, there is the idea that strong group ties constrain generalised trust 
(Granovetter, 1973) because they do not contribute to forging an openness to 
others that is central to generalised trust. First, higher levels of trust in the family 
are negatively associated with generalised trust according to recent studies (Alesina 
and Giuliano, 2010, 2011). Then, complementarities among the dimensions of trust 
indicate that an increase in the level of trust associated with bonds forged in 
horizontal relations, such as the family, can be detrimental to the building of 
generalised trust. Second, another possible association involves the level of trust in 
the CBO (or NGO) and in the municipality, in their complementary or substitute 
roles. Since the co-production intervention affects the social organisation of 
residents, supporting new ways of effective representation by CBOs, it could 
substitute the levels of trust in the municipal public sector for the handling of local 
demands.  
5.5. TRUST AND INVESTMENT 
It has been explained that services may provide incentives to invest in house 
transformations. The natural experiment allows an empirical assessment of these 
incremental effects and whether they are associated with tenure, legality and 
residential stability, beside other household characteristics, such as income. The 
adjusted household behaviour associated with predicting the impact of the 
connection may explain lower disposition to invest before the connection was 
obtained and paid for, while investment will increase once installation payments 
are completed. We might also consider two other effects. First, the association of 
house transformations and trust, and second the “spillover” effect that may have 
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been generated for those residents who did not enrol in the co-produced 
programme.  
The first group of explanations related to trust involves the effect of the 
programme on generalised trust. However, others, such as trust in the municipality, 
neighbours and the family ought to be considered in the analysis of their 
association with physical investments. Importantly, the hypothesised effect of 
generalised trust on housing improvements is not clear. In Buenos Aires informal 
settlements, di Tella et al., (2007) found greater levels of trust in others in recently 
titled residents compared to squatters. They also observed higher investment for 
the titled group of residents. They interpret this higher level of trust as 
complementing the individualistic, materialistic, and meritocratic preferences 
which favoured the operation of markets (see Arrow, 1971; and studies by 
Coleman, 1990; Durlauf, 2002; Glaeser et al., 2002; Putnam, 1993). If this is true, we 
can expect a positive correlation between generalised trust and physical investment 
and the flourishing of more individualistic behaviours, particularly for legal owners. 
Nevertheless, we can also expect untitled residents to have a greater need of 
reliance on inner circles of trust, such as neighbours or the family. For example, 
building trusting relations with neighbours can help to reach informal credit 
sources, such as solidarity networks for micro-financing. But having a title deed can 
facilitate access to other, formal sources of credit (De Soto, 2000). Therefore, we 
can expect that the correlation among trust and improvements will not be equal for 
residents holding legal or informal rights to their property. In contrast to the above 
mentioned case, when trust in the municipality is considered, we can expect that 
greater trust in the municipal public sector for residents holding informal rights to 
property might be positively correlated with individual investment in the house.  
Finally, an extensive literature points to trust in the family as a substitute for 
generalised trust (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011; Ermisch and Gambetta, 2010). Lower 
“outward exposure” and increased reliance on the family are correlated with lower 
levels of trust in others. Furthermore, families are more productive as economic 
entities when members display higher levels of trust between each other. In 
particular, Alesina and Giuliano (2010) provide evidence of higher levels of home 
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production in societies where family ties are stronger, emphasising the relevance of 
taking the family organisation into consideration. Based on this notion, it is feasible 
to expect trust in family members to be positively correlated to investment in these 
settlements. 
 
6. BUENOS AIRES  
6.1. INFORMAL NEIGHBOURHOOD CHARACTERISTICS  
In many metropolitan areas such as Buenos Aires, there are many households that 
live in informal neighbourhoods, without access to basic infrastructure services and 
lacking legal land rights. There, households construct their houses gradually over 
time, starting out with precarious housing units which are replaced progressively by 
permanent building structures, with new rooms added at a pace that is mainly 
determined by ﬁnancial capability. Although self-help is central to the 
construction process, someone -other than the ‘owner’- usually helps –such as a 
relative, friend or fictive kin – or is hired such as a builder or building apprentice to 
assist with the task.52 
Two principal factors have determined the origin of areas of informal urbanisation 
in BAMA during the twentieth century. First, the process of rural-urban migration, 
which was especially significant during and from the 1930s, increased as the import 
substitution process drove population concentration in large urban centres 
(Clichevsky, 2000). Second, and as a result of the intial phase of demographic 
expansion there was a rapid increase in population from 1960 (Pirez, 2002). In the 
BAMA, 12.7 percent of households are located in areas of informal urbanisation 
(EPH, INDEC, 2013), extending to 16 percent of households when the whole 
metropolitan region configuration is considered (INDEC, 2013). 
                                                             
52 This fact is a constant in progressive housing processes  in different cities or regions (Choguill, 
1999)  
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Low-income households followed three paths to address their housing needs.  First, 
through invasions of public or private land, second, by increasing population 
density of existing shanty towns, known as villas miseria or asentamiento, and 
third,and the central focus of this study, the creation of informal settlements 
(loteos populares) through the subdivision of private land by informal developers 
without provision of networked services. It is important to underscore that, unlike 
the squatter settlements (villas miseria or asentamientos), loteos populares 
(popular subdivisions) were developed on private land that was legally owned by 
the developers at the time when plots were sold, generally converting rural into 
urban land, but without providing basic services or observing land use laws. This 
differentiation between types of settlement is central to policy formulation, since 
the instruments should be catered to the specificities of each.  
The three groups of neighbourhoods under study (OC, NUA and Primavera) were 
formed as loteos populares, located within the contiguous Municipalities of Moreno 
and José C. Paz. The two jurisdictions belong to the second metropolitan ring of 
Buenos Aires (see Chapter 1 for definition of BAMA rings). Figure 3.1 shows the 
location of the neighbourhoods in the west part of the metropolitan region. Figure 
3.2 provides information about the strong spatial correlation between lack of 
service access (such as connection to water in the kitchen and toilet, to the 
sewerage network, to piped gas, paved streets and public lighting) and other 
conditions (such as informal tenure, deficient housing units in terms of low quality 
construction materials,53 overcrowding,54 and the household’s material deprivation 
index (MDI).55 It is indicative that the households located in the neighbourhoods 
under study, from both municipalities, are below the average level of infrastructure 
coverage in the metropolitan area.   
                                                             
53
  According to the Census, a housing unit is defined as deficient (Type B) when it has at least one of 
the following conditions: an earth floor or loose bricks, it does not have a domestic piped water 
supply or does not have a toilet with water discharge. The most precarious or irrecoverable houses 
are huts or shanties.  
54 Three or more people sharing a room (INDEC, 2001). 
55 HMDI definition (INDEC, 2001) identifies the household’s material deprivation in terms of current 
resources. It is the closest to the income census measure that indicates households’ economic 
capacity to purchase goods and basic services for subsistence.  
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FIGURE 3.1 MORENO AND JOSÉ C. PAZ MUNICIPALITIES AND BUENOS 
AIRES METROPOLITAN REGION (2001)  
 
Source: Author using information provided by INDEC (2001) 
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FIGURE 3.2 BAMA INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES DEFICIT AND 
HOUSEHOLD’S WELFARE CONDITIONS (2001) 
 
Source: Goytia and Lanfranchi (2009) 
Figure 3.3 shows the location of the three groups of neighbourhoods (Google Earth, 
2013). They all belong to the same urban area, despite being located in two 
different municipal jurisdictions. The two neighbourhoods in the Municipality of 
Moreno - Organised Community (OC) and Neighbourhoods United in Action (NUA) - 
are separated by the Argentine National Route 24, President Hipólito Yrigoyen 
Avenue, which gave rise to the different programme implementation stages. The 
Derqui Cross-Road, the main transportation hub for public and private motor 
vehicles in the region is highlighted by a circle.  
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FIGURE 3.3. INFORMAL NEIGHBOURHOODS: AERIAL VIEW  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Google Earth, 2013 
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FIGURE 3.4. INFORMAL NEIGHBOURHOODS: LAYOUT  
 
Source: Author’s based on NDO (2000), and cadastral information from DPUPBA (2012)  
 
The research organised the neighbourhoods into three groups. Group 1 is defined 
by the OC neighbourhoods, which include Alem, Anderson, Don Máximo, José C. 
Paz, and Namuncurá. Group 2 is defined by NUA neighbourhoods, which includes 
Mayor Del Pino, Don Sancho, Irigoin, Milenio, San Alberto and San Norberto. 
Finally, Group 3 is defined by the Primavera neighbourhoods. The total area covers 
586 blocks and 16,100 households (INDEC, 2001). 
In contrast to squatter settlements the initial land division in these informal 
neighbourhoods has produced a very regular layout. An orthogonal grid of blocks, a 
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hundred metres per side, is the most typical block unit, which contains 32 parcels of 
similar area. Figure 3.4 shows the definition of each group of neighbourhoods and 
the regular parcelling as the result of informal developer subdivisions.  Figure 3.5 
provides views of the unpaved streets in the neighbourhoods, the scale of housing 
units and gives some indication of block layout (Figure 3.5).  
The most representative plot is ten metres wide and 30 long; there are some small 
variations in shape while keeping the area almost fixed (lote tipo). In this case, the 
uniformity of dividing areas among neighbourhoods has its origins in the 
commercial objective of informal developers, standardising the subdivision process 
in the different settlements developed in the area under study (Vinelli, 1978). 
Therefore, the average area of a plot in each of the neighbourhood groups is similar 
(274, 270, and 275 square metres and the mode is 274 in all groups, while the 
standard deviation is very low, 0.12).  
Nevertheless, sharing the plot is a frequent housing alternative in these 
settlements, where 20 percent of the plots held two housing units (79 percent had 
only one) There are only two cases in which up to four houses are sharing the plot. 
Plots are informally subdivided by households under very diverse circumstances. In 
this area, there are three reasons that residents indicate as the most frequent. First, 
and most common, is the plot is shared with offspring or other family members. 
Second, residents sell part of the parcel to non-family members, but this option is 
less common. Finally, the construction of a spare unit to rent was found in some 
cases, and this issue will be further analysed in the following chapters in relation to 
programme effects on tenants.56  
Housing is also shared. While 85 percent of the houses have only one household, 
there are two households in 13 percent and just under one percent house three 
households. Although the average number of members in the housing unit is four, 
the number ranges from 1 to 13, while just under 8.5 percent of the units are 
housing eight or more people.  
 
                                                             
56 There are no extensions by annexation of another plot in any of the housing units where the 
survey was implemented.  
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6.2. THE ENERGY DEMANDS OF RESIDENTS IN INFORMAL URBAN AREAS 
There is no comprehensive or defined policy aimed at mitigating the energy 
demands of residents in informal urban areas in Buenos Aires (Bravo et al., 2008). 
The main energy options of the residents living in informal neighbourhoods in 
BAMA include bottled gas and electricity, as the more relevant energy sources, 
although some households use lower quality substitute goods, like charcoal, 
kerosene or firewood. More importantly, residents in informal neighbourhoods 
have unmet basic energy needs, meaning a low level of satisfaction for water and 
space-heating needs.  
Bottled gas is the most popular fuel used by residents in informal neighbourhoods, 
although availability and affordability is found to be a key issue limiting its use. High 
upfront cost drives households to replace gas with charcoal and kerosene, two 
dirtier and less efficient fuels, thus increasing energy consumption and possibly 
even fuel expenditure for cooking.57 Finally, these fuels are complemented with 
firewood (and sometimes solid waste) used for space heating.  
The energy needs of the poorest are partially addressed by means of a national 
programme that sets a maximum price for up to two (ten kilogramme) gas bottles 
for every household each month and an equivalent flat fee for up to 1,500 cubic 
metres of networked gas (ENARGAS, 2008). There are two important facts to 
underscore associated with this service delivery. First, the caloric power of piped 
gas is greater than bottled, which makes the piped service cheaper and more 
efficient for domestic activities (Bravo et al., 2008). Importantly, the final cost of 
two gas bottles purchased under the regulated price equals the basic total cost of 
networked gas service consumption in the house, which includes heating and hot 
water appliance use, plus the usual domestic cooking use of this type of energy.  
                                                             
57 Charcoal is heavily used, but average prices, which have increased steadily, limit this energy 
option for the most poor (Bravo, 2008). 
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The second important issue to underscore is related to the market itself, since over 
recent years, demand has outweighed supply. At highly regulated prices, gas 
distributors are reluctant to provide the required quantities to the market. 
Therefore, the outcome is supply scarcity and also an illegal market at higher than 
the regulated prices. Thus, besides the costs for users, the unpredictability in gas 
supply constitutes an additional problem that distorts the usual patterns of 
consumption, since residents need to stock up on gas bottles, and also creates 
some periods of forced lower consumption when product supply is scarce.  
In consequence, the connection to the gas energy grid provides benefits above 
those based on cost reduction alone. The use value, through improved comfort that 
the new service brings about, exceeds the benefits associated with costs and 
finance and extends to immediate payback in comfort that impact on health and 
nutrition, to mention two highly relevant welfare dimensions of improved housing 
and energy (Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1987; WHO, 2005, 2011). There is today 
enough evidence that associates the complex effects of housing conditions on 
health, giving strong relevance to the characteristics of indoor air quality (WHO, 
2002) and thermal comfort (Howden-Chapman, 2004; Krieger and Higgins, 2002; 
Ormandi and Ezratty, 2012). It also decreases the time spent on securing adequate 
provision of bottled gas; networked gas supply is constant, reliable and cheap and 
improves the options for daily nutrition. By making energy for cooking less 
expensive, households can choose a wider repertory of foods – and cooking styles – 
in daily meals, while reducing illnesses that are derived from not observing 
indicative times for cooking meat and other ingredients. Indeed, users do not have 
to stop consuming due to the lack of available resources as a type of loan allows 
them to consume at lower costs, and without inefficient interruptions that would 
lead to decreased effectiveness. Therefore, the lower cost and better 
environmental performance of the service may allow considerable improvements in 
the quality of life and well-being (WHO, 2002, 2011).58 
                                                             
58
 Energy improvement is also associated with further improvements in the productivity of 
entrepreneurial activities, an issue raised by Benjamin (2000), Tipple (2004, 2005a and 2005b), 
Werna (2001) and Strassmann (1986) for Latin America.  
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The second most utlised service for domestic activities is electricity, although it is 
characterised by its low quality and poor reliability, aggravated by its cost and also 
by the spread of illegal connections (Bravo et al., 2008). Importantly, lower-income 
households pay proportionally more per kWh of electricity than higher-income 
customers (Bravo et al., 2008).59 Therefore, most of their energy expenditure is 
concentrated in cooking fuel and on electricity, when they are legally connected to 
the grid.   
6.3. THE ENERGY TRANSITION PROCESS AND HOUSING IMPROVEMENTS 
The progressiveness of infrastructure services improvement has been 
acknowledged by Choguill (1996, 1999), mainly associated with community 
services. Although piped gas reduces considerably the money spent on energy, it 
does not necessarily guarantee that such benefit is effectively put in place at once. 
In contrast, there is an energy transition process, in which substitution is done 
progressively over time, in the same way in which the housing construction process 
has developed overall. As a result, not all households will be able to move through 
the different stages of infrastructure upgrading at the same rate. 
There are three issues associated with improvements due to the service connection 
that should be underscored. First, substitution is a process that starts immediately 
with the new networked service being used in cooking appliances which most of 
the time extends to the acquisition and connection of an oven. Cooking appliance 
replacement or its adjustment to natural piped gas constitutes the first immediate 
step in the energy upgrading process. A year after connection to the grid all the 
housing units that participated in the programme were using this source for food 
preparation.   
Also, as previously explained, the new service make it possible to obtain hot water 
inside the house at a lower cost, bringing an incentive for the building of interior 
water connections supplying hot water to kitchen and toilets, in neighborhoods 
                                                             
59
 The unit electricity price is higher for a monthly consumption of a hundred kWh, while the price 
increase for very high electricity use – six hundred kWh a month – is only about twenty per cent 
above this (Resolution No. 356/2008 (August 2008), from the electricity regulatory agency (ENRE)). 
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where only a low proportion of the households have got running water installations 
inside their house. The substitution of bottled gas consumption with the new 
lower-cost network gas generates new resources that allow the financing of the 
internal water installations.  
The second important fact to highlight is that the appliances connected to the grid, 
and monthly charges, can still fluctuate considerably within the transition process 
from energy substitute goods – such as bottled gas, charcoal, coal, kerosene or 
electricity – to the use of gas from the piped system for all domestic activities. 
Some households living in units that have already received the connection, do have 
to wait until resources are made available to undertake the required 
improvements, for example the acquisition or adaptation of appliances to make use 
of the gas service in water and space heating. Considering that most non-
participant residents use costly water and space heating choices (electricity and 
bottled gas), there is a strong reduction in fuel expenses when the low-cost natural 
piped gas devices are in use. 
Third, energy connection requires a high degree of safety-related measures 
regulated by the Gas National Entity of Regulation (ENARGAS, 1992, 1997), which 
establishes the requirements for connections inside units. It includes pipe 
dimensions and materials, location of the devices, requirements on building 
materials, minimum size for each room and appropriate subdivision between places 
for cooking and sleeping areas, and ventilation characteristics. Therefore in order to 
obtain gas company approval for the connection some improvements in the 
housing unit must often be undertaken. Importantly, the service connection will not 
be approved until the regulatory safety measures are completely followed. That is 
why many residents at the post connection stage, still have to complete this type of 
improvement to be allowed to use this fuel for other domestic activities, besides 
cooking.  
The typical neighbourhood houses are shown in Figure 3.5. Nevertheless, those 
seem not to be important constraints for obtaining a gas connection once minimal 
habitability and safety measues are implemented within the initial improvemnets. 
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Ventilation devices and quality of construction materials are two of them, but also 
improvements in electric wire conections and plumbing or windows.   
 
FIGURE 3.5. NEIGHBOURHOOD STREET VIEWS  
 
 
 
FIG.3.5.1  A STREET VIEW: OC, CUARTEL 
V., MUNICIPALITY OF MORENO 
FIG.3.5.2 TYPICAL NON-PAVED STREET.  
OC, CUARTEL V., MUNICIPALITY  
OF MORENO 
  
FIG.3.5.3  NON-PAVED STREET.  NUA,  
CUARTEL V., MUNICIPALITY OF MORENO 
FIG.3.5.4  NON-PAVED STREETS. 
PRIMAVERA, MUNICIPALITY OF J.C.PAZ) 
Source: all photographs from author’s photo collection, 2008 
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7. CONCLUSION 
This thesis addresses physical investment effects by concentrating on house 
transformations through services. Furthermore, it underscores a broader dimension 
of investments. First, underlining participatory involvement through activities and 
membership in organisations, enrolment in the programme, and trust, a 
conceptualisation of collective capacity is introduced to describe the willingness to 
advance in collaborative experiences for neighbourhood consolidation. Second, the 
association between trust and physical investment is introduced to validate the 
explanation of the relationship between the physical and social dimensions. Given 
the stages of programme implementation it is proposed that the research will be 
able to track whether the outcomes of the physical and social dimensions are 
present from the first stage through to their residual effects, ie. once the 
experience has been established and bonds and networks have been consolidated.  
The opportunity for involvement is driven by internalisation of benefits that might 
be derived from it. The explanations of physical and social investments extend the 
definition of property rights from the association with security to a broader 
definition of homeownership incentives through internalisation of benefits, based 
on security, savings, permanence in the house and reverse causation for increasing 
security through investments, participation and enrolment. This means that 
participation in community-enhancing activities will increase as far as the 
investment costs required (e.g. in time and coordination with others) are less than 
the long-term benefits. Then, tenure or legal status of the house should provide 
differentiated investment payoffs for participation. Yet, this study argues that 
savings from substitution and services capitalisation should provide a powerful 
incentive to enrol in the scheme that may moderate the relevance of legality and 
tenure considerations.  
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explains the methodology employed in the research. It is organised in 
four parts. The first section outlines what is termed the identification of effects 
strategy. The co-production model and the sequential advance in programme 
implementation across different groups of neighbourhoods are taken into 
consideration for the design of the identification strategy. The quasi-experimental 
methodology outlines three different stages in which effects are assessed: i) social 
interaction and information gathering, the “familiarity building” stage; ii) the 
“complete experience” – social interactions and connection to the networked 
service, and, iii) residual effect of the intervention after four years of connection.  
The second section describes the survey and the data collection, and discusses the 
outcome variables. The physical capital dimension of investment effects is assessed 
by tracking the evolution of housing consolidation improvements. Neighbourhood-
enhancing social capital is divided into the two different social dimensions, trust 
(generalised and particularised) and participation (enrolment, participatory efforts 
and collective capacity). The section concludes by presenting a description of the 
main characteristics of the residents and housing.  
The third section assesses treatment and control group balance based on pre-
treatment information (year 2001) and baseline survey data (year 2006). The causal 
effects are evaluated in the fourth section at two points in time, 2006 and 2009, by 
two alternative methodologies. For 2006, a cross-section comparison of treatment 
and control groups is made. For 2009, the changes in outcomes from 2006 to 2009 
in the treatment and control groups are evaluated. These are explained where the 
determinants for enrolment through internalisation of savings, the legal and tenure 
security explanations and the association of house improvements and trust are 
framed. 
 
107 
 
2. IDENTIFICATION OF EFFECTS STRATEGY 
The expected effects of the co-produced gas programme are related to: i) housing 
improvements, ii) participatory involvement and the building of collective capacity, 
iii) generalised and particularised dimensions of trust, and, iv) the causal association 
of trust and consolidation efforts. In order to isolate the causality effect of the 
programme, the evaluation posits a counter-factual scenario. This constructs a 
hypothetical situation consisting of what would have happened to the households 
had they not received the intervention. Consequently, the differences between 
what would have happened and what did happen is defined as the programme 
effect (Rubin, 1974; Shadish et al., 2002). Although it is impossible to observe such 
a situation in reality, it is possible to approximate it by establishing a comparison 
group (control group) made up of households which have not received the 
programme, and which are as similar as possible to the group that did (treatment 
group). The way in which the intervention was assigned to one group of 
neighbourhoods in its first stage and later to another, permits the definition of the 
treatment and control groups. The mechanism that selected neighbourhoods was 
exogenous and mimics a random assignment to the programme, and therefore 
overcomes possible self-selection biases. 
There are two essential points that substantiate this identification of effects. First, a 
key piece of information that could help to determine whether the selection of the 
treatment group was exogenous with respect to neighbourhood characteristics 
(which could partially be associated with outcome variables) is to check whether 
the treatment and control groups/neighbourhoods had similar socioeconomic 
characteristics at the moment when the programme was launched. To do that, I will 
analyse information available from the National Population and Housing Census 
that corresponds to 2001 (INDEC, 2001), that it is available at the census-radius 
level. This is complemented by doing the same analysis using information from the 
2006 survey.  
The second important issue for this methodology emerges because the programme 
has not reached all households assigned to the treatment group. Although the 
108 
 
programme was available to everyone living in the neighbourhoods targeted by the 
co-produced initiative, not all the families decided to enrol. In the literature this 
problem is known as “partial compliance” (see Duflo et al., 2008). As already 
explained, the co-produced model required that over 65 percent of the housing 
units in each block should express their interest in becoming clients in order for the 
whole block to be connected to the pipe network. If the analysis considered the 
treatment group as comprising only houses that were connected, the results would 
potentially suffer from self-selection bias, since the decision of each household to 
enrol could be considered as an endogenous component in which the most 
entrepreneurial or least risk-averse residents self-selected to participate. Therefore, 
the identification strategy deals with this potential endogeneity. Two alternative 
methods are applied: (i) the estimation of the intention to treat effect, and, (ii) the 
estimation of the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) (Angrist et al, 1996). 
To apply the first estimation method I randomly selected households from the 
neighbourhoods where the programme was offered, no matter whether they had 
joined the programme or not. This group is called the Intention-to-Treat group. 
Thus, the estimation is based on the Intention-to-Treat sample (ITT) that gives the 
average effect of the co-production programme on the whole group of residents, 
regardless of their enrolment. In this way it is possible to obtain representative 
samples of everyone initially allocated to the group where the programme has been 
delivered. The second model, the impact of the programme per se, is measured by 
estimating the average effect on only those who have enrolled. This is defined as 
the Local Average Treatment Effect “on the treated” (LATE). By comparing the 
results from both model specifications it is possible to forecast the causal effects of 
the co-produced intervention.  
Figure 4.1 shows the evolution of the programme stages (by year) for Groups 1 and 
2 and the two periods (2006 and 2009) when the data were collected. Baseline 
information for the three groups that form the treatment and control samples was 
gathered in the 2006 survey and updated information completed by the 2009 
follow-up survey. Table 4.1 describes each programme stage and the definition of 
treatment and control groups.  
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FIGURE 4.1. CO-PRODUCTION SEQUENTIAL IMPLEMENTATION AND DATA 
COLLECTION 
 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on chronological data from co-poduced 
programme implementation collected during fieldwork. 
 
TABLE 4.1. CO-PRODUCTION STAGES: TREATMENT AND CONTROL 
GROUPS 
Co-Production Stage  
Treatment 
Group  
Control Group  
Year  
Complete Experience ( social 
interactions and connection)  Group 1 Groups 2 / 3  2006 
Social interactions and information 
gathering  Group 2 Group 3 2006-2009 
After connection    Group 1  Group 3  2006-2009  
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The group of neighbourhoods which were connected to the gas network on August 
2005 is defined in this study as Treatment Group 1. The “complete experience” for 
this group marks residents’ participation as having “paid off”. Yet, in 2006, Group 1 
had already gone through the two implementation stages. The first, from 2003 to 
2005, was the social interaction phase (Co-production Stage 1) and the second, the 
connection phase in 2005 (Co-production Stage 2). From a total of 4,492 plots in 
Group 1, 1,951 had been connected to the gas network, and 945 had been 
connected for at least 12 months when the first survey was conducted in November 
2006. The control group is formed by adjacent neighbourhoods, which at that time 
wanted to join the programme, but were unable to do so for technical reasons. 
Group 2 Stage 1 had not yet started at the time the baseline survey was 
implemented. Finally, Group 3 is not part of the programme and data on this 
neighbourhood has been collected in order to have a control group. 
The implementation of the programme was extended to Group 2 in 2007. At that 
time, residents of these neighbourhoods started the process of social interactions 
involving information sharing and programme details. By 2009, Group 2 had gone 
through Stage 1 and participant families had been identified but they were still in 
the process of considering the signing of contractual agreements to formalise 
enrolment. By 2009, therefore, this group has already gone through the initial 
stage, where the links of generalised reciprocity are starting to turn into economic. 
The connection stage had not been implemented for Group 2 in 2009 and, as a 
consequence, access to the gas supply was not available (the “complete 
experience” had yet to materialise). In this group, from a total of 4,416 plots, 950 
had already fulfilled the enrolment process at the time the follow-up survey was 
done in November 2009. Treatment Group 2, is therefore defined by the group of 
neighbourhoods in which only the social interactions and information stage has 
been implemented between 2007 and 2009. A control group, Group 3, formed of 
adjacent (non-treated) neighbourhoods had neither engagement with the 
programme nor any plans to do so.  
By 2009, Group 1 had been connected to the gas service for four years and over 
2,582 housing units had individual connections. For most of these households their 
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economic commitments to the programme should be complete; most should have 
finished the instalment payments. This is the third stage of the analysis, when the 
residual effect of programme implementation is evaluated years after the 
connection has been granted in order to trace the dynamics of the consolidation 
efforts over time.  
 
3. DATA DESCRIPTION 
The survey questionnaire was designed to capture detailed information on the 
socio-demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the residents, their 
occupation and monthly income, the characteristics of housing and infrastructure 
and details related to progressive transformations made to the house with the 
passing of time.60 Furthermore, a set of social capital questions associated with 
participatory involvement and trust were included, which fulfilled the standard 
survey measures that are considered to be “good practice”. All variables measured 
contemporaneous values at the time of the survey, except for works carried out in 
which were measured retrospectively. In 2006, respondents were asked about all 
changes made since 1995, which is ten years before the survey.61  
The survey was applied to randomly selected households. The sampling was 
prepared using the administrative records kept by the local NGO and additional 
information provided by the planning departments of the municipalities.62 A 
number was used to identify each block, plot and each observation selected, using 
random numbers (lottery). Then, maps of blocks and plots were compiled and all 
the plots that had been randomly selected were shown. A number of replacements 
were indicated in each case. The protocol was set that after making three 
                                                             
60 The questionnaire was not specifically prepared for this project. It was compiled from a series of 
surveys to collect information from residents as part of the activities of the NDO. I have participated 
actively in its creation, both in the devising of the questionnaire and in the fieldwork.  
61 A plan of the house was drawn during the interview and improvements were also checked at that 
point.  
62
 FPVS is involved in activities that aim at supporting urban programmes in the neighbourhoods 
located in the municipalities of Moreno, San Miguel and José C. Paz that were covered by the 
sampled areas of this study. 
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unsuccessful attempts to conduct an interview with the sample household, a 
substitution of the next household on the list would be made. Where a plot had 
more than one housing unit, all of those present were included in the sample. 
Respondents were the heads of single households, identified as those people 
preparing and eating the same meal. The interviews were held over six weeks in 
2006 and four in 2009; weekends were chosen to increase the chances of people 
being at home.63 
Before the main surveys were held pilot sessions were conducted for the validation 
of the questionnaire, fieldwork planning and training of the team that helped with 
data collection.64 Two pilot sessions identified difficult to understand questions 
(from percentage of missing answers) and the wording of original questions to be 
modified. The questionnaire was modified also to include some specific questions 
that emerged during the research. For example, the assessment of collective 
capacity based on a real proposal for an active collaboration was a new addition to 
the 2009 survey.  
The survey team was formed of professional staff and university students.65 
Interviewing was done in pairs, each person dealing with a part of the 
questionnaire. Professional interviewers asked the bulk of the questions while 
students helped with observation questions related to the housing unit and the 
block, for which a specific knowledge of architecture was required.66 The 
preparation for the survey included a letter of presentation that was delivered to 
each housing unit the day before the interview. The letter outlined the survey 
objectives, the estimated time that a visit would take place and the likely duration 
of each interview. At the start of each interview the purpose of the research project 
was repeated, and it was explained that participation was voluntary and people 
could refuse to participate or withdraw at any time without having to give any 
                                                             
63 When it rained, we cancelled the survey and it was postponed to the next weekend day. In 30 
percent of cases, the same person was not found in the house during the follow-up survey.  
64 Training sessions on the questionnaire were undertaken two weeks before the survey was 
formally begun. 
65
 The team were members of the NDO, see Chapter 1. 
66 They completed the task of drawing a plan for each housing unit, including the estimated size of 
the plot, the built space, its position in the plot and the block. 
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reason. Research ethics considerations attached to fieldwork and anonymity in the 
processing of results were observed, which means that all results have to be 
reported in aggregate mode and no personal information is specified. The 
qualitative insights collected from interviewees, some of which are included in the 
thesis as quotes, only use first names.  
A group of local residents provided additional logistic support during the fieldwork. 
The residents focused exclusively on helping the team locate each of the housing 
units selected for the sample as the neighbourhoods, houses and plots do not have 
street signs or identifying numbers. The residents also assisted with introductions 
to the interviewees, which minimised people’s suspicion of strangers. While a 
household was being interviewed the resident volunteers moved to the next 
sample participant to let them know that someone from the team would call in 
soon. Each interview took between 30 and 35 minutes, and each team would 
complete eight interviews over 6.5 hours. 
The first survey, carried out in 2006, was delivered to a total of 630 households. 
More than half – 330 households – were randomly selected as Group 1. In order to 
construct a representative control group, 300 households in Group 2, 
neighbourhoods that had not yet benefited from the programme were surveyed. 
The survey was administered to a sample of 200 households located in the 
neighbourhoods where the programme was going to be implemented at a second 
stage and a random sample of 100 were located in the third group, the control 
neighbourhoods that would not be part of the intervention. Figure 4.2 shows the 
number of total observations, participants and non-participants in each group. 
 
 
FIGURE 4.2. SAMPLE GROUPS DEFINITION AND NUMBER OF 
OBSERVATIONS BY GROUP (2006)  
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Total Sample  
 
N= 630 
Control Group  
Group 3 
(PRIM) 
 
Treatment Group 1 
Group 1 
(OC) 
 
 
Complete Experience 
 
 
 
Treatment Group  2 
Group 2 
(NUA) 
 
 
Information and Social 
Interactions Stage  
 
N=100 
 
N=330 
 
N=200 
  
Participants 
(connected to 
the energy 
grid) 
 
Non- 
Participants 
    
Participants  
(not yet 
connected)   
Non- 
Participants 
  
  
N=240 
 
N=90 
 
N=86 
 
N=114 
 
Note: Group 1 is defined by OC´s neighbourhoods; Group 2 is defined by UNA´s neighbourhoods and 
Group 3 is defined by Primavera´s neighbourhoods. N is the number of observations in each group. 
Respondents are household heads. 
 
 
Panel data allows testing different hypotheses on the effects of the programme. Of 
the sample 630 households interviewed for the first time in 2006, roughly 70 
percent were interviewed again in 2009 (433 families). The second survey was 
presented with the challenge of identifying and locating the original interviewees. 
This time a smaller subset was randomly selected from the 2006 sample, and the 
same procedures in terms of sampling, maps, letters of information and visits was 
followed. The response rate was high; 95 percent success in 2006 and 90 percent in 
2009. However, it took much longer to find the sample household in 2009 
compared with 2006.  
In this case, power calculations were necessary to determine the sample size under 
consideration, and these calculations contributed to indicate the minimum sample 
size needed to answer the question of interest. According to Gertler et al. (2011), 
power calculations help verify if the available dataset is sufficiently large for the 
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purposes of an evaluation of the effects of a programme, in order to avoid the 
collection of excessive or of too little data. For my research, it was important to 
avoid a type II error (see Greene, 1987); that is, having sufficient data to avoid 
concluding that the programme had had no impact when, in fact, it had an impact. 
The power calculation was conducted through the identification of the outcome 
indicators, and by deciding what subgroups to compare.  
The initial round of the survey was oriented at estimating the effects of the 
intervention on several outcomes. However, tenure and document categories were 
not included initially in order to estimate the mean and variance of the data and its 
minimum impact (by 80 percent). As stated by Gertler et al. (2011), sample 
requirements increase if the minimum detectable effect is small, if the outcome 
indicator is highly variable or there is a rare event, or if the evaluation is aimed at 
comparing impacts between different subgroups. The minimum number of 
households to be included in the sample covered all residents enrolled into the co-
production programme (treated) and those that did not adhere to the scheme 
(controls). For the identification of an effects strategy, it was important to be sure 
that both subgroups (treatment and control) were balanced as to their observable 
characteristics. For my research, a confidence level of 0.95 and a statistical power 
of 0.8 were assumed. The consideration was focused on the following three 
indicators:67 proportion of housing units that had formal rights to property, 
proportion of unemployed members of the household, and proportion of houses 
that had tiled floors. Within these parameters and a standard deviation of 0.2, a 
minimum sample of 413 households was calculated. 
 
3.1. DEFINITION OF OUTCOME VARIABLES  
3.1.1. HOUSING IMPROVEMENTS 
                                                             
67 Source: National Population, Household and Housing Census, from year 2001 (INDEC, 2001) and 
Household Survey 2005 (fourth trimester) from National Statistics and Census Office (INDEC, 2006).  
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The provision of infrastructure is linked to housing investment, which is stimulated 
by infrastructure service improvements. According to Varley, “In terms of priorities, 
services should surely come first: the rest may even follow of its own accord” 
(1987: 478). Such housing improvements following the provision of water and 
sanitation infrastructure are described by Strassman (1984) who argues that 
progressive housing construction can be accelerated by an early provision of 
infrastructure.  For the purposes of my research, housing improvements are 
described in this study as a dynamic process through which the house is 
progressively built and upgraded. Under the definition of housing improvements, all 
transformations and work on each of the housing elements, improved, replaced or 
added, are measured by means of a detailed checklist. 
There are three broad transformation effects due to the gas service. First, for 
programme participants, housing formalisation follows safety regulatory measures 
enacted by ENARGAS, encourages replacement of precarious or temporary building 
materials for walls, roofs and floors with permanent ones. Second, and regardless 
of programme participation, improvements might be carried out such as using 
better construction materials or the addition of more rooms as residents adapt 
expectations to successive household transformations. Third, the energy transition 
from lower quality or expensive substitute goods to piped natural gas makes 
possible service upgrading inside the house, such as water basins in the kitchen or 
heating installation.   
Three outcome variables related to progressive housing improvements are defined 
based on the information collected in the survey. One is the proportion of houses 
where changes were undertaken in the last year; second, an indicator capturing the 
number of transformations undertaken in the house during the same time frame; 
and third, the number of changes affecting the quality of construction materials 
(e.g., walls and plasterwork, ceramic tiles on floors and improved roof). The 
variables are defined from reported information about the works undertaken each 
year in the process of house consolidation. Due to budget constraints, the residents 
of these neighbourhoods did not undertake many improvements simultaneously, so 
any works could be identified individually and extend significantly over time. The 
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sequence of works for each housing unit was reconstructed and the year in which 
each work was initiated and finished was recorded, to facilitate the construction of 
the three different dependent variables.  
The construction of the housing improvement variables proceeds in two steps. The 
first step is a measure for the occurrence of housing improvements is intended to 
assess whether residents located in the neighbourhoods that were targeted by the 
programme, in OC and NUA, behaved differently in their incentive to invest in 
improvements when they are compared with the control group. This is a dummy 
variable that equals one when the household has carried out an improvement 
during the last year and zero otherwise. 
Figure 4.3 shows the proportion of residents that reported that they made home 
improvements.  It displays the dynamic of this measure by comparing mean values 
of this variable for four different groups:  three  groups of housing units in OC - with 
and without piped gas connection, added to the whole intention to treat sample,  
to show the measures for participants and non-participants in the co-produced 
intervention, –  and housing units in the control group. The horizontal axis shows 
the years and the vertical one the mean value of this variable.  
Between 2006 and 2009, the undertaking of improvements sharply increased for 
households located in the neighbourhoods of OC, where the co-produced 
programme was completely implemented, while remain fairly stable for residents in 
control groups. Indeed, both participants and non-participants have sharply 
increased the rate of housing improvements after the service was extended to the 
OC neighbourhoods.  Programme participants display the higher proportion of 
housing units undertaking major improvements during this period. Indeed, the 
graph suggests the presence of spillovers induced by the gas network extension to 
the targeted area, providing investment incentives for the majority of residents, 
regardless of their enrolment in the programme.  
Importantly, the parallel trend in all these groups before the programme was 
offered and implemented in the targeted neighbourhoods, emphasises the similar 
patterns of investment behaviour due to their common origin through “loteos 
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populares”, although some differences in the levels of households undertaking 
improvements may be due to socioeconomic and socio-demographic differences 
among groups. This issue will be analysed in Section 4 of this chapter. The decline in 
the proportion of residents undertaking house improvements in all the groups from 
1999-2000 to 2003-2004 is associated with the significant economic crisis and 
major downturn in economic activity (McKenzie, 2004) when the unemployment 
rate reached 45 percent of household heads in the neighbourhoods under study 
(INDEC, 2001). In such a context, it is feasible to consider that other expense 
priorities sharply limited – or interrupted – any housing investment. 
 
FIGURE 4.3. HOUSING IMPROVEMENTS (YEAR 1995-2009) 
RESPONDENTS UNDERTAKING IMPROVEMENTS (PERCENTAGE OF HOUSEHOLDS, BY YEAR).  
 
 
 
Note: Based on survey data 1995-2009, for participants and non-participants within the intention to 
treat sample in Group 1 (OC) and control group  
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The second step is the progressive consolidation of the housing unit, captured by 
the number of improvements indicator that measures the extent in which major 
improvements or remodelings have been done. The improvements carried out are 
classified in three different element categories, based on quality of construction 
materials and new rooms or expansions, infrastructure, and finally, other additional 
improvements - related to interior and exterior spaces, including frames – doors, 
windows, fences, and exterior space, including sidewalks and carports)  
In each case, a checklist of improvements was constructed during the interview 
based on the detailed description of yearly works carried out by households.  For 
each component – remodel or new addition improvement - a value of one is 
assigned if the improvement was done and finished, one-half in the case it was still 
under construction or without appropriate constructive finishing (such as plaster in 
walls, tiles in floors or asphalt and isolation in concrete roofs) and zero when done 
n temporary building materials or not done at all. Households might differ in the 
scope of improvement efforts, from remodelings to new additions and extensions.  
Ideally, the sub indices will more appropiatly reflect that scope when weighted by 
the areas -in squared meters- that each improvement involves. Since obtaining such 
information goes well beyond this research data collection efforts, a simple weight 
was applied to correct for minor and major improvements (i.e., remodelling-or new 
additions).   The indicator is the average sum of all the components and reflects the 
level of residents’ investments in their house yearly. It allows capturing, in the 
econometric models, the dymanic of housing improvements and remodelings using 
comparable information from the different sample sub groups. 
An alternative strategy, applied in De Souza (1999) and Van Gelder (2007), 
constructs a score based on the observed quality of construction materials from 
roof, floor and walls and compared them within time periods. The major drawback 
to  apply that measure  in this context is that measuring final quality rather that 
improvements, may underestimate the majority of new undertakings – which are 
still unfinished construction (i.e., without plaster) biasing the overall quality to 
lower than real boundaries. This issue of progressiveness will not be accurately 
captured when between period indicators based on the overall quality evaluation 
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of walls, roof and floor are compared. Thus, within such measurement strategy in 
this context, a new undertaking compared to the initial state can be taken as 
worsened up constructive quality conditions without taking into consideration that 
improvements are developing progressively intended to upgrade housing quality.   
The first component, quality of construction materials includes all new 
improvements or remodellings built with permanent materials – as opposed to 
those built with temporary building ones. Permanent building materials are adobe, 
bricks and cement blocks for walls, tiles and cement for floors and concrete, tiles, 
metal or wood ( with an additional ceiling and appropriate asphalt or membrane 
isolation, for roofs). Specifically, this category comprises floor, roof and walls new 
works (or following up), detailing the construction of concrete foundations, cement 
subfloor (contrapiso) and floor tiling or cement floor finishing, within the floor 
category; interior and exterior walls and their plasterwork for walls and roof built 
on durable materials and ceiling, shaping the construction quality of the roof 
component of the indicator.  
These are the physical and tangible measures which can indicate whether 
households are consolidating their houses.  Most of the times, households improve 
and replace transitory structures, in several occasions new rooms are added.  It was 
very common to find that new rooms are built progressively, all -or few walls at 
once- the roof or the floor upcoming at a later stage. Therefore, by construction, 
this indicator is able to capture the dynamic of housing improvements related to 
new extensions. Therefore, in case a room has been added, the survey asked 
whether it was completed or partially built during that year, and then computes its 
constitutive elements separately.  In those few cases in which a new toilet was 
built, their construction elements add plumbing or electricity works to that of 
construction materials –on floor, roof and walls.  
This indicator for the number of housing improvements has a second component 
that reflects infrastructure improvements. Those include plumbing works related to 
-cold and hot water (in kitchen and toilets) and sanitary installation, electrical 
repairs and gas installation and appliances (as minor or major works).  
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Table 4.3 shows that there is energy transition process in fuel sources following the 
introduction of the natural gas connection to the houses. In the after connection 
stage, the complete shift to networked gas is reported only for cooking activities, 
while not for water or space heating. Note that 91 percent of the houses without 
access to natural gas consume bottled gas (in ten kilogramme cylinders), whereas 
the remaining nine percent use firewood, charcoal and electricity (Table 4.3.A). 
Once connected to the grid, natural gas is used for cooking in 100 percent of those 
units.  
There is, however, a clear distinction between residents who are connected to the 
grid and those who are not, in the availability of hot water installation in the house. 
After obtaining the natural gas connection, the clearest effect for water and space 
heating is the progressive substitution of piped gas for bottled gas, electricity and 
less efficient sources (firewood, kerosene and charcoal). In non-serviced houses, 
water heating is commonly done by electricity (44 percent of houses) and the gas 
bottle (42 percent). After connection most houses progressively adopt piped gas for 
water heating. However, in both groups – with and without natural gas connection 
– there are still houses in which no system for water heating is in use. Additionally, 
some houses where natural gas connection has been made available, were still 
using electricity or had no water heating system in 2006, one year after gas was 
obtained.  
The fuel most used for space heating, electricity, is significantly substituted by 
natural gas appliances, although there remained 20 percent of houses where 
kerosene, firewood, charcoal or no heating system were in used in 2006, despite 
the presence of the piped gas connection. Therefore, a surprisingly large 
proportion of households were still using electricity, carbon or coal, and even 
their cooking device, for inside heating when the weather was extreme.68 
                                                             
68 In Buenos Aires, for at least three months a year the average temperature is below 11o centigrade 
while extreme minimum temperatures can be around -5o centigrade, on the Celsius scale.  
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TABLE 4.3. FUEL USE BY TYPE OF DOMESTIC ACTIVITY (YEAR 2006) 
FUEL THAT IS USED FOR COOKING, WATER-HEATING AND SPACE-HEATING (IN PERCENTAGE 
OF HOUSEHOLDS). TOTAL SAMPLE IN 2006 SURVEY.  
 
 
Table 4.3.A 
  
 
Cooking System                
by fuel  type  
Without Gas Connection 
(%)  
Connected to piped 
gas (%) 
 
 
Piped Gas  
 
100 
 
Bottled Gas  91 
 
 
Electricity  3 
 
 
Charcoal 3 
 
 
No system  3 
 
 
Total  100 100 
Table 4.3.B 
  
 
Water-Heating  
System by fuel  type  
Without Gas Connection 
(%)  
Connected to piped 
gas (%) 
 
 
Piped Gas  
 
72 
 
Bottled Gas  42 
 
 
Electricity  44 24 
 
No system  14 4 
 
Total  100 100 
Table 
4.3.C       
 
Space-Heating  
System by fuel  type  
Without Gas Connection 
(%)  
Connected to piped 
gas (%) 
 
 
Piped Gas  
 
70 
 
Bottled Gas  12 
 
 
Electricity  49 11 
 
Firewood 12 5 
 
Charcoal 4 3 
 
Kerosene  8 6 
 
No system  15 5 
 
Total  100 100 
 
Note: N=240 (units connected to gas network) and N=330 (without gas conection)  
 
 
The third component of the number of housing improvements indicator includes 
other exterior or interior improvements – related to framing –windows and doors 
repairs, fences and sidewalks. Lastly, as an alternative to housing improvements 
estimation models, those exclusively related to quality of construction materials are 
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analysed separately from other improvement components in the econometric 
regressions. 
 
 
3.1.2. PARTICIPATION 
The first variable is enrolment, which measures financial contribution to the co-
production scheme and the fiduciary trust. The other set of participation measures 
are participation in neighbourhood voluntary organisations and activities, in leisure 
associations, in formal organisations (active and passive), and the number of 
organisations in which the respondent participates. Participation variables are 
measured according to a set of standardised questions concerning participatory 
involvement of the respondents, collected for each adult member in the house, 
introduced in this way:  
I would like to ask you about any organisations or associations in which either you 
or the rest of the household members may participate, whether in formally 
organised groups or just groups of people that gather regularly to do any activity or 
to talk about any specific matter. 
Participation is defined as taking part in activities, going to meetings or performing 
tasks. A card shows the nine types of activities/organisations. The categories are: i) 
religious (Church, Temple, Synagogue and all the Methodist and Evangelist groups); 
ii) sports club or recreational activity (soccer, volleyball, among others); iii) arts, 
music or educational activities (theatre group, musical group, school cooperative); 
iv) unions (trade union, unemployed movement); v) political parties; vi) 
environmental Groups (i.e., Ecologists); vii) professional institutions (i.e., 
professional society or chamber of commerce); vi) local social associations (local 
sanitary unit, local communal kitchens, mutual societies, among others); viii) 
consumers associations, and, ix) CBO and neighbours’ meetings, and any activities 
for the improvement of the neighbourhood (i.e., Comunidad Organizada – 
Organised Community (OC) – for the gas service programme, meetings with 
neighbours within the same block, or any other local neighbourhood gathering).  
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Table 4.4 shows the sample characteristics of the participation variables in 2006. 
The participation rate is 28 percent, which indicates that less than one third of the 
respondents are members – or participate – in at least one group. The standard 
deviation of the membership variable is 0.45, which indicates a considerable 
variation in participation rates across individuals. The fraction of participants in the 
various groups ranges from none for professional associations to 25 percent for 
religious groups.69 Sport groups are the second most popular category, with a 
participation rate of 15 percent of respondents, followed by neighbourhood 
associations (8 percent). Respondents who reported participation in other 
community service groups and artistic or hobby club activities is six percent. The 
low enrolment in political associations is remarkable: less than one percent of 
respondents are members of political groups or labour unions which suggest that 
the neighbourhood organisations are not explicitly politically oriented and 
clientelistic. 
TABLE 4.4. PARTICIPATION IN ORGANISATIONS 
(YEAR 2006) 
RESPONDENTS’ PARTICIPATION BY TYPE OF ORGANISATION OR ACTIVITIES.  
TOTAL SAMPLE IN 2006 AND 2009 SURVEYS.  
 
Organisation Type   
(year 2006) 
  Obs. Mean 
Standard 
Deviation. 
Min. Max. 
Religious   633 0.245 0.430 0 1 
Sports   633 0.150 0.357 0 1 
Artistic   633 0.060 0.238 0 1 
Union   633 0.005 0.069 0 1 
Political   633 0.011 0.105 0 1 
Professional   633 0.000 0.000 0 0 
Humanitarian   633 0.063 0.243 0 1 
Consumers   633 0.002 0.040 0 1 
Neighbourhood   633 0.079 0.270 0 1 
Participation (total)   633 0.280 0.450 0 1 
                                                             
69 The survey shows extensive participation in religious organisations (i.e., such as Parroquia Nuestra 
Señora de Itatí – Virgin of Itati Parish – or Iglesia Pentecostal – Pentecostal Church). Such 
organisations have acquired a fundamental role in channelling direct assistance through provision of 
food, clothes and medicine, or in matters related to personal rights, such as domestic violence (Di 
Virgilio et al., 2009). 
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Note: Based on categories used in the survey questionnaires. Participation (total) indicates 
the proportion of respondents that participate in at least one organisation type. 
 
Participation in community activities in Argentina is limited. According to the data 
obtained by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) in 2010, 
participation for the solution of neighbourhood issues - both in BAMA and 
nationally- is below the average level for the region. On a 1 to 100 scale, Buenos 
Aires averages 16 percent, which is 2.5 points below the regional average and ten 
points below the participation level reported in countries such as Paraguay. The 
study underscores that seven percent of the respondents participate in 
neighbourhood associations, a measure similar to that reported in the study 
settlements, while people report a higher level of involvement in religious 
organisations (22 percent).70 Importantly, the frequency of participation across 
categories remained constant from 2008 to 2010. In contrast, in the 
neighbourhoods the figures slightly increased, but involvement in community 
enhancing activities remained low.  
The empirical analysis focuses on four different participation variables.71 The 
interest of this study lies on the respondent’s involvement in voluntary 
neighbourhood organisations and activities. Measures of individual social capital 
investment are constructed considering the type of participatory involvement, 
whether it is voluntary or within formal, structured organisations. Voluntary 
participation is particularly useful to measure and two categories are distinguished: 
i) participation in voluntary neighbourhood activities and organisations and ii) 
participation in voluntary non-social activities and organisations, which includes all 
voluntary, leisure activities and organisations in which the respondents are actively 
                                                             
70 Average religious participation is 20 points below the average for Latin America and the lowest on 
the continent. Political participation is similar to other Latin America averages (6.9 percent) LAPOP, 
2010.  
 
71 Empirical studies that assess participatory involvement in community enhancing social capital, 
such as Hilber (2010) or Di Pasquale and Glaeser (1999), use estimation measures of membership of 
neighbourhood associations and organisations. Estimations focus on evaluating the levels of 
participation that only provide individual returns, a variable indicating individual membership in 
non-neighbourhood associations, such as those with co-workers, is generally used as the outcome in 
falsification tests that assess for the robustness of the models and estimates.  
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involved. Finally, among the formal organisations defined in the study, the main 
distinction is i) active formal organisations or ii) passive formal organisations. The 
former includes participation in religious, political and labour union activities and 
organisations, while the latter includes professional, consumer or environmental 
organisations.  
Religious organisations are included in the study as ways of formal, active 
participatory involvement but because of their structured and hierarchical 
configuration they are not considered neighbourhood-enhancing voluntary 
activities. Obviously, the motivations for getting involved in these organisations 
include religious considerations and spiritual guidance. But, when respondents 
were invited to explain involvement, they also mentioned “help in wellbeing”, 
“making them feel good”, and “giving education to children and teaching them 
good values”. In 2006, 14.2 percent of respondents participated in voluntary social 
activities and organisations while 21 percent in voluntary leisure activities and less 
than two percent in formal passive organisations. Notably, 26 percent participated 
in formal active organisations which are mostly religious in nature (Table 4.4). 
In order to complete the participatory assessment, an additional question to 
evaluate the presence of “collective capacity” was included. This measure 
constitutes a proxy for active participatory involvement and assesses capacity by 
means of a concrete proposal. Two questions were asked. First, the relevance of 
having street signs with names and numbers. Respondents were unanimous: 
almost 98.7 percent of the responses considered street signs to be of high 
importance. Without numbers the residents are not able to receive regular mail, an 
issue that strongly affects their employability. Second, the people were asked: “Do 
you think we can succeed in obtaining street signs if all neighbours get organised for 
such purpose?” and “Are you willing to participate, even with money to finance 
this?”. A dummy variable for the affirmative answers to both questions is 
constructed and called ‘collective participation’.72 
                                                             
72
 The survey also included some open questions with the idea of gathering qualitative insights as 
regards the motivations invoked by those that had not been willing to participate when the 
programme was presented for their consideration. 
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TABLE 4.4. PARTICIPATION IN ORGANISATIONS  
(YEARS 2006 AND 2009) 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: RESPONDENT´S PARTICIPATION BY ORGANISATION OR ACTIVITIES 
CATEGORIES DEFINED FOR THIS STUDY.  
TOTAL SAMPLE IN 2006 AND 2009 SURVEYS.  
 
ORGANISATION TYPE   
(YEAR 2006) 
  Obs. Mean 
Standard 
Deviation. 
Min. Max. 
              
voluntary_social_org    633 0.142 0.243 0 1 
voluntary_leisure_org   633 0.210 0.338 0 1 
formal_organisations_active    633 0.016 0.089 0 1 
formal_organisations_active 
(includes religious org) 
  633 0.261 0.370 0 1 
formal_organisations_passive    633 0.002 0.040 0 1 
              
ORGANISATION TYPE 
(YEAR 2009) 
  Obs. Mean 
Standard 
Deviation. 
Min. Max. 
              
voluntary_social_org    433 0.155 0.251 0 1 
voluntary_leisure_org   433 0.085 0.212 0 1 
formal_organisations_active    433 0.029 0.090 0 1 
formal_organisations_active 
(includes religious org) 
  433 0.245 0.333 0 1 
formal_organisations_passive    433 0.030 0.097 0 1 
              
 
Note: Based on answers from survey questionnaires on types of organisations and 
activities.  
3.1.3. PARTICULARISED AND GENERALISED TRUST  
The standard survey question, framed in Rosenberg (1956), estimates generalised 
trust according to the statement: “Generally speaking, would you say that most 
people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”. 
Individuals who answer that ‘‘most people can be trusted’’ are defined as trusting, 
and the non-trusting category includes those who say that ‘‘you can’t be too 
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careful’’.73 Despite the popularity of Rosenberg´s question to measure trust, a 
number of authors have raised important criticisms (Glaeser et al., 2000; Uslaner, 
2002; Beugelsdijk, 2006).  
First, the question is not clear on how far trust may extend. The wording is 
problematic because the meaning given by each respondent to “most people” may 
be different. It may refer to people whom they know personally or to the 
population in general (Stolle 1998; Glaeser et al., 2000; Hardin, 2002; Rotenberg et 
al., 2005) or as a sign to indicate trust in strangers (Uslaner, 2002). Empirical 
evidence indicates that when respondents think about people they already know, 
the generalised trust measure is correlated with particularised trust. Second, 
instead of measuring trust and distrust, the question refers to trust and caution, 
which are not opposites (Miller and Mitamura, 2003). The answer as formulated 
may include cautiousness but not distrust. Moreover, answers may be biased 
depending on whether a person lives in a safe environment, associated with low 
levels of caution, or in places where caution is deemed essential (Miller and 
Mitamura, 2003). These critiques point to the difficulties of how attitudes can be 
measured (Hertzberg, 1988), under conditions where question interpretation is 
likely to be highly varied (Sturgis and Smith, 2010).  
Indeed, the issue of language and meaning of terms is relevant to my research. In 
Spanish a single word defines both trust and confidence (confianza) while in 
English, these are two different words. Therefore, a definition of particularised 
measures of trust as used in this study may be better interpreted as a measure of 
resident ‘confidence’. Although the conventional Anglo-Saxon definition and 
terminology has been followed in the literature review and my analysis, there is 
some slippage between interpretations of terms in Spanish from the field. 
Qualitative insights gathered during fieldwork provided an indication of trust 
among residents. During the survey application, nobody was willing to open their 
door to strangers and the team had to present references and make several prior 
                                                             
73 A dummy variable takes the value 1 if the respondent answer is within the “trusting” category, 
and 0 otherwise. 
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visits before people agreed to be interviewed in their home. When the idea of trust 
was inquired about, people referred to unknown others and to strangers, leaving 
aside day-to-day experiences, in connection with crime, insecurity or cheating. 
Generalised trust was neither connected to insecurity measures such as number of 
assaults to which the respondent or inner circle of family members and neighbours 
was exposed, nor whether the family usually leaves someone at home as security 
from crime. On average, 20 percent of the respondents in the Group 1 
neighbourhoods said that ‘‘most people can be trusted’’ in 2006. To put such a 
measure in the Argentinian context, it should be noticed that the average 
proportion of household heads that declare they trust most people in Argentina 
from 1990 to 2001 was 15 percent (Bjornskov, 2006). Therefore, after the gas 
connection was granted in the neighbourhoods, the level of trust reported by 
residents was 32 percent higher than average values.  
A set of questions interrogate other dimensions of trust. These focused on 
respondents’ trust in certain institutions; namely, the municipal public sector, 
neighbours, the NGO and CBO, banks and the utility company where relevant. The 
answers for these variables related to different trust domains, are coded from one 
(low or none at all) to five (high). Descriptive statistics using the average score 
indicates the highest level of trust - 4.63 - is in the family. The average score for 
trust in neighbours is 2.99, trust in neighbourhood associations is 2.33 and trust in 
the municipality is 2.09. Based on this scale, the variables defined for each 
particularised trust domain take both higher categories together – high and quite 
high, respectively – to construct an indicator that approximates a trusting attitude 
towards each specific domain. 
Table 4.5 presents descriptive statistics for the complete sample in 2006 and 2009, 
respectively. The first column displays sample averages, which represent the 
fraction of respondents in 2006 who say that they trust other people or institutions 
(as listed in each row). On average, 16 percent of respondents in 2006 say that 
‘‘most people can be trusted’’, and the figure increases to 30 percent to 2009. 
Moving from trust in others to trust in institutions, mean values display a wide 
variation across types of institution. Over 91 percent of respondents report very 
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high and high trust in the family, which remains stable over the two periods. Forty-
eight  percent and 58 percent respectively have trust in the NGO and CBO in 2006. 
The former remains stable and the latter is reduced in 2009 to 48 percent.  Trust in 
neighbours falls slightly from 38 to 35 percent, comparing 2006 to 2009. The lowest 
trust measure reported is in the municipality at 15.7 percent, which is almost 
halved to nine percent in 2009. Forty two percent of respondents report high and 
quite high trust in the utility firm.  
TABLE 4.5. TRUST VARIABLES (2006 AND 2009) 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS. TRUST OUTCOMES. ALL SAMPLES.  
SOURCE: BASELINE AND FOLLOW-UP SURVEYS (2006-2009) 
   
 VARIABLE 
TRUST (HIGH AND QUITE HIGH)  
YEAR 2006 Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
 
Generalised Trust  633 0.16 0.37 0 1 
 
Trust in Family 633 0.91 0.29 0 1 
 
Trust in Neighbours 633 0.38 0.49 0 1 
 
Trust in NGO  633 0.48 0.50 0 1 
 
Trust in CBO  633 0.58 0.49 0 1 
 
Trust in Municipality 630 0.16 0.36 0 1 
  Trust in Utility 633 0.42 0.49 0 1 
 
 
 
 
     
VARIABLE 
TRUST (HIGH AND QUITE HIGH)  
YEAR 2009 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
Generalised Trust  413 0.30 0.46 0 1 
 
Trust in Family 413 0.91 0.29 0 1 
 
Trust in Neighbours 413 0.35 0.48 0 1 
 
Trust in NGO  413 0.48 0.50 0 1 
 
Trust in CBO 413 0.48 0.50 0 1 
 
Trust in Municipality 412 0.09 0.29 0 1 
 
 
   
Table 4.6 describes the same variables for Group 1, 2 and 3.  Group 1, is the treated 
group of residents that are located in the neighbourhoods where the co-produced 
programme was implemented and the connection to the energy grid already 
granted. Generalised trust is higher (20 percent) while we observe ample variation 
across different types of institutions. The family earns the highest level of 
confidence, 88 percent, and trust in the CBO is 43 percent. Once again, the lowest 
degree of confidence is in the municipality, 11.6 percent followed by the level of 
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confidence in the utility firm at 16.4 percent. Interestingly the neighbours on the 
block and the NGO all enjoy high levels of trust, 38 and 54 percent, respectively.  
TABLE 4.6. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS TRUST VARIABLES – BY SAMPLES. 
SOURCE: BASELINE SURVEY. YEAR 2006. 
 
 
  
GROUP 1 
(OC) 
GROUP 2 
(NUA) 
GROUP 3 
(PRIMAVERA) 
VARIABLE 
TRUST (VERY HIGH AND 
HIGH) Mean (SD) 
Mean 
(SD) Mean (SD) 
     
 
Trust in Others 0.20 0.12 0.12 
  
(0.4) (0.33) (0.32) 
 
Trust in Family 0.88 0.96 0.91 
  
(0.32) (0.2) (0.29) 
 
Trust in Neighbours 0.38 0.40 0.36 
  
(0.49) (0.49) (0.48) 
 
Trust in NGO 0.54 0.52 0.39 
  
(0.50) (0.50) (0.52) 
 
Trust in CBO 0.43 0.33 0.13 
  
(0.5) (0.47) (0.5) 
 
Trust in Municipality 0.12 0.22 0.18 
  
(0.48) (0.50) (0.51) 
 Trust in Utility Firm         0.16 0.15 0.08 
 
  
GROUP 1 
(OC) 
GROUP 2 
(NUA) 
GROUP 3 
(PRIMAVERA) 
VARIABLE 
TRUST (VERY HIGH) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
     
 
Trust in Family 0.76 0.79 0.79 
  
(0.43) (0.41) (0.41) 
 
Trust in Neighbours 0.16 0.15 0.13 
  
(0.37) (0.36) (0.4) 
 
Trust in NGO 0.26 0.20 0.17 
  
(0.36) (0.4) (0.38) 
 
Trust in CBO 0.16 0.14 0.08 
  
(0.37) (0.35) (0.44) 
 
Trust in Municipality 0.09 0.22 0.14 
  
(0.43) (0.41) (0.36) 
     
 
 
Generalised trust is lower in the other two neighbourhood groups while trust in the 
family and the municipality are higher in Group 2 and Group 3. The description of 
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these measures indicates that there are differences among groups that, as I will 
analyse later in Chapters 5, may be attributed to the programme implementation.   
 
3.1.4. TENURE VARIABLES: THE LEGAL AND THE TENURE SECURITY APPROACH  
Based on the academic controversy on tenure security and legality already 
discussed, two alternative criteria are applied to define conceptualisations of 
informality. Two different types of questions are used. One is related to self-
declared security by tenure status. The other asks about the documents the 
residents have as proof of their tenure status, and what is the relation of the head 
of household with the person named in the documents. The self-declared tenure 
status is the standard way to measure informality in national statistics in Argentina. 
It is based on respondent’s answers to the question “Would you inform me of your 
status, as regards the house and plot of land?”. The categories are: i) own both the 
house and the plot of land, ii) own the house only, iii) rent the house, iv) occupant 
type categories (paying taxes and with permission), v) squatter (occupant without 
permission) and vi) another answer or don’t know. In this approach, each self-
declared set of tenure conditions is used as a dummy variable which is indicative of 
self-declared tenure status. The formal group comprises owners of the land and the 
house (formal owners) and owners that have obtained formalised rights through 
regularisation programmes. The informal owners group comprise owners of the 
house but not of the land (informal owners). Finally non-owners are all those that 
are occupants – paying property taxes or with permission to stay such as 
preliminary tenure – and another category for occupants without approval 
(squatters)74 and renters. This category has (full or partial) rights of use.  
Nevertheless, there are plenty of reasons to believe that the form in which National 
Statistics measure tenure status under-reports informality (see Goytia and 
Lanfranchi, 2009 in Lall et al., 2009). As this is a self-declared measure, the 
categorisation of formal owners does not provide information on whether the 
                                                             
74 This approach can be seen as the standard approach found in the literature (see Cruz and Morais, 
2008). 
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rights over the asset are legal or informal ones. In particular, in settlements which 
originated as informal commercial subdivisions and where households have already 
paid for the land, households consider themselves to be homeowners (of both the 
plot and the house) even though no formal title has been granted.  
In order to conceptualise informality in legal terms, a second set of questions was 
introduced. The second question checks the documents that respondents possess 
as proof of ownership and who is entitled as the holder of legal rights. The 
categories include i) title deeds, ii) preliminary purchase agreement (conveyance), 
receipt of purchase, iii) regularisation programme (known as Pierri´s or Precarious 
Ownership Law (Law 24.374)) and iv) no document at all. These documents can be 
endorsed with the name of the household head and/or his wife/husband, but also 
under the name of a close relative (fathers, mothers) or other relatives (uncles or 
aunts, cousins, etc.) or are shared among several neighbours (as is the case of 
undivided rural land) or none of these options.  
The two differentiated sets of dummy variables corresponding to the declared 
tenure and the legal status of the plot and the house are constructed and included 
in the analysis.  
 
3.2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE GROUPS AT THE INITIAL SURVEY (2006)  
This description is an overview of the main characteristics of both residents and 
housing in the area where the co-production intervention is being carried out. Table 
A.1 (in the Appendix 1) provides a description of all the variables in the database, 
while Table 4.7 presents summary statistics for the whole sample (treatment and 
control groups). The 36 variables for which the data was obtained in the 2006 
survey are grouped in seven categories: i) socioeconomic characteristics; ii) 
employment; iii) income and wealth; iv) housing characteristics; v) length of 
residence; vi) tenure and legal status, and, vii) distance measures. A mean, standard 
deviation, and minimum and maximum values are presented for each.  
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A brief overview of group characteristics is useful. The data for declared head of the 
household provide an average age of 48 years, 63 percent of respondents were 
male and 68 percent have primary educational level as the highest educational level 
achieved, whereas 12 percent have completed high school and 20 percent have not 
completed primary school. Two-thirds of the respondents were either married or 
cohabited while 15 percent were divorced or widowed and the rest were single. 
Importantly, ten percent are immigrants, 59 percent were local domestic migrants 
while 30 per cent were BAMA-born residents.  
Employment and income variables help to characterise the labour market features 
of the residents in these neighbourhoods. The proportion of informal workers – 62 
percent – is considerably higher than the 48 percent average for Great Buenos Aires 
(GBA) provided by EPH-INDEC (2006), denoting the precariousness of the labour 
market for these residents. The proportion of temporary and self-employed 
(freelancer) workers ranges from 12 to 19 percent of the total share of working 
household heads. Nevertheless, the unemployment rate of seven percent is similar 
to that of GBA for that date (EPH-INDEC, 2006). The highest proportion of workers 
was employees – 42 percent – while only one percent are employers and eight 
percent are retired. Moreover, the proportion of social plan beneficiaries 
represents four percent of the respondents. The mean value for the monthly per 
capita income in 2006 was ARG $308.30, and incomes ranged from ARG $40 to ARG 
$2,000. The total average monthly income, including all adult members in the 
household was ARG $1,233.91 and ranged from ARG $450 to ARG $3,800. National 
statistics by INDEC, indicates that the indigence line per adult in December 2006, 
which was based on the basic food basket was ARG $134.14 while the poverty line 
for an adult was ARG $291.08. Both figures indicate that the average income in the 
area was just above the poverty line. 
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TABLE 4.7. SUMMARY STATISTICS TABLE. VARIABLE LIST AND MEANS.  
(YEAR 2006) 
VARIABLE   OBS MEAN 
STD. 
DEV. MIN MAX 
Household´s  Head Socio-Demographic 
Characteristics  
     
 
Age 633 48.69 13.08 1 90 
 
Sex_Male 633 0.63 0.44 0 1 
Highest Level of Education (Completed) 
     
 
no education 633 0.20 0.46 0 1 
 
Primary School 633 0.68 0.46 0 1 
 
Secondary School 633 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Marital status  
     
 
Single 632 0.10 0.28 0 1 
 
Divorced, Separate or Widow 632 0.15 0.35 0 1 
 
Married or Co-habitant  632 0.75 0.48 0 1 
 
Economic dependency ratio 633 0.23 0.22 0 0.82 
 
Number of occupants in the house 633 4.56 2.12 1 11 
 
International immigrant 629 0.10 0.31 0 1 
 
National migrant 629 0.59 0.49 0 1 
 
Bs. As local migrant 629 0.30 0.46 0 1 
 
Household´s Head Socioeconomic 
Characteristics  
Employment and Income  
     
 
Unemployed 631 0.07 0.25 0 1 
 
Employee 631 0.42 0.49 0 1 
 
Retired 631 0.08 0.28 0 1 
 
Employer 631 0.01 0.12 0 1 
 
Temporary Worker 631 0.12 0.33 0 1 
 
Social Plan Beneficiary 633 0.04 0.21 0 1 
 
Freelance Worker 631 0.19 0.40 0 1 
 
Housewife 631 0.05 0.23 0 1 
Type of occupation  
     
 
Formal Worker 617 0.48 0.50 0 1 
 
Informal Worker 617 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Income and wealth       
 
Total household Income 606 1233.91 697.26 450 3800 
 
Income per capita 606 308.30 200.22 40.91 2000 
 
Goods index 633 0.42 0.14 0 0.50 
 
Service Index  633 0.15 0.09 0 0.30 
Housing Characteristics       
 
Number of Houses by plot 633 1.25 0.54 1 6 
 
Number  of rooms 616 1.99 0.82 1 8 
 
U. B. N. overcrowding 616 0.29 0.46 0 1 
 
Type - standard 627 0.87 0.31 0 1 
 
Type - very precarious  627 0.02 0.14 0 1 
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Type - shack 627 0.08 0.28 0 1 
 
Houseage up to 5 years 611 0.08 0.27 0 1 
 
House age between 6 and 15 years 611 0.28 0.45 0 1 
 
House age between 16 and 22 years 611 0.21 0.41 0 1 
 
House age between 23 and 29 years 611 0.19 0.39 0 1 
 
House age more than 30 years 611 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Length of Residence 
     
 
Up to 5 years  625 0.15 0.36 0 1 
 
Between 6 to 15 years  625 0.32 0.47 0 1 
 
Between 16 to 22 years  625 0.18 0.39 0 1 
 
Between 23 to 29 years  625 0.18 0.39 0 1 
 
More than 30 years  625 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Housing Tenure Status       
 Formal Owner 633 0.77 0.41 0 1 
 
Formal Renter 633 0.02 0.12 0 1 
 Informal owner  633 0.17 0.11 0 1 
 
Occupant (with permission) 633 0.07 0.25 0 1 
 
Squatter 633 0.04 0.22 0 1 
 
Other types of ownership 633 0.00 0.07 0 1 
Legal Status By Ownership Documentation  
    
 
Title 633 0.34 0.47 0 1 
 
Preliminary purchase agreement 
(boleto) 633 0.40 0.49 0 1 
 
Preliminary legal documents 
(regularisation of land rights)  633 0.06 0.23 0 1 
 
No Document 633 0.17 0.38 0 1 
 
Other type of documents 633 0.02 0.14 0 1 
Neighbourhood Heterogeneity  
     
 
Tenure heterogeneity  488 0.50 0.05 0.43 0.66 
 
Housing Type heterogeneity  488 0.64 0.02 0.58 0.68 
 
Permanence  heterogeneity  488 0.29 0.03 0.26 0.36 
 
Migrant heterogeneity  488 0.11 0.05 0.06 0.26 
Distance       
  Dist. Network 611 726.44 517.01 39.91 2060.16 
 
 
Two indices were created to capture respondents’ access to goods and services.75 
The average index score is 0.42 (goods) and 0.15 (services), which indicates a higher 
proportion of goods than services in the house. The indices suggest that the 
consumption of some valuable goods depends exclusively on efforts within 
households while service acquisition needs coordinated activity since it cannot be 
acquired individually in the market. Finally, the survey calculated the average 
                                                             
75 It takes into consideration five domestic services (water obtained with a motor pump or similar, 
sink with water in the kitchen, lavatory with water, toilet with a water discharge to a septic tank, 
cellular phone) and five goods (fridge with freezer, washing machine, VCR, computer, car). 
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distance to the energy network, producing a figure of 727 metres (standard 
deviation 517, ranging from 39 to 2,000 metres), a measure that was originally 
related to the random assignment of the neighbourhoods to the programme.  
 
4. TREATMENT AND CONTROL GROUP BALANCE 
4.1. PRE-TREATMENT CHARACTERISTICS OF THE GROUPS (2001) 
Table 4.8 presents the pre-treatment information from the 2001 National 
Population and Housing Census (INDEC, 2001). The purpose of this comparison is to 
confirm that the main characteristics of the treatment and control groups are 
balanced and, if differences emerge, to define the comparison properly by including 
the corresponding control variables in the model. The Table presents two groups of 
results. The first three columns provide descriptive statistics – mean and standard 
deviation – for each variable that was obtained from the census data and computed 
at a census track-units level. Columns 4 to 6 include a summary of the results of 
differences from the tests of means calculated on each variable, as well as its 
significance and the standard deviation in parentheses. The list of variables is 
divided into several groups that represent the residents, housing, and the 
characteristics of the neighbourhoods. 
The pre-treatment similarities in socio-demographic and housing characteristics can 
be taken as consistent with the exogenous allocation of the co-production 
intervention in the neighbourhoods, and this was described when the natural 
experiment was presented in Chapter 1. The socioeconomic, housing and 
infrastructure service variables are reasonably well balanced for the three groups in 
2001. The variable for educational level does not display significant differences; the 
difference is relatively small for primary educational level attained, which is only 2 
percent lower for Treatment Group 2. When considering the maximum educational 
level attained by the head of the household, we cannot reject the hypothesis of 
equality as regards the highest educational level reached. The strong similarity in 
secondary and university level education compensates for the small difference in 
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the variable for completing primary education (means: 44.5, 41.3 and 44.6 percent 
in each of the treatment and control groups, respectively) which is hardly 
significant at 0.10 significance level. Nevertheless, this fact might have a direct 
incidence on several outcome variables, since there is a claimed-for link between 
education and social capital (Glaeser, 2001). A low education level might even 
suggest greater employment precariousness in Group 2, which might constrain 
housing investment. Then, as a function of this difference, the incorporation of the 
primary education variables in the estimations can be justified. 
The proportion of immigrants and domestic migrants is lower in the control groups, 
where the proportion of locally born residents is slightly higher. The difference in 
the mean values for the proportion of residents that were not born in Argentina is 
marginally significant (at 5 percent). The means are 4.19 and 5.25 percent in each 
of Groups 1 and 2 respectively, and 3.15 percent in the control group. The same 
goes for the proportion of domestic migrants that are born outside the BAMA. 
Among the socio-demographic characteristics that might influence participatory 
involvement and trust, these indicators are usually considered relevant (Portes and 
Zhou, 1992). Hence, these indicators need to be included as controls in the 
estimations.  
Household welfare conditions, which are measured by the Unsatisfied Basic Needs 
(UBN) indicators,76 including characteristics such as housing, sanitation, education, 
overcrowding and subsistence, suggest a strong similarity between groups in 2001. 
The hypothesis of equality in the proportion of unrecoverable deficient houses 
(shacks), shown in the housing term from the UBN indicator can not be rejected. 
The groups are well balanced in terms of maintenance capacity of the household, 
measured by dependency ratio, which indicates the existence of four or more 
                                                             
76 The households that have Unsatisfied Basic Needs (UBN) are the ones that show at least one of 
the following deprivation indicators i) Housing: houses of an undesirable type, such as a room in an 
inquilinato, or precarious housing or others, including ranchos; ii) Living capacity: 4 or more people 
per employed member and also, whose head has not completed the third grade of primary school; 
iii) Sanitary conditions: homes having no toilets; iv) School attendance: household where children at 
school age (6 to 12 years) do not go to school, and v) Overcrowding: houses with more than 3 
people per room (INDEC, 1984).  
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people dependent per employed family member in the household, when this 
member has not completed the third grade of primary school. The latter is a 
commonly used indicator from census data that provides a proxy of subsistence 
conditions among family members. Given the differences in primary school 
attendance, and considering that the national census does not provide information 
on the household’s income, this measure provides evidence of similarities within 
the households of the different groups.  
The difference between the treatment and control groups in the variable of the 
overall unmet basic needs is significant at ten percent: the mean values are 30.94, 
28.16 and 26.96 percent of households, for Groups 1, 2 (treatment groups) and 3 
(control group), respectively. Importantly, the mean values of the different sub-
elements that are part of the UBN indicator suggest that overcrowding for 2001 
(associated with the number of people that sleep in a room) is slightly higher for 
Group 1 (12.2 percent) when compared with Group 2 (9.1 percent) and control 
Group 3 (8.82 percent). This indicator explains in great part the differences in the 
UBN indicator among the groups. Nevertheless, the difference is relatively small 
and significant at a ten percent level. Since this indicator can be affected by the 
programme, a variable indicating the number of members in the house will be 
included in the control vector of the estimations. 
The indicators related to services and housing suggest similar conditions among 
groups. The hypothesis of equality of means in the variables of tenure cannot be 
rejected. No significant differences appear in the tenure variable of formal 
ownership (that is the formal, declared ownership of the house and the land), 
which is slightly lower for Group 2 (UNA). This characteristic may influence directly 
some of the result variables that we want to analyse in our study, since tenure may 
affect housing and community-enhancing investment. 
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TABLE 4.8. MEANS AND DIFFERENCE OF MEANS TESTS FOR CENSUS 
VARIABLES. BY GROUPS (YEAR 2001)  
 
VARIABLE  
GROUP 1 
Treatment 
1 (OC) 
GROUP 2  
Treatment 
2 (NUA) 
GROUP 
3  
Control  
 
OC vs. 
NUA 
 
 
OC vs 
PRIM 
 
NUA vs 
PRIM 
    Mean  Difference of means    
Household Head Socio-Demographic Characteristics      
Highest Level of Education (Completed) 
     
 
       
 
no primary education 20.94 20.6 20.99 0.16 0.12 -0.29 
  
(0.31) (0.45) (0.36) (0.31) (0.27) (0.25) 
 
primary education   44.54 41.38 44.67 1.56** 0.45 -1.10* 
  
(0.22) (0.2) (0.14) (0.56) (0.48) (0.59) 
 
secondary school  14.91 14.85 14.94 0.06 -0.025 -0.09 
  
(0.28) (0.29) (0.29) (0.42) (0.42) (0.42) 
 
university degree  0.07 0.11 0.10 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 
  
(0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
Migrant Status 
      
 
international immigrant 4.19 5.25 3.15 -1.05** 1.03** 2.09** 
  
(0.34) (1.2) (0.27) (1.29) (0.45) (1.26) 
 
national migrant 31.91 31.81 21.37 0.09 0.54** 0.44** 
  
(0.27) (0.15) (0.2) (0.31) (0.34) (0.25) 
      Bs. As. local migrant  0.11 0.13 0.10 -0.01 0.01 0.02 
   (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) 
Unsatisfied Basic Needs   
       UBN (any category) 30.94 28.16 26.96 0.778* 0.97* 0.20* 
  (1.00) (1.63) (1.14) (1.9) (1.56) (2.05) 
 UBN housing 9.38 9.42 9.63 0.95 0.75 0.79 
  (0.81) (1.24) (0.71) (1.53) (1.10) (1.47) 
 UBN dependency 1.28 1.73 1.43 -0.45 -0.15 0.30 
  (0.22) (0.26) (0.18) (0.35) (0.29) (0.32) 
 UBN overcrowding 12.2 9.21 8.82 1.38** 1.87** 0.38* 
  (0.87) (1.05) (0.69) (1.41 (1.14) (1.29) 
Housing Tenure status  
      
 
formal owner 68.64 65.14 68.94 0.50 -0.29 -0.80 
  
(1.15) (2.29) (0.7) (2.65) (1.38) (2.46) 
 
formal renter 2.64 2.98 3.29 -0.34 -0.65 -0.30 
  
(0.24) (0.61) (0.28) (0.68) (0.38) (0.69) 
Neighbourhood 
heterogeneity 
      
 
tenure  0.49 0.55 0.48 -0.06* 0.01 0.06** 
  
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) 
 
housing  0.64 0.65 0.62 -0.01 0.01 0.02* 
  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
education  0.28 0.30 0.29 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 
  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Infrastructure        
 no running water 53.94 52.14 53.32 0.79 0.62 0.82 
  (1.32) (1.72) (2.15) (1.24) (1.59) (1.83) 
 
no household sewage 
disposal 55.53 54.98 55.91 0.55 0.62 0.07 
  (2.36) (2.39) (2.01) (3.48) (3.19) (3.22) 
 unpaved streets 18.83 11.32 33.97 7.50 -15.14 -22.65** 
  (5.63) (4.57) (6.88) (7.530) (9.16) (8.51) 
        
         
        Source: Based on  NHPC,INDEC (,2001)  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Furthermore, the hypotheses of equality in infrastructure and services among the 
treatment and control groups can not be rejected. This means that the groups are 
well balanced in the proportion of houses having substitute goods of appropriate 
quality instead of a substitute for networked services in those neighbourhoods. No 
significant differences are seen in the infrastructure services available in the house, 
which involves a toilet with an appropriate disposal arrangement (i.e., connected to 
a septic tank), and availability of water obtained from a reliable source in terms of 
bacteriological quality (i.e., a deep enough underground well activated by a motor 
pump). 
One of the main services provided by the municipal public sector in areas with 
informal urbanisation is adequate paving of streets. The difference in the 
proportion of non-paved roads is statistically significant (at a 0.01 significance 
level). The number of paved roads is higher in treatment than in control groups. 
While 34 percent of the houses in the control group are located in areas with no 
paved roads; 19 percent and 11 percent of the dwellings belonging to Groups 1 and 
2 (OC and NUA), respectively, do not have access to such an amenity. This fact can 
be indicative of the municipal public sector being less attentive to basic demands. 
Nevertheless, this is compensated for by the fact that those units  are much closer 
to the main avenues of the area, as it is explained later when the descriptive 
statistics of our survey measures are summarised. If this is associated with the level 
of trust in the municipality, the bias might be detrimental to control 
neighbourhoods, since treatment groups are better serviced. To overcome such an 
issue, the distance to the main avenue is included as a control in those estimations.  
We cannot reject the null hypothesis of equality of means related to the indicators 
of heterogeneity, except for tenure heterogeneity which is slightly higher in Group 
2, but the difference is marginally significant at a 0.10 significance level when 
Groups 1 and 2 are compared. Most of the indicators of neighbourhood 
heterogeneity (on housing, education and migrant status) are generally well 
balanced among groups, suggesting a strong similarity in the composition of the 
census tracks in these groups.  
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I can therefore conclude that the groups are well balanced in terms of pre-
treatment, socio-demographic, housing and neighbourhood characteristics, which 
are consistent with the exogenous allocation of the co-production intervention. 
Nevertheless, some additional measures are taken in order to substantiate the 
empirical strategy. First, the differences in the pre-treatment characteristics will be 
controlled, including those features in the estimations. Second, the resident’s and 
housing characteristics from the 2006 baseline survey are described in the next 
section. If significant differences between treatment and control groups were found 
in some of the observed features, it is necessary to control such differences in the 
estimation of the effects of the programme.  
 
4.2. TEMPORAL (SOCIAL CAPITAL) TRENDS 
Despite the fact that the groups are well balanced in their observable 
characteristics, it is useful to corroborate that the trends in these characteristics 
over time have also been similar. Differences might have an impact on some of the 
analysis. The exogeneity of the programme allocation and the similarity of the 
observable characteristics, when referring to the residents, housing, the origin of 
informal neighbourhoods, plus the fact that the Groups had been a single 
administrative locality for many years, suggest similar processes and timings of 
change. Residents in the neighbourhoods share a similar contextual environment 
since the locality had originated and developed as a single jurisdiction, and then 
was split into two different municipalities in 1993. At that time, neighbourhoods in 
Groups 1 and 2 were allocated to Moreno, while Group 3 to José C. Paz. 
Three different participation measures from a 2002 survey (Forni and Coniglio, 
2003, based on IDICSO-COSNET, 2002) present very similar trends during the period 
prior to the programme implementation in the two municipal jurisdictions, José C. 
Paz and Moreno. Importantly, 75 percent of the respondents from José C. Paz and 
85 percent from Moreno reported that they have never been involved in 
neighbourhood organisations. In both, among those that have participated at least 
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once in their life, one-third have done so in neighbourhood organisations. Indeed, 
respondents in both groups have a relatively similar knowledge of their peers in the 
block since two-thirds of the respondents know their neighbours. Besides, 29 
percent in José C. Paz and 41 percent in Moreno have a negative perception about 
residents’ disposition to allocate time to organisations; this was slightly greater in 
the treatment group. These figures are consistent with what has been reported by 
other studies assessing participatory efforts in Latin America (Gilbert and Ward, 
1984b). However, the difference among groups may be indicative of a lower 
involvement of the respondents in treatment groups, but the perception of other 
neighbours’ involvement is similar between both groups.  
Although we do not have data about trust among neighbours in order to trace 
behaviours, there are certain qualitative insights that help substantiate an overall 
view of the level of social interactions among peers before the intervention in those 
neighbourhoods. Scholars that have focused on issues connected to social capital in 
these neighbourhoods describe a very low level of interaction among neighbours 
before the announcement and implementation of the programme (Fidanza, 2005). 
They also point to the “more inward” focus and fewer opportunities to develop 
solidarity bonds during the economic crisis of 2001, when unemployment affected 
47 percent of household heads (Fidanza, 2001: 8; INDEC, 2001). Commonly heard 
expressions included, “I don’t even know my neighbour’s name”, “I wouldn’t risk 
my neck for any of them”, “I’m not in touch with them ... I manage on my own”, 
and “I did everything on my own”. Such expressions summarise the context before 
the intervention, and show that the residents’ involvement in reciprocal relations 
with others was very limited (Fidanza, 2001). Under such initial conditions new 
social interactions elicited by the intervention may affect the level of trust among 
peers as a result of new interactions and commitments.  
 
4.3. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE GROUPS IN 2006 
Individual-level data from the sample gathered in 2006 include neighbourhood 
comparisons of socioeconomic variables. These included, age, sex, level of 
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education and employment of the head of the household, marital status, total 
family income and dependency ratio, tenure and housing legal status (both as 
reported by respondents and backed with documentation), length of permanence 
in the neighbourhood and characteristics of the dwellings (number of houses per 
plot, number of rooms, age and type of the house and overcrowding). The above-
mentioned indicators from the baseline survey of 2006 are described In Table 4.9, 
where they are compared for the treatment and control groups.  
Summary statistics for each treatment and control group and the t-tests for the 
difference in the mean value of key variables between the control and treatment 
groups are reported, grouped in seven different categories: i) socio-economic 
characteristics, ii) employment, iii) income and wealth, iv) housing characteristics, 
v) length of residence, vi) tenure and legal status, and, vii) distances measures.  
Most socioeconomic variables are well balanced among groups and do not show 
significant statistical differences, a result which is consistent with our hypothesis 
that the selection for the programme was not based on socioeconomic 
characteristics of the residents. We cannot reject the hypothesis of equality of 
means for the sex of the household head, the level of education (no education and 
complete secondary education), number of members in the house and most of the 
employment and income variables, even the proportion of formal workers and 
social plan beneficiaries. Moreover, the differences in the variable of completed 
primary education, which were reported as being statistically significant in the pre-
treatment data analysis for 2001, is hardly significant (at 5 percent) with more 
respondents having primary school as the higher level of scholarship attained in 
Group 1. While this might suggest greater employment precariousness, the 
similarity in employment status and type of occupations does not support such a 
belief.  
When the difference in the mean values for the proportion of residents that were 
not born in Argentina is considered, once again, it is marginally significant (at 5 
percent). This result is aligned with the evidence provided by pre-treatment data 
analysis. It indicates a lower proportion of international and domestic immigrants in 
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the control group, where the proportion of locally born residents is slightly higher 
and statistically significant (at 1 and 5 percent, respectively). In order to account 
properly for these observable marginal differences in the group composition, the 
two variables will be included as control in the estimations.  
Results for age, marital status (separated, widow or widower) and retirement status 
(as an occupational activity) show values that are marginally higher in the control 
group. Moreover, the dependence ratio is marginally lower in that group. While we 
cannot reject the hypothesis about the number of members in the house neither 
the variables related to income per capita and total income, nor do the above-
mentioned differences contribute to suggest the existence of a slightly higher 
proportion of older residents in the control group. These variables are added as 
controls to account for such differences among groups. Furthermore, to illustrate 
the balance in the economic characteristics, income and employment were 
considered. The household per capita income is close to ARG $300 in all groups 
(ARG $298.26, $309.98 and $319.5 for Groups 1, 2 and 3, respectively) and the 
average total household income per month is ARG $1,224.13, $1,190.92 and 
$1,231.87, respectively. The mean differences for the average monthly income per 
capita are marginally and statistically significant at a ten percent significance level. 
Moreover, one cannot reject the null hypothesis of equality of means in the 
proportion of all occupational categories (employee, unemployed, and employer, 
temporary and freelance workers) and of housewives and social plan beneficiaries. 
We cannot reject the hypothesis for the proportion of formal and informal workers 
either.  
 
 
 
146 
 
TABLE 4.9 MEANS AND DIFFERENCE OF MEANS TESTS: BY GROUPS. 
(YEAR 2006)  
 
 VARIABLE
GROUP 
1      
(CO)
GROUP 
2     
(NUA)
GROUP 
3 
(PRIM)
OC       
vs .    
NUA
OC       
vs . 
PRIM.
NUA  
vs . 
PRIM.
Household Head Socio-Demographic Characteristics
Age 48,19 47,08 53,78 1,11 -5.5*** -6.6***
(13,23) (13,09) (11,34) (1,17) (1,49) (1,56)
Sex_Male 0,65 0,62 0,61 0,05 0,04 -0,008
(0,43) (0,46) (0,46) (0,03) (0,05) (0,05)
Highest Level Of Education (Completed)
No education 0,22 0,23 0,24 -0,08 -0,08 0,001
(0,44) (0,48) (0,48) (0,04) (0,05) (0,05)
Primary School 0,7 0,66 0,66 0.08** 0,08 0.01*
(0,44) (0,48) (0,48) (0,04) (0,05) (0,05)
Secondary School 0,09 0,11 0,1 0,04 0,01 -0,03
(0,35) (0,29) (0,33) (0,02) (0,03) (0,03)
Marital status 
Single 0,17 0,16 0,15 -0,02 0,002 0,03
(0,26) (0,31) (0,26) (0,02) (0,03) (0,03)
Divorced, Separate or Widow0,25 0,23 0,32 0,007 -0.1*** -0.1***
(0,33) (0,32) (0,45) (0,02) (0,04) (0,04)
Married or l iving with 
couple 0,52 0,49 0,44 -0,04 0.1*** 0.1***
(0,48) (0,49) (0,41) (0,04) (0,05) (0,05)
Economic dependency 0,22 0,27 0,16 -0.1*** 0.1*** 0.1***
(0,21) (0,24) (0,19) (0,01) (0,02) (0,03)
Number of members  in the household 4,63 4,53 4,39 0,1 0,24 0,14
(2,13) (2,12) (2,11) (0,18) (0,24) (0,26)
International  Immigrant 0,11 0,11 0,09 0,01 0,04 0,01
(0,31) (0,31) (0,29) (0,03) (0,02) (0,03)
National  Migrant 0,58 0,56 0,51 1.13** 3.0*** 2.1***
(0,49) (0,50) (0,46) (0,05) (0,04) (0,06)
 Loca l  Migrant GBA 0,32 0,33 0,38 -0.12* -1.01** -1.13**
(0,47) (0,47) (0,40) (0,02) (0,03) (0,03)
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(Continue)
 VARIABLE
GROUP 
1      
(CO)
GROUP 
2     
(NUA)
GROUP 
3 
(PRIM)
OC       
vs .    
NUA
OC       
vs . 
PRIM.
NUA  
vs . 
PRIM.
Household´s Head Socio-Economic Characteristics
Employment 
Unemployed 0,08 0,06 0,09 0,03 -0,01 -0,04
(0,26) (0,21) (0,29) (0,02) (0,03) (0,02)
Employee 0,4 0,46 0,38 -0,05 0,02 0,08
(0,49) (0,50) (0,49) (0,04) (0,05) (0,06)
Reti red 0,08 0,07 0,15 0,01 -0.1** -0.07**
(0,26) (0,25) (0,35) (0,02) (0,03) (0,03)
Employer 0,01 0,01 0,03 -0,01 -0,02 -0,01
(0,09) (0,12) (0,17) (0,01) (0,01) (0,01)
Temporary Worker 0,14 0,12 0,08 0,01 0,05 0,03
(0,35) (0,32) (0,28) (0,03) (0,03) (0,03)
Socia l  Plan Beneficiary 0,04 0,05 0,05 0,01 0,01 0,01
(0,19) (0,23) (0,22) 0,00 0,00 0,00
Freelance Worker 0,19 0,21 0,19 -0,01 0,01 0,02
(0,39) (0,41) (0,39) (0,03) (0,04) (0,04)
Housewife 0,06 0,04 0,05 0,02 0,01 -0,01
(0,24) (0,20) (0,22) (0,02) (0,02) (0,02)
Social Security 
Formal  Worker 0,49 0,51 0,53 -0,05 -0,07 -0,01
(0,50) (0,50) (0,50) (0,04) (0,05) (0,06)
Informal  Worker 0,51 0,48 0,46 0,05 0,07 0,01
(0,50) (0,50) (0,50) (0,04) (0,05) (0,06)
Income and Wealth Indicators
1224,1 1190,9 1231,9 33,22 -77,7 -71
(685) (672) (781) (62) (84) (90)
Income per capita 298 309 319 -11,72 -11.2* -29,53
(188) (219) (195) (18,2) (22,6) (26,9)
Goods   Index 0,42 0,43 0,43 -0,01 -0,01 0
(0,16) (0,15) (0,14) (0,01) (0,02) (0,02)
Service Index 0,19 0,16 0,18 0.02* 0.06* -0,04
(0,17) (0,17) (0,19) (0,01) (0,02) (0,02)
Distances 
855 1281 325 -426** 529*** 956***
(146) (105) (59) (187) (162) (124)
340 809 1285 -945*** -469*** -476***
(60) (124) (104) (125) (142) (167)
Average dis tance to 
network
Tota l  Household 
Income
Distance to nearest 
avenue
MEAN DIFFERENCE IN MEANS 
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(Continue)
 VARIABLE
GROUP 
1      
(CO)
GROUP 
2     
(NUA)
GROUP 
3 
(PRIM)
OC       
vs .    
NUA
OC       
vs . 
PRIM.
NUA  
vs . 
PRIM.
Housing  characteristics 
Houses   by plot 1,18 1,34 1,28 -0.16*** -0.10** 0,06
(0,42) (0,69) (0,50) (0,05) (0,05) (0,08)
Number  of rooms 1,98 1,8 2,09 0.10* -0.20* -0.28*
(0,85) (0,76) (0,69) (0,07) (0,09) (0,09)
U. B. N. overcrowding 0,33 0,33 0,3 -0,04 0.19* 0.203*
(0,46) (0,48) (0,35) (0,04) (0,05) (0,06)
Type _standard 0,88 0,87 0,9 0,01 -0.18* -0.12*
(0,32) (0,34) (0,18) (0,03) (0,03) (0,04)
Type_precarious  0,03 0,02 0,01 0,01 0.03* 0.01*
(0,16) (0,12) (0,10) (0,01) (0,02) (0,01)
Type _shack 0,08 0,11 0,03 -0,03 0.05* 0.08**
(0,27) (0,32) (0,18) (0,03) (0,03) (0,04)
House age up to 5 years 0,07 0,12 0,01 -0.05** 0.05** 0.1***
(0,25) (0,33) (0,10) (0,03) (0,03) (0,03)
House age between 6 
and 15 years 0,27 0,31 0,22 -0,03 0,05 0,08
(0,45) (0,46) (0,42) (0,04) (0,05) (0,06)
House age between 16 
and 22 years 0,26 0,19 0,12 0.07* 0.1*** 0,07
(0,44) (0,39) (0,32) (0,04) (0,05) (0,05)
House age between 23 
and 29 years 0,23 0,14 0,17 0.09** 0,06 -0,03
(0,42) (0,34) (0,38) (0,04) (0,05) (0,04)
House age more than 
30 years 0,17 0,24 0,48 -0.07** -0.3*** -0.2***
(0,38) (0,43) (0,50) (0,04) (0,05) (0,06)
Housing Tenure and Legal Status 
Self declared tenure status
Formal  Owner 0,76 0,72 0,91 0,03 -0.1*** -0.18***
(0,43) (0,45) (0,29) (0,04) (0,05) (0,05)
Informal  Owner 0,08 0,11 0,04 -0,03 0,03 0.06*
(0,27) (0,31) (0,20) (0,03) (0,03) (0,03)
Formal  Renter 0,02 0,01 0,01 0.01* 0,01 -0,01
(0,15) (0,07) (0,10) (0,01) (0,01) (0,01)
Occupant with permiss ion 0,06 0,1 0,01 -0,03 0.05** 0.01***
(0,24) (0,30) (0,10) (0,02) (0,03) (0,03)
Squatter 0,05 0,05 0,05 0 0,04 0,04
(0,21) (0,23) (0,10) (0,02) (0,02) (0,02)
Other types  of ownership 0,01 0 0 0 0,01 0
(0,08) (0,07) 0,00 (0,01) (0,01) (0,01)
MEAN DIFFERENCE IN MEANS 
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(Continue)
 VARIABLE
GROUP 
1      
(CO)
GROUP 
2     
(NUA)
GROUP 
3 
(PRIM)
OC       
vs .    
NUA
OC       
vs . 
PRIM.
NUA  
vs . 
PRIM.
Legal Status By Ownership Documentation
With Ti tle 0,31 0,35 0,45 -0,04 -0.1*** -0.10**
(0,46) (0,48) (0,50) (0,04) (0,05) (0,06)
Boleto -coveyance 0,4 0,37 0,48 0,03 -0,08 -0.11*
(0,49) (0,48) (0,50) (0,04) (0,06) (0,06)
Precary tenure -regularization 0,1 0,01 0,01 0.01*** 0.07** -0,01
(0,30) (0,10) (0,14) (0,02) (0,03) (0,01)
No Document 0,16 0,25 0,04 -0.08** 0.1*** 0.2***
(0,37) (0,43) (0,20) (0,04) (0,04) (0,05)
Other type of documents 0,02 0,02 0 0 0,02 0,02
(0,15) (0,16) 0,00 (0,01) (0,02) (0,02)
Length of Residence in the neighbourhood
Up to 5 years  0,17 0,18 0,01 -0,011 0.1*** 0.1***
(0,38) (0,39) (0,10) (0,03) (0,04) (0,04)
Between 6 to 15 years 0,31 0,33 0,31 -0,01 0,01 0,02
(0,46) (0,47) (0,46) (0,04) (0,05) (0,06)
Between 16 to 22 years  0,2 0,18 0,13 0,01 0,06 0,05
(0,40) (0,39) (0,33) (0,04) (0,04) (0,05)
Between 23 to 29 years 0,2 0,14 0,19 0.06* 0,01 -0,05
(0,40) (0,35) (0,39) (0,03) (0,05) (0,05)
More than 30 years 0,12 0,17 0,37 -0.05* -0.2*** -0.2***
(0,32) (0,37) (0,48) (0,03) (0,04) (0,05)
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Notes: Table computed at the household level using survey information (2006). Standard errors 
shown in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Other characteristics, such as the means for the goods index, are very similar across 
groups. One exception in the service index, marginally superior in Group 1, is 
related to the expected outcome of the effects of having gas connection, in 
connection to housing improvements in the treatment group that has already been 
connected to the service. This issue is indicative of the effects of the intervention. 
In most other respects, housing characteristics are well balanced and the marginal 
differences shown between the groups are statistically significant at a 10 and 5 
percent significance level. There are more housing units per plot in Group 2 (1.34 
units compared to 1.18, and 1.28 units per plot in Groups 1 and 3) and the number 
of rooms is slightly higher in the control group (the difference is statistically 
(Continue)
 VARIABLE
GROUP 1      
(CO)
GROUP 2 
(NUA)
GROUP 3 
(PRIM)
GROUP 1 
vs. 
GROUP 2
GROUP 1 
vs. 
GROUP 3
GROUP 2 
vs. 
GROUP 3
Legal Status By Ownership Documentation
With Title 0.31 0.35 0.45 -0.04 -0.1*** -0.10**
(0.46) (0.48) (0.50) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
Boleto -coveyance 0.4 0.37 0.48 0.03 -0.08 -0.11*
(0.49) (0.48) (0.50) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
Precary tenure -regularization 0.1 0.01 0.01 0.01*** 0.07** -0.01
(0.30) (0.10) (0.14) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
No Document 0.16 0.25 0.04 -0.08** 0.1*** 0.2***
(0.37) (0.43) (0.20) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Other type of documents 0.02 0.02 0 0 0.02 0.02
(0.15) (0.16) 0.00 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Length of Residence in the neighbourhood
Up to 5 years 0.17 0.18 0.01 -0.011 0.1*** 0.1***
(0.38) (0.39) (0.10) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Between 6 to 15 years 0.31 0.33 0.31 -0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.46) (0.47) (0.46) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
Between 16 to 22 years 0.2 0.18 0.13 0.01 0.06 0.05
(0.40) (0.39) (0.33) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Between 23 to 29 years 0.2 0.14 0.19 0.06* 0.01 -0.05
(0.40) (0.35) (0.39) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
More than 30 years 0.12 0.17 0.37 -0.05* -0.2*** -0.2***
(0.32) (0.37) (0.48) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
MEAN DIFFERENCE IN MEANS 
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significant at a 10 percent significance level). As we have already indicated when 
describing the pre-treatment information, the overcrowding indicator associated 
with the number of people per room in the house shows a slightly higher difference 
in the treatment groups when compared to the control group (means 0.33 and 
0.30, respectively). This variable can have a direct incidence on some of the 
improvement outcomes because families may have more incentives to build a new 
room. Consequently, the number of members in the house should be included as 
control in the model regressions.  
As can be seen, the tenure and document variables are reasonably balanced for the 
three groups, displaying no significant differences in most of them. For example, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis of equality for the proportion of formal renters, 
occupants and squatters. The proportion of households that declare having a 
formal tenure status of the house and the plot is higher in the control group (91 
percent), when compared to the neighbourhoods in the treatment groups (76 and 
72 percent, respectively), and the difference is significant at a one percent 
significance level. This feature may influence directly some of the outcome 
variables of interest. The tenure formality/informality status can affect people’s 
incentives to improve the house and thereby have an impact on the estimated 
participation and on trust. In all models this variable is included as a control to 
check differences among groups.  
The length of residence ranges from six to 22 years (from 1984 to 2000) and is well 
balanced among groups. The fact that there are more newcomers and a greater 
proportion of newer built houses during the last five years in the treatment groups 
might be considered a side effect of the intervention.77 These differences are 
statistically significant at a one percent level. Moreover, the higher proportion of 
older housing units and the statistically significant difference in the proportion of 
residents who settled there more than 30 years ago reinforces the notion of an 
older established population within the control group. These facts can bias the 
estimation of social capital investment because the newly arrived can have a 
                                                             
77 Restricted to residents living there for less than four years before the baseline 
survey.  
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“diluting” effect (see Hilber, 2010) and affect other changes. On the one hand, long-
standing houses may have been progressively improved over a longer time frame 
and thus require fewer improvements. On the other hand, older units may be in 
need of a greater number of repairs, as was shown by Ward et al. (2011a) for 
Mexican colonias. What is relevant is that those differences among groups have to 
be controlled. Therefore, dummy variables corresponding to length of residence 
and tenure status are included in the models.  
A tenure status variable is included because of the higher correlation between the 
length of residence and the type of document that residents hold as a proof of their 
tenure status. The probability of a dweller having formal or informal status is 
correlated with the time in which s/he has settled in the area. Indeed, the residents 
that settled after the 1977 enactment of the provincial government of Buenos Aires 
(8912) are considered illegal according to the law. This land-use legislation was 
enacted in order to limit informal development in the region (Goytia and 
Lanfranchi, 2009). The law required a minimum plot size of 300 square metres and 
forced developers to finance infrastructure as a prerequisite for the subdivision of 
land. At the same time, any land development not following regulations was 
deemed illegal. The land regularisation programme developed in 1994 for 
settlements inhabited until 1984 was aimed at people who could prove continuous 
occupation of the plot. The residents that arrived after 1994 are deemed illegal by 
the provincial law.  
That is an important explanation for the differences in the proportion of residents 
holding legal status of their units, since the time of arrival and the age of the 
housing unit are correlated with the possession of this type of documentation. We 
cannot reject the null hypothesis of equality in means for the proportion of 
residents that have a conveyance, which is the preliminary sales agreement. 
Moreover, there are statistically significant differences in the proportion of 
household heads that reported having legal titles, a preliminary tenure 
regularisation certificate or no document at all. The proportion of titled units is 45 
percent for neighbourhoods included in the control group, while it is 31 and 35 
percent for the units included in Treatment Groups 1 and 2. This suggests that the 
153 
 
higher proportion of older population that has been established for a longer period 
of time within the control group has had access to a legal status. The 
undocumented status of the housing units is higher within Group 2 (UNA), which 
has a slightly higher proportion of newcomers, while the proportion of units that 
have certificates of preliminary tenure regularisation is higher in Group 1 (OC). 
These facts should justify the incorporation of the dummy variables for the 
documents and of the tenure categories in the regressions. Finally, the average 
distance to the energy network is 726.44 metres, with a standard deviation of 
517.01, ranging from 39 to 2,000 metres.  
To sum up, many of the observable characteristics of the households in the 
treatment and control groups appear similar at this stage. When this is not the case 
for variables that are more closely related to the expected outcomes of the co-
produced intervention, they are included as covariates in the models.  
The observable characteristics that are statistically different among groups and that 
may not be directly affected by the programme are included in the models.78 Those 
include all resident and housing-level characteristics already described which 
account for differences in observable characteristics. This set of covariates include: 
i) socio-demographic characteristics of the head of household, the family and the 
housing unit: age (and age square), sex, marital status (binary variable taking value 
1 for married or cohabitation and 0 otherwise), primary education, migratory status 
(two dummy variables taking value 1 if respondent is immigrant or domestic 
migrant from another province of the country, and 0 if otherwise) and number of 
houses in the plot; ii) socioeconomic characteristics of household head: 
employment and income characteristics (a binary variable for retired), logarithm of 
average family income per capita, dependency level (i.e. the ratio of the number of 
residents under 14 and the number of income earning family members), the total 
number of members in the house; iii) dummy variables identifying the length of 
residence of the family in the neighbourhood, divided into five categories: less than 
                                                             
78 There is a usual trade-off involved in the choice of covariates in order to avoid post-treatment 
bias, which is caused by adjusting for variables that are themselves affected by treatment 
(Rosenbaum 1984). 
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five years in the neighbourhood, 6 to 12 years, 12 to 22 years, 23 to 30 years and 
more than 30 years and, finally; iv) tenure and documents dummies.  
Measures that account for contextual effects related to heterogeneity are also 
included as controls. The calculation of statistics of the surrounding blocks is 
considered since the degree of homogeneity or heterogeneity between neighbours 
may affect participation costs. The very low number of neighbourhoods in our 
sample (15 in total) constrains the inference over heterogeneity measures at the 
neighbourhood level. The models include the average values and heterogeneity 
indices of a selected set of characteristics related to nearby neighbours. The 
definition of nearby houses includes those that are within 200 metres or less from 
each other. This distance accounts for what could be a reasonable spatial expansion 
of daily social interactions.  
The heterogeneity characteristics in such neighbouring clusters are: i) income index 
(computed using household income from the different surveys) to measure levels 
of income inequality, ii) the (migrant) origin heterogeneity index (that takes into 
consideration nationality and province of origin), iii) the education heterogeneity 
index, iv) the tenure heterogeneity index; v) housing heterogeneity index and, 
finally, vi) the length of residence heterogeneity index. The construction of the 
indices is described in Appendix 3.  
The income index is based on the quintiles of the income distribution within the 
group; the migrant heterogeneity index considers the share of local-born residents, 
of national migrants and of cross-border ones. The education heterogeneity index 
divides people into four educational level categories: primary education not 
completed, and primary, secondary and university level studies completed.  
The tenure heterogeneity index divides people into five categories: formal owner, 
informal owner, renter and occupant, and the last category considers those that are 
squatters. The housing heterogeneity index takes into account the share of units 
that are regular ones, and those that are shacks and dilapidated ones (casillas and 
ranchos, in Spanish) Finally the length of permanence index categorises people into 
the 5 categories already described as controls: less than five years in the 
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neighbourhood, 6 to 12 years, 12 to 22 years, 23 to 30 years and more than 30 
years.  
 
5. ESTIMATION MODELS FOR YEARS 2006 AND 2009.  
Two different estimation methods are used to present the impact of the 
intervention at the two different points in time, 2006 and 2009. One, based on OLS 
– 2SLS, when using data from 2006, and “differences-in-differences” estimators, 
when households are observed at two points in time by the surveys from 2006 and 
2009. Basically, difference-in-differences methodology compares variations in the 
results over time between treatment and control groups. The outcome variables 
are used as dependent variables in the econometric models, which have the 
offering of the programme (intention to treat) and the effective enrolment (local 
average treatment effect) as main explanatory variables. The main significant 
differences on individual and contextual variables are included as covariates, based 
on the results obtained in this chapter assessing treatment and control groups 
balance. The econometric models that are estimated to obtain measures of the 
effects are included in the Appendix 2.  
 
5.1. SAVINGS AND ENROLMENT 
The first set of models contributes to understand how different characteristics of 
the households affect their probability of joining the programme. Enrolment in the 
co-produced programme is explained based on observable characteristics of the 
household head, the family and the house, using 2006 information of residents 
located in Group 1. First, the model includes two sets of socio-economic 
characteristics from the householder – age, sex, marital status, maximum level of 
education attained and migrant condition (international, provincial or local 
metropolitan area native) – and from the members that cohabit in the house (the 
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number of residents, number of children under 14 years old), dependency ratio,79 
number of houses per plot and total family income by quintiles of the income 
distribution. In Model 2 labour status and occupation variables are added. Those 
include: (i) household head labour occupation, (ii) whether the household head 
works in formal employment conditions – which means regularity on income and 
stability through pension system coverage, and (iii) the length of permanence in the 
job. All these measures may affect (current and permanent) income. Since long 
term residence may reduce information problems and may determine security, 
Model 3 includes (iv) the stability effect -by length of residence in the 
neighbourhood. Models 4 and 5, take into account the self-declared tenure status 
of the respondent, using the following characteristics80: (i) owner of the house and 
the plot (defined as formal owner); (ii) tenant (defined as formal renter); (iii) Owner 
of the house only (defined as informal owner); (iv) occupant having permission to 
dwell in (defined as occupant) and (v) occupant without permission to live in the 
house (defined as squatter). Documentation of ownership rights is included, instead 
of including the tenure situation. Model 5 adds legal type of documentation for 
ownership rights.81 The legal ownership rights include the following categories: (i) 
legal title, either nominated at his/her name or a close relative (Title), (ii) 
Conveyance, or receipt , either nominated at his/her name or a close relative 
(Conveyance), (iii) land regularisation beneficiary ( precarious tenancy, known as 
“titularidad precaria” or “Ley Pierri”82 (Regularised), (iv) None and (v) Unknown, in 
case the respondent does not know what type of  document the family holds. 83 
This thesis underscores that the potential savings that energy substitution 
represents for families are a key determinant in providing incentives to participate. 
In order to assess the validity of this assumption, a variable captures the cost of gas 
                                                             
79
 Number of adult working members per number of children in the household.  
80 It distinguishes the use rights from those to transfer and modify the unit. It has no legal 
connotation since legality is not assessed by INDEC. 
   
81 Due to the fact that the documentation and tenure self-reported are highly correlated, these set 
of variables cannot be included altogether.  
82 
The Governor of Buenos Aires Province, which enacted in 1994 the Land Regularisation Law No 
24.374.  
83 The set of explanatory variables are included sequentially in five Probit models. 
157 
 
substitutes spent by both participants and non-participant households. For non-
participant families this amount represents their current expenditure in any 
network gas substitute, while for participant families, the expenditure in gas 
substitutes is computed by a retrospective question of how much they were 
spending before their connection to the grid. There is an obvious disadvantage to 
this method of coding gas substitution expenditure: programme adherence would 
be underestimated if inflation has affected the price of energy substitutes, since 
adherent households will systematically have lower values as compared to what 
they would be nowadays reporting. But, the inflationary context – 12.3 percent rate 
from 2005-2006 (BCRA, 2012) – is offset by regulated maximum prices for gas 
tanks. So, a conservative estimate of the savings in energy expenditure that guide 
households in their participation decision is provided here.  
The importance of savings is captured in the models that include the full set of 
individual and household variables detailed above. In addition, three different 
measures of gas substitute’s expenditure are added. Savings are coded as a 
dichotomous variable taking value 1 if the family spends (or was spending if they 
belong to the (now) connected group) above a certain percentile of the distribution 
of expenditure in the neighbourhood and 0 otherwise.  
 
5.2. THE MEASUREMENT OF EFFECTS   
As we explained above, in many policy circumstances, understanding if the 
neighbourhood where the intervention is offered, as a whole, exhibits some 
average difference as compared to the control group is of high relevance. On the 
one hand, this sort of intervention where residents have to contribute to finance 
the connection, can never expect full compliance and, on the other hand, we might 
expect spillovers to affect the residents that were not enrolled in the co-produced 
programme (the “non-treated” group in the “intention to treat” sample group). For 
these reasons, the first set of models involves comparing the intention to treat 
group (all residents in the neighbourhoods where the programme is offered, both 
treated and non-treated) against the control group (Group 3, formed by Primavera 
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neighbourhoods).  
We have two differentiated “intention to treat” groups. Comparing 
neighbourhoods from Group 2 ( NUA) and Control (Primavera), will shed light on 
the effect of introducing an exogenous source of social interactions (Stage 1 of the 
co-production intervention) while comparing Group 1 (OC) and Control Group84 will 
inform on the “complete experience” effects, if any, that arise from the outcomes 
under analysis. The same is estimated again, as result of the whole co-production 
experience and gas network connection after some years of its implementation in 
year 2009.  
Finally, there is also an interest in understanding the effects of the programme on 
other, more specific groups. In particular we are interested in analysing programme 
effects – or incremental effects – for the actual “treated” residents, which means 
those that enrol in the programme and obtain the connection to the energy grid. 
First, it compares enrolment families in Group 1 against the non-treated families 
(non-participants in Group 2 and every household in Group 3). The same is done to 
compare outcomes for enrolment families with non-adherent ones within 
neighbourhoods where the programme was not implemented.  
 
5.3. TENURE, HOUSING IMPROVEMENTS AND TRUST 
Given the heterogeneity of formal rights to property that prevailed in these 
settlements – from titled property rights to informal ones, such as those associated 
with informal occupation or the possession of informal documents – there might be 
different incentives for the residents to invest in social capital, thanks to the energy 
programme. Therefore, the sample is split into four different categories, which are: 
titled ownership rights, non-legal rights ownership, secure ownership (declared 
formal owners) and non-owners (squatters and occupants or renters holding use 
rights).  
                                                             
84 In 2006 the programme was only delivered to Group 1, so at that time, the control group includes 
Group 2 and 3. 
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The last group of estimations are intended to shed light to the hypothesised effect 
of trust development on housing reforms. The effect on improvements will be the 
estimated effect of the gas programme on the selected outcome (i.e., housing 
improvements or number of improvements), which is the result of the direct effect 
of the programme on improvements plus the indirect effect of the programme on 
the generation of trust.  
Therefore, the next stage of this analysis assesses the association between trust 
measures and private investments on changes to the house. The trust variable is 
incorporated as an independent variable in the model where the dependent is the 
variable indicating the improvements in the house.  
The third goal of this work is to examine whether the co-production intervention 
effect on investment in the house might be affected by the generation of trust. The 
main hypothesis that is considered here is that both formal and informal 
institutions – such as tenure rights as well as trust, may have effects on private 
investment in the house due to co-production programme implementation. As 
result of such considerations, in this section the trust elicited by the new networks 
supported by the programme and their influence on the likelihood to invest for 
housing improvements are jointly assessed. The models provide empirical evidence 
about the association between several dimensions of trust and private investments 
when it comes to improvements in the houses.  
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The implementation of the co-produced programme was carried out in a way that 
facilitates the evaluation of effects by means of the “natural experiment”.  The 
chapter has described the data and the central methodological issues that help to 
quantify these social and physical effects. First, it defines three different 
programme stages that are the base for the identification of the causal effects of 
co-production taking into consideration the sequential implementation into the 
neighbourhoods.  
Second, this methodology compares variations in the results between the groups of 
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neighbourhoods that were beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of the intervention 
at two points in time (2006 and 2009). Residents that are located in the 
neighbourhoods that were programme beneficiaries are compared against those 
residents located in non-beneficiary neighbourhoods. Thus, the counterfactual for 
the beneficiary group is estimated from the change in outcome of the non-
beneficiary group (comparison or control group). In the completed experience 
stage in 2006, Group 1 is compared to Groups 2 and 3, since the last two were not 
beneficiaries of the co-produced programme at that date. In 2009, either the 
effects from the social interactions and information gathering stage (in Group 2) 
and the effects from the after connection stage (in Group 1) have the 
neighbourhoods where the programme is not implemented as a control group 
(Group 3). In each beneficiary group, the method distinguishes the average effect 
from the specific effect on the programme participants that decided to enrol in the 
co-produced scheme.  
Third, the chapter provided evidence on the well-balanced characteristics of the 
groups (treatment and control) that validates the exogeneity of programme 
allocation. This information helps to determine any differences among groups 
previous to the intervention that are controlled- and ruled out- once included as 
controls in the models. Besides, the limitations on checking social trends before 
programme implementation are overcome by presenting available qualitative 
information that helps to substantiate the balance among groups. Still, the 
relevance of utilising differenced data between 2006 and 2009 takes away any 
difference in unobservable characteristics that cannot be appropriately control 
when including observables differences among groups as covariates.   
Finally, the methods used to measure programme effects, enrolment and savings 
internalisation, the tenure and legal explanations and the association between trust 
measures and housing improvements are outlined. This way, the legal and tenure 
security explanations for internalisation of benefits from investment are empirically 
framed, when the causal effects on the outcomes of interest are contrasted 
between residents that where beneficiaries of the co-produced service programme 
and those located in the control group.  
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CHAPTER 5: THE SOCIAL DIMENSIONS: PARICIPATION AND 
TRUST 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the effects of service co-production on participation and 
trust. The presentation of these results is organised in four sections. Section 5.2 
considers enrolment to the network extension programme and outlines the effects 
of savings which is a key factor for the internalisation of benefits. Section 5.3 
considers voluntary participation in neighbourhood activities and organisations 
driven by implementation of the co-produced programme, and the building of 
collective capacity. Section 5.4 concentrates on the co-produced programme’s 
effect on generalised and particularised trust and bases the analysis in the three co-
production stages. Finally, Section 5.5 presents the conclusions on the social 
dimension of co-producing services.  
2. MEMBERSHIP, GAS EXPENDITURES AND SAVINGS 
Chapter 3 outlined the internalisation of benefits from household membership in 
the co-produced programme. Membership is defined as the contribution in time 
and financial resources to the programme via enrolment and becomes effective 
with the signing of the fiduciary trust agreement. By 2006, Group 1 households 
were connected to the new pipeline, and had been since 2005. In the group, non-
participating residents had either not given their consent or were unable to reach 
agreement with a sufficient proportion of neighbours within their block. The survey 
of this group captured data for 240 households enrolled on the programme (over 
70 percent) and 90 that were not.  
The decision to enrol on the programme depends on a calculation of savings 
generated by substituting bottled gas (garrafa social) or other poor quality goods 
such as wood logs, kerosene, or expensive electricity services, for the networked 
gas, against the costs of the new system. Obtaining energy from the gas company is 
cheaper and safer, and increases comfort in all domestic activities, from nutrition to 
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hygiene.85 Yet, participation involves individual and household commitments to 
finance the grid extension. Residents are encouraged to pay regular monthly 
expenses over a time frame that extends beyond most of the financial 
commitments they are used to. Indeed, by signing the fiduciary trust agreement, 
each adult member in a participant household has to guarantee that financial 
commitments will be paid and, moreover, each becomes liable for their neighbours’ 
accountability or payment default.  
In order to understand the substitution effect the 2006 survey included two 
questions. One retrospective dealing with energy consumption habits, while the 
second disaggregates actual consumption through piped provision into two items: 
gas expenses (charged for consumption) and average installation costs. Participants 
report average monthly energy spending on gas around AR$ 62 before connection, 
while on average they paid almost the same (AR$ 60) for their new piped gas 
consumption. Net consumption spending is half of that sum, with the rest used to 
pay for the extension and connection works. After paying the fixed costs of the 
installation, there is a projected reduction in energy expenses and a boost in 
disposable monthly income of almost AR$ 35. Since families are spending around 
five percent of their incomes on either buying gas or gas substitutes, in the short 
run it seems that households might be indifferent to the decision to participate in 
economic terms, since the only benefit at this stage would seem to have been the 
use value of the new service.  Nevertheless, the internalisation of net savings 
through connection is apparent when all the installation costs have been paid, 
reducing energy expenditure to AR$ 28.5, that is 2.3 percent of the average 
monthly income of AR$ 1,200. Importantly, taking into account the variable and 
fixed costs, at the connection stage in 2006, 41 percent of households experienced 
some sort of savings, a percentage that will increase to 77.5 percent after the 
installation cost is paid. Finally, the rest of the participants spend the same but are 
                                                             
85 A fixed maximum price and a fund to finance subsidies for bottled gas were established by the 
National Government, that aimed to target the population that lack access to piped gas service. 
Nevertheless, the subsidised gas bottle is much more expensive than network-distributed natural 
gas (ENARGAS, Resolutions Nos. 1070 -1071 and 1080/2008), while supply is insufficient due to lack 
of adequate monitoring and control by the regulatory authority (Bravo et al, 2008). 
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consuming much more energy, since the new service allows for heating devices and 
hot water, besides cooking use (Table 5.1).86 
 
TABLE 5.1. AVERAGE MONTHLY ENERGY EXPENDITURES ON PIPELINED 
GAS AND SUBSTITUTES.  
In AR$ (November – December 2006) 
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Gas substitutes (consumption)  330 62.4 74.9 10 850 
Pipelined gas (consumption) 240 28.5 28.2 4 200 
Pipelined gas (consumption & connection)  240 59.9 42.5 5 200 
Savings (substitution) 240 -34.6 77.2 14 -750 
Savings (substitution & connection) 240 -2.7 64.4 10 -565 
 
 
Savings from substitution may constitute a powerful incentive to explain 
enrolment. To understand what are the characteristics associated with 
membership, participation is explained by socioeconomic and socio-demographic 
conditions of the household head and the family, tenure, legality and residence 
stability. After that, the savings hypothesis is assessed adding gas expenditures 
before connection as an explanatory variable in the models. Lastly, the analysis is 
complemented by the inclusion of contextual (spatial) effects, in terms of 
heterogeneity and neighbours’ enrolment. Model results are reported in Table 5.2. 
We can see that age is positively associated with participation (an additional year 
correlates with a 1-percentage point increase in the probability of connecting to the 
gas network), implying that the more mature the household head the greater the 
chance they will engage in this costly improvement. On average, those who did 
participate are 5.2 years older. However, age is no longer statistically significant 
once legal documents are included, which indicates that youth is not a constraint to 
participation when legal rights are taken into consideration.   
                                                             
86 Information estimates from Gas BAN indicate that gas consumption of these customers was 
increasing progressively from 500 cubic metres a year to an average consumption over 750 cubic 
metres a year (Gas Natural BAN, 2006).  
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TABLE 5.2. MEMBERSHIP IN CO-PRODUCED PROGRAMME 
Dependent Variable: Membership in Co-Produced Programme 
 
    
(1) 
 
11 
(2) (3)   ( 4)  ( 5) 
       
Socioeconomic characteristics 
 
Head of household characteristics 
  
Age 0.010*** 0.007** 0.006** 0.005* 0.004 
   
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
  
Male 0.001 -0.038 -0.055 -0.055 -0.077 
   
(0.072) (0.085) (0.082) (0.086) (0.077) 
 
Marital status. Baseline Category: : single 
  
Divorced, separated or widow -0.211 -0.201 -0.178 -0.193 -0.195 
   
(0.149) (0.173) (0.170) (0.181) (0.176) 
  
Married or cohabitant 0.003 0.042 0.075 0.075 0.092 
   
(0.113) (0.141) (0.141) (0.148) (0.139) 
 
Education. Baseline Category: : no education 
  
Completed  Primary 0.092 0.021 0.053 0.064 0.051 
   
(0.068) (0.072) (0.073) (0.075) (0.075) 
  
Completed  Secondary 0.095 0.035 0.068 0.070 0.051 
   
(0.075) (0.089) (0.085) (0.086) (0.087) 
 
Place of birth. Baseline Category: : Buenos Aires 
  
International immigrant 0.093 0.108 0.115* 0.138** 0.151*** 
   
(0.077) (0.069) (0.069) (0.061) (0.055) 
  
National migrant 0.133** 0.171** 0.167** 0.167** 0.177** 
   
(0.060) (0.069) (0.069) (0.070) (0.070) 
 
Household characteristics 
  
Houses  per plot -0.050 -0.044 -0.039 -0.044 -0.029 
   
(0.071) (0.073) (0.071) (0.070) (0.067) 
  
Number of members 0.047** 0.033 0.028 0.025 0.027 
   
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) 
  
Number of children under 14 -0.140** -0.071 -0.076 -0.051 -0.080 
   
(0.065) (0.067) (0.064) (0.064) (0.063) 
  
Dependency ratio 0.008** 0.006* 0.007** 0.006* 0.008** 
   
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
 
Income 
  
Quintiles of total family income 0.025 0.007 0.011 0.018 0.025 
   
(0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) 
Permanent income and labour characteristics 
 
Labour situation. Baseline Category: : formal worker 
  
Informal worker 
 
-0.139** -0.137** -0.133* -0.147** 
    
(0.070) (0.070) (0.071) (0.071) 
 
Type of job. Baseline Category: : employee 
  
Unemployed 
 
0.003 -0.017 0.008 -0.025 
    
(0.114) (0.120) (0.124) (0.138) 
  
Temporary job 
 
0.008 0.033 0.048 0.059 
    
(0.087) (0.083) (0.081) (0.075) 
  
Social plan beneficiary 
 
-0.417 -0.460* -0.474 -0.324 
    
(0.277) (0.271) (0.301) (0.273) 
  
Freelancer 
 
0.207**
* 
0.196*** 0.175*** 0.193*** 
    
(0.059) (0.060) (0.064) (0.054) 
  
Retired 
 
0.092 0.100 0.094 0.097 
    
(0.091) (0.088) (0.090) (0.088) 
  
Employer 
 
-0.199 -0.275 -0.260 -0.157 
    
(0.235) (0.247) (0.248) (0.210) 
 
Time in current job. Baseline Category: : Less than 2 months 
  
between 2 and 3 months 
 
-0.044 -0.062 -0.076 0.008 
    
(0.103) (0.110) (0.113) (0.098) 
  
Between 4 and 6 months 
 
0.079 0.067 0.035 0.063 
    
(0.078) (0.081) (0.086) (0.076) 
  
Between 7 and 12 months 
 
0.169**
* 
0.162** 0.144** 0.176*** 
    
(0.062) (0.066) (0.071) (0.061) 
  
Between 1 and 2 years 
 
0.079 0.063 0.020 0.048 
    
(0.077) (0.080) (0.086) (0.080) 
  
More than 2 years 
 
0.012 0.011 -0.028 -0.033 
    
(0.104) (0.102) (0.113) (0.110) 
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Table 5.2 [Continued] 
 
Length of residence in neighbourhood. Baseline category: Less than 5 years   
 
Between 6 and 15 years 0.162*** 0.164** 0.164** 
    
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
 
Between 16 and 22 years 0.229*** 0.199*** 0.197*** 
    
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
 
Between 23 and 29 years 0.166** 0.133 0.119 
    
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
 
More than 30 years 
 
0.139* 0.12 0.097 
    
(0.07) (0.08) (0.09) 
Tenure situation. Baseline category : Formal owner   
 
Renter 
   
-0.35 
 
     
(0.21) 
 
 
Informal owner 
  
-0.129 
 
     
(0.12) 
 
 
Occupant 
   
-0.475*** 
 
     
(0.15) 
 
 
Squatter 
   
-0.1 
 
     
(0.17) 
 Title of property. Baseline category: Title 
 
 
 
 
Conveyance 
   
-0.242*** 
      
(0.078) 
 
Regularized 
   
-0.12 
      
(0.136) 
 
Other documents 
   
0.002 
      
(0.152) 
 
No title 
    
-0.586*** 
      
(0.103) 
 
Unknown 
   
-0.521 
      
(0.331) 
       
Log-likelihood -176.3 -140 -133.7 -126.4 -118.2 
Pseudo-r2 0.10 0.19 0.22 0.26 0.31 
Fraction of participants  
observed in data 
0.71 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 
Average probit score 0.62 0.72 0.75 0.75 0.82 
 
Notes: N=330 Probit Model. Marginal probabilities calculated at the mean. 
All models include socioeconomic controls, head of household labour characteristics and length of 
permanence of residence in the neighbourhood. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 p<0.01 *** p<0.05 ** p<0.1*.    
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The migrant condition of the head of household is a predictor of enrolment. 
Compared with household heads born in Buenos Aires, those coming from other 
provinces of Argentina and immigrants are more likely to enrol in the programme. 
The latter display greater probability of participation (13 percentage points), but 
only when their permanence of residence, tenure and legal status is considered, 
implying that those born in neighbouring countries have a higher probability of 
enrolment, holding all other determinants at their mean level.  
In a context of occupational instability, household decisions to enrol and how the 
service (and further installation works) would be financed become relevant. The 
main reason is that income is unstable and households face risks of affordability 
during some months. At such times, people usually manage to cope by reducing 
consumption, including deferring buying a gas bottle, especially at the end of the 
month. Importantly, income per se is not a significant constraint for accessing 
services. The distribution of participating households is almost perfectly even along 
quintiles of income (see Graph 5.1). Both participants and non-participants are 
similarly represented among the different quintiles of the income distribution in the 
neighbourhood. These data indicate a positive distributive effect of the 
programme.  
Evidence of earnings is complemented by the household head’s relationship with 
the labour market. There is a strong negative relationship between enrolment and 
heads of household who report employment in the informal sector. These findings 
are in line with the explanation that income instability might deter families from 
engaging in monthly expenditure obligations. Notably, residents who are 
freelancers or self-employed (cuentapropistas) are more likely to enrol than 
employees. Since membership is not bound to formal employment, self-employed 
(generally informal workers) benefit most from co-production. Those heads of 
household who started working between seven and 12 months before the 2006 
survey was conducted have higher probabilities of programme participation as 
compared with other reported timeframes of job initiation. The suggestion is that 
households decided to enrol influenced by very recent employment experience.  
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FIGURE 5.1 MEMBERSHIP DISTRIBUTION BY INCOME QUINTILES  
(MEANS IN AR$) YEAR 2006 
 
 
 
 
As already explained in Chapter 3, it could possibly be the case that those who 
decided to participate had started to look for jobs in order to cover the expected 
monetary commitments of participation. In effect, they planned for the prospective 
investment by increasing their participation in the labour force. Membership into 
the programme may imply more hours at work or other family members taking on 
new occupations. The qualitative insights provide some support for this notion.  
According to Marcos T., a resident who lived in the Barrio Alem, whose family 
decided not to enrol in the programme, “… I think natural gas would be good, it 
would be good if I have a job, because until now, thanks God, I’m working, but … I 
don’t know, maybe, who knows, [if] I’m out of work, and I would be in a bit of 
trouble … wouldn’t I? So … it would be complicated to get stuck in it”.  
These figures underscore the relevance of residential stability to participation. 
Length of residence in the neighbourhood is a good predictor of the internalisation 
of benefits through participation. It increases the probability of enrolment, as 
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compared with those households that have been living in the neighbourhood for 
less than five years.87 Breaking down the sample, those who first arrived 16 to 22 
years ago had the greatest likelihood of membership (22 percentage points more 
likely as compared to families living in Organised Community for less than five years 
and holding all other determinants at their mean level). All other groups are also 
positively associated with membership as compared to the newcomers and this 
relationship is statistically significant.  
Importantly, once tenure and documents are included as controls, six to 22 years 
residence predicts participation. Notably, this group had arrived to the area after 
the enactment of Buenos Aires Province Decree, law 8912/77, which declared this 
settlement subdivision type “illegal”.88 The group was always informal while 
households with greater permanence of residence were able to claim the benefits 
from Land Regularisation National Law 24.374, after 1992 (Clichevsky, 1996). The 
findings support the explanation that titling and tenure are strong predictors of the 
decision to engage in housing improvements but stability is still a significant 
predictor for residents who arrived in the neighbourhoods during the period when 
the area developed under informal treatment under the law. Therefore, while 
tenure and documents are significant for long-term residents’ enrolment, 
residential permanence is central for participation of those residents who are 
categorised as informal within the scope of the Land Use Regulation Law.  
Tenure is associated with enrolment: formal owners do lead enrolment as 
compared with occupiers, though reported formal owners are not more likely to 
participate than those who report being informal owners (owners of the house but 
not of the plot). At the same time, renting or squatting is not a deterrent to 
participation and there is no statistical difference between those reporting being 
formal owners and squatters. Although the number of squatters is very low (16 in 
the entire sample) over 70 percent of them have enrolled in the programme, 
especially those that enjoy stability of residence. Occupants have fewer incentives 
                                                             
87 Eleven percent of people enrolled arrived within less than five years, while among those not 
enrolled the figure is 30 percent. 
88 Below a minimum lot size of 300 square metres and without complete provision of infrastructure 
(Clichevsky, 1996). 
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to engage in costly infrastructure improvements given their uncertain expectations 
of future residency. Of 21 occupants, less than one-third are enrolled and these 
have been living in the house for between 6 and 22 years. It is somewhat similar 
with legal documents, since not having any documentation as proof of ownership 
or having a conveyance is associated with diminished enrolment. From a total of 
133 residents holding a conveyancing document, 36 do not participate. However, 
titleholders are not the only ones who participate. Those who are regularised, have 
other documents or are unclear about the documentation are not statistically 
associated with lower enrolment in the programme. From a total of 54 residents 
that have no documentation as proof of tenure, one-third (18) have already 
enrolled in the programme.  
It is particularly relevant to analyse the importance that savings in gas represent for 
households that decide whether or not to invest in connecting to the gas grid. In 
Table 5.3 (Columns 1 to 6) the gas expenditure variable separates the sample into 
those that spend (or spent) the least and those that were above this threshold. 
Different measures are used to code expenditures. First, it separates the sample 
into those that spend the least (25 percent of the sample) and those that were 
above this threshold (75 percent of the sample) (columns 1 and 4). Then, it 
separates spending below and above the mean expenditure (columns 2 and 5) and 
finally, expenditure was coded as 1 for those spending above the 75th percentile 
(the quarter that spent the most) and 0 for those below this threshold (Columns 3 
and 6). Importantly, the threshold which has the greater predictability is the one 
identifying households that consume the least in gas substitutes (the quarter of the 
sample which reported the lowest values for this variable): the group spending 
above this low threshold are almost 40 percentage points more likely to enrol than 
their counterparts who spent below the 25th percentile (holding all other variables 
at their mean level). Together with tenure (being a formal owner as compared to an 
occupant) and title (having property title versus not having any documents or 
having conveyance), expenditures in gas substitutes is the most powerful predictor 
of programme participation. It is interesting to note that both the threshold 
identifying consumers of gas substitutes above the median and that which 
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identifies the top consumers (above the 75th percentile) are less predictive than the 
first one, since in any of the models their predictability is higher than 24 percentage 
points.  
TABLE 5.3. MEMBERSHIP IN CO-PRODUCED PROGRAMME  
(SAVINGS MODEL) (YEAR 2006) 
Dependent Variable: Membership in Co-Produced Programme 
 
  
TENURE STATUS OWNERSHIP DOCUMENTS 
    (1) ( 2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        Income 
 
Quintiles of total family 
income 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 
  
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Tenure Condition. Baseline Category: : Formal owner 
 
Formal renter -0.27 -0.30 -0.29 
   
  
(0.21) (0.23) (0.21) 
   
 
Informal owner -0.13 -0.17 -0.20 
   
  
(0.11) (0.12) (0.12) 
   
 
Occupant -0.44*** -0.43*** -0.49*** 
   
  
(0.14) (0.15) (0.16) 
   
 
Squatter 0.010 -0.031 -0.06 
   
  
(0.14) (0.15) (0.15) 
   
Ownership Documents. Baseline Category: : Title 
 
Conveyance 
   
-0.23*** -0.23*** -0.20*** 
     
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
 
Regularised 
   
-0.10 -0.16 -0.14 
     
(0.13) (0.14) (0.13) 
 
Other documents 
   
0.06 0.01 -0.01 
     
(0.11) (0.14) (0.15) 
 
No documents 
   
-0.56*** -0.57*** -0.53*** 
     
(0.10) (0.107) (0.11) 
 
Unknown 
   
-0.45 -0.50 -0.57 
     
(0.42) (0.369) (0.35) 
Expenditure in Gas (before substitution) 
 
Above 25th percentile 0.39*** 
  
0.38*** 
  
  
(0.07) 
  
(0.07) 
  
 
Above median 
 
0.20*** 
  
0.18*** 
 
   
(0.05) 
  
(0.05) 
 
 
Above 75th percentile 
  
0.23*** 
  
0.18*** 
    
(0.04) 
  
(0.04) 
        Log-likelihood -112 -120 -119 -104 -113 -114 
Pseudo-r2 0.342 0.293 0.303 0.38 0.33 0.33 
Average probit score 0.789 0.78 0.79 0.80 0.80 0.81 
 
Notes: N=330 Probit Model. Marginal probabilities calculated at the mean. 
All models include socioeconomic controls, head of household labour characteristics and length of 
permanence of residence in the neighbourhood. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 p<0.01 *** p<0.05 ** p<0.1*.    
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In all, identifying the group of families that spend the least on gas substitutes, 
together with tenure conditions that identify occupants and legal documents which 
identify conveyance holders and undocumented holders, seems the most 
reasonable strategy for identifying the lower probability of membership. 
Importantly, the results from incorporating the consumption variables greatly 
increase the models’ predictability.89 Socio-demographic and socio-economic 
characteristics of the household head and the family explain only ten percent of the 
variance in membership.  The new models identify approximately 34 to 38 percent 
of the variability observed in participation. This finding compares with Di Pasquale 
and Glaeser’s (1999) “better citizenship” analysis of membership that explained 
only 8 to 13 percent of the variability on “working to solve local problems” when 
using a much larger sample from the US General Social Survey (GSS).  
In Table 5.4 the heterogeneity indices are included. For each there is a positive 
relationship between enrolment and greater homogeneity. This finding is in line 
with the work of Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) that shows that in heterogeneous 
communities, both in terms of income inequality and racial or ethnical 
fragmentation, participation in groups that require direct contact among members 
is low. All three heterogeneity indices are statistically significant in explaining 
membership, meaning that the greater the homogeneity of group members the 
easier they find it to come to an agreement to sign the trust fund agreement. This is 
true for income, migration and length of permanent residence. However, income 
heterogeneity seems to represent the weakest relationship with membership (both 
in terms of magnitude of the effect and level of significance). This might be because 
as explained previously, income does not constrain participation.  
 
 
 
                                                             
89 R squared more than doubles as compared to models in the previous section.  
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TABLE 5.4 MEMBERSHIP IN CO-PRODUCED PROGRAMME 
(HETEROGENEITY) 
Dependent Variable:  
Membership In Co-Produced  
Programme  
HETEROGENEITY INDEX  
MIGRANT  INCOME  PERMANENCE  
(1) (2) (3) 
    Migrant heterogeneity index 0.033*** 
  
 
(0.01) 
  Income heterogeneity index 
 
0.014* 
 
  
(0.01) 
 Permanence heterogeneity index 
  
0.028*** 
   
(0.01) 
Observations 330 330 330 
Log-likelihood -58.35 -65.53 -61.55 
 
Notes: Probit Model. Group 1. Clustered standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. All models include socio-economic controls, head of household labour characteristics, length 
of residence in the neighbourhood and tenure controls 
 
 
 
3. PARTICIPATION  
In addition to membership, involvement in neighbourhood activities might be 
boosted by the specific “participatory” aspects of the co-production institutional 
scheme. The following sections present the co-produced programme effects on 
participation at the three different stages of implementation. I consider the 
complete experience effects of Group 1; the information gathering stage (in Group 
2) and finally, the post connection stage.  
3.1. CONNECTION STAGE: THE COMPLETE EXPERIENCE 
Table 5.5 reports a summary of the econometric results for the evaluation of 
participatory outcomes at the connection stage in Group 1. The outcomes 
examined are listed together with the effect that can be attributed to the co-
produced gas programme and the range of effects estimated according to the 
different specifications of the econometric models.  For each variable there are two 
tables: one summarises the results obtained from the standard estimation of the 
model, the average impacts in the whole group of residents, besides their effective 
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enrolment (which is reported by the intention to treat variable, ITT), in Columns 1 
to 3. The second reports the average effect on those that enrol in the co-produced 
programme to obtain the piped gas connection (reported by the local average 
treatment variable, LATE) in Columns 4 to 6.  All the differences between groups 
are added as controls in Column 2 (see Chapter 4) and in Column 3, contextual 
heterogeneity measures (of income, nationality, and length of residence). Columns 
4 to 6 display the same regressions showing the average effects on those that enrol 
only (local average treatment effect on the treated, LATE).  
TABLE 5.5. PARTICIPATION: CONNECTION STAGE (2006) 
 
 
 
GROUP 1 (OC) 
Intention- to -Treat Estimates 
(ITT)  
GROUP 1 (OC) 
Average Treatment Effect   
on the Treated   (LATE)   
Dep. Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Voluntary social org -0.014 -0.008 -0.028 -0.019 -0.011 -0.038 
 (0.029) (0.032) (0.034) (0.041) (0.042) (0.045) 
Voluntary leisure org -0.032 -0.051 -0.048 -0.044 -0.069 -0.066 
 (0.033) (0.035) (0.037) (0.046) (0.048) (0.049) 
Formal org_active  -0.014 -0.013 -0.012 -0.019 -0.017 -0.016 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) 
Formal_org_passive -0.010 -0.007 -0.006 -0.013 -0.010 -0.008 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) 
Q orgs 0.036 0.020 -0.023 0.050 0.027 -0.031 
 (0.073) (0.079) (0.079) (0.101) (0.106) (0.104) 
Formal org active_rel  0.098 0.096 0.090 0.136 0.131 0.123 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.042) (0.052) (0.050) (0.054) 
Collective_capacity 0.211** 0.225** 0.244** 0.290** 0.303** 0.324** 
 (0.088) (0.102) (0.110) (0.120) (0.136) (0.142) 
 
 
Notes: N=630. Models 1 to 3 are OLS, Models 4 to 6 are (IV) 2SLS. Models 1 and 4, no control 
variables; Models 2 and 5, full set of socio-demographic, socioeconomic controls, length of 
residence, tenure and legality; Models 3 and 6, socio-demographic and socioeconomic controls 
length of residence, tenure and legality; and adds heterogeneity indices for migrant condition, 
income and length of residence.  Columns (1), (4) and (7): Standard errors in parentheses. Columns 
(2), (3), (5) and (6): Robust Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
^includes religious organisations. 
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If we consider the effects of the programme at this stage on the different 
participatory variables, results show that one year after the connection, there is no 
induced increase in resident participatory involvement attributable to the 
programme.  Participation - the proportion of respondents who report participation 
- is no higher for residents connected to the grid than is reported by residents in the 
control group.  Both the intention to treat estimator and the estimation of the 
treatment effect on the treated suggest similar conclusions in that differences 
among groups are not statistically significant (Table 5.5). The analysis confirms the 
expected pattern from the literature; namely, once services are obtained, mutual 
contributions tend to weaken. In short, participation is a response to “pragmatic 
policy interests” (Mansuri and Rao, 2004), such as a cost-effective service delivery.  
Despite the low level of involvement, the results suggest that the co-produced gas 
programme did raise collective capacity at this stage. Regarding the effects on the 
readiness to work together for the collective provision of public goods, the results 
show that the programme induced an increase in this willingness. The “intention to 
treat” estimator suggests an increase of 21.1 to 24.4 percent in the proportion of 
respondents that report such a disposition attributable to the co-produced 
programme, whereas the average effect on the “treated” estimator reports 
stronger effects, with an increase of  29 to 32.4 percent .  
Table 5.6 reports the results for this collective-capacity dependent variable based 
on “practical collaboration” when the sample is divided into the tenure categories. 
The intention to treat estimator suggests an increase of 21 to 24 percent in the 
willingness to collaborate. The LATE estimator reports a stronger effect of 29 to 32 
percent. These results suggest that the programme implementation increases the 
willingness to collaborate displayed by residents, despite the tenure and legal 
status that they hold. Regarding the effects of the programme on formal owners, 
the intention to treat estimator suggests an increase of 19 to 25.6 percent and the 
LATE estimator reports a stronger effect of 25.2 to 31.7 percent attributable to the 
programme.  In the case of non-titled residents, the intention to treat estimator 
suggests an increase of 21.5 to 27 percent and the LATE estimator reports a 
stronger effect of 31.2 to 38.3 percent. 
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These effects seem less robust for titled owners and non-formal owners, whose 
willingness to collaborate are determined by contextual effects of 
heterogeneity/homogeneity of the group. In the case of residents holding legal 
rights to property, there is no robust effect attributable to the programme.  
Regarding the effects of the programme on this group, the results indicate that the 
co-produced programme induced an increase in their willingness to participate in 
collective activities only when the model specification controls for the contextual 
effects. In such a case, the intention to treat estimator suggests an increase of 25 
percent whereas the LATE estimator reports a stronger effect of 30 percent.  Then, 
in the absence of selective incentives provided by group composition, titled 
residents do not increase their participation compared with legal owners in the 
control groups. As these results indicate, the composition of the group (its 
heterogeneity or homogeneity) is a key determinant for the individual incentives to 
participate. Collaboration is easy among similar peers, but group inequalities 
provide incentives that can either increase the willingness to participate – for 
example, to make one’s voice heard – or can weaken such a willingness due to 
difficulties to share a “common language” among the parties. 
A similar effect on the willingness to collaborate is found for non-formal owners.90 
The significant effect in this group disappears when individual characteristics and 
group heterogeneity are accounted for in the models. The intention to treat 
estimator suggests an increase from 31 to 56.5 percent. In other words, the positive 
effect on the group of residents associated with the connection stage of the 
programme disappears due to the inclusion of the contextual effect of neighbour 
characteristics.  Some interesting features arise from the information on this group. 
The local average treatment estimator (LATE) suggest an increase of 60 to 98 
percent, which suggests that almost all of the households that participated in the 
programme and were connected to the new gas service, would be willing to 
participate in a new collective intervention in their neighbourhood (were such an 
opportunity to present itself). This analysis is complemented in Chapter 6 when 
                                                             
90 Non-formal owners are informal owners, occupants, squatters and renters.  
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housing improvements for this group and the association with the specific 
institutional co-produced programme institutional framework are analysed.  
TABLE 5.6. COLLECTIVE PARTICIPATION: THE COMPLETE EXPERIENCE. BY 
LEGALITY AND TENURE (2006) 
 
 
      Dep. Variable: 
Collective participation 
Intention to Treat Estimates (ITT)  
for Complete Experience in OC 
  (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
Full Sample  0.211** (0.088) 0.244** (0.110) 0.225** (0.102) 
Titled  (Legal Rights) 0.221 (0.144) 0.227 (0.157) 0.254* (0.144) 
Formal Owner (Secure 
Ownership) 
0.199** (0.100) 0.256** (0.119) 0.235** (0.117) 
Non-Titled  (No Legal Rights) 0.215* (0.111) 0.270** (0.136) 0.224* (0.122) 
Informal Owner or Use rights 
(Non- Secure Ownership) 
0.315* (0.183) 0.565** (0.234) 0.252 (0.226) 
       
  
Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE)  
for Complete Experience  in OC 
  (4)  
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
Full Sample  0.290** (0.120) 0.324** (0.142) 0.303** (0.136) 
Titled  (Legal Rights) 0.268 (0.174) 0.262 (0.168) 0.299* (0.166) 
Formal Owner (Secure 
Ownership) 
0.252** (0.127) 0.317** (0.141) 0.292** (0.142) 
Non-Titled  (No Legal Rights) 0.312* (0.161) 0.383** (0.179) 0.319* (0.169) 
Informal Owner or Use rights 
(Non- Secure Ownership) 
0.591* (0.355) 0.979*** (0.369) 0.437 (0.377) 
        
Notes: N=630 (full sample); Title=214; Formal Owner= 485; Non-Titled=415 and Informal/Use rights 
=145. Models are OLS for the ITT and (IV) 2SLS for LATE. Comparison is Group 1 and Groups 2 and 3. 
Model 1 and 4, no control variables; Model 2 and 5, full set of socio-demographic, socioeconomic 
controls, length of residence, tenure and legality; Models 3 and 6, socio-demographic and 
socioeconomic controls length of residence, tenure and legality; and adds heterogeneity indices for 
migrant condition, income, length of residence.  Columns (1), (4)): Standard errors in parentheses. 
Columns (2), (3), (5) and (6): Robust Standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
3.2. THE INFORMATION GATHERING STAGE (2006-2009) 
As explained in Chapter 4, the sequential implementation of the programme meant 
that in 2009, Group 2 had gone through the social interaction phase, started in 
2007. Group 1 had been connected to the gas network for four years, while Group 3 
remained as a pure control group with no implementation of the co-produced 
177 
 
intervention. Households were observed at two points in time (years 2006 and 
2009). The results reported in this section are then based on the difference-in-
differences methodology. This compares variations in the results over time 
between treatment and control groups. Table 5.7 reports the results on 
participatory outcomes at the two different stages of implementation: the 
information and social interaction stage (in Group 2) and the residual effect of the 
programme several years after implementation (in Group 1). 
The co-production programme caused an increase in participatory involvement in 
voluntary neighbourhood activities and organisations, and in the average number 
of activities in which residents in Group 2 were involved. This is the expected result 
of the information and social interactions stage, when residents are encouraged to 
gather the required information and to build links among neighbours (i.e., to reach 
the level of enrolment that is required for the connection of the block). The 
intention to treat estimation shows an incremental effect in the residents’ level of 
participatory involvement that ranges from 13.9 to 17.4 percentage points is 
attributable to the programme (Columns 4 to 6). The incremental effect due to the 
co-produced programme represents a 100 percent increase in the proportion of 
residents that reported having participated in voluntary neighbourhood activities 
compared to 14.6 percent of the residents that reported that they had participated 
in voluntary social activities in the control group during the same time frame. In 
order to have a comprehensive measure of the scope of overall participation (Row 
5) reports the effect on the number of organisations in which respondents 
participate. The intention to treat estimator suggests a positive incremental effect 
of the programme in the number of activities reported by respondents in Group 2 
that is attributable to the programme, and this effect is negative for Group 1 at the 
post connection stage. Both are statistically significant at conventional significance 
levels. The information stage supports an increase of 17.2 to 22.7 percent on 
residents’ membership in activities departing from an average of 0.6 in the control 
group. Participatory involvement has increased when it is required by the co-
produced model, but less than one third of respondents report doing so. 
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TABLE 5.7. INFORMATION AND POST-CONNECTION STAGE 
(YEARS 2006-2009). INTENTION TO TREAT ESTIMATES  
DEP. VARIABLE  
POST-CONNECTION STAGE          
GROUP 1 (OC) 
 INFORMATION STAGE              
GROUP 2 (NUA) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       part_voluntary_soc 
_org -0.062 -0.026 -0.017 0.139*** 0.166*** 0.174*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
part_voluntary_leis. -0.024** -0.025** -0.012 0.014 0.016 -0.02 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
part_formal_passive -0.024** -0.025** -0.012 -0.014 -0.016 -0.02 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
part_formal_active -0.041* -0.036 -0.021 0.014 0.028 0.017 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
q_ogs -0.277*** -0.228*** -0.179*** 0.172*** 0.227*** 0.211*** 
 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
        
Notes: N=387 (Group 1) and N=270 (Group 2). Models are Differences in Differences. Intention- to-
Treat Estimates. Comparison is Group 1 and Groups 2 compared to Group 3. Model 1 and 4, no 
control variables; Model 2 and 5, full set of socio-demographic, socioeconomic controls, length of 
residence, tenure and legality; Models 3 and 6, socio-demographic and socioeconomic controls 
length of residence, tenure and legality; and adds heterogeneity indices for migrant condition, 
income, length of residence. Robust Standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
3.2.1. PARTICIPATION AND LEGAL/TENURE STATUS 
The empirical results provide evidence that participatory involvement is tightly 
associated with the internalisation of benefits. Residents increase their 
participation when it is required, and when benefits are internalised, and reduce it 
when motivation ceases.  This is the cyclical trend for residents’ involvement. In 
Table 5.8, the differences-in-differences estimation is presented for each of the 
categories defined according to the tenure status and legality of rights that 
residents have over their housing units (legal and non-legal rights, and formal and 
non-formal ownership categories). These indicate the legal and tenure security 
explanations from investments associated with the internalisation of benefits from 
services. Non-legal and informal owners may feel encouraged to participate 
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because the improvements in neighbourhood infrastructure can provide individual 
benefits, reinforcing security. This fact constitutes a key element in cooperation.  
The results of offering the intervention at the information stage (the intention-to-
treat effect in Group 2) indicate a positive effect on participatory involvement. 
Despite the differences in tenure status, residents in three of the four categories 
from Group 2 display positive incremental effects in the likelihood of participatory 
involvement in voluntary neighbourhood activities as an effect of the information 
stage of the intervention. The positive coefficient on the intention to treat 
estimator 1 for Titled (legal owners), declared formal owners and informal (non-
titled) owners, indicates that these are more likely to report participatory 
involvement compared with the control group. Except for the residents that did not 
declare having any ownership rights (occupants with or without permission and 
renters), the coefficients for all tenure categories are positive and significant at the 
information stage. This effect is largely consistent with the urban literature 
reviewed in Chapter 3, since these residents are less able to reap the direct benefits 
of an improved neighbourhood through capitalisation. The result must be treated 
with care, however, as the sample is small and may not allow for statistical 
significance (N=145).  
That said, stability through length of residence in the house is correlated with 
participatory voluntary involvement for this group. In the case of non-formal 
owners, the coefficient for 23 to 29 years of permanent residence in the house is 
highly correlated to participatory involvement, and larger and more significant than 
the other variables. The results indicate that residential stability has a powerful 
significant impact on increasing participatory involvement in voluntary 
neighbourhood activities despite the tenure condition of this group.     
 
TABLE 5.8. INFORMATION AND POST-CONNECTION STAGE.  
PARTICIPATION BY LEGALITY AND TENURE 
DIFFERENCES IN DIFFERENCES INTENTION TO TREAT ESTIMATES - PARTICIPATION IN VOLUNTARY 
SOCIAL ORGANISATION (FOR NEIGHBOURHOOD IMPROVEMENT) - REDUCED AMPLE 
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Dep. Var;  
PARTICIPATION IN  
VOLUNTARYSOCIAL 
ORGANISATION 
LEGAL 
OWNERSHIP  
FORMAL 
OWNERSHIP   
NON-TITLED 
(NO LEGAL 
RIGHTS) 
USE RIGHTS/ 
NO-
OWNERSHIP 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  
        intention_to_treat_OC -0.21*** -0.09*** -0.07*** -0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.21** 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.09) 
intention_to_treat_NUA 0.10*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.20*** 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.05 -0.13 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.09) 
howlong1_5 
   
0.31*** 
 
0.16*** 
 
-0.07 
  
   
(0.03) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.06) 
howlong6_15 
 
0.03 
 
0.021 
 
0.011 
 
0.07* 
  
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.04) 
howlong23_29 
 
-0.05 
 
0.01 
 
0.14*** 
 
0.44*** 
  
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.05) 
howlong30_more 
 
0.23*** 
 
0.13*** 
 
0.04 
 
0.12* 
  
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.07) 
Socio-demographic and income 
controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant 0.86*** 0.82*** 0.225* 0.076 -0.82*** -0.88*** -0.94*** -0.94*** 
  (0.16) (0.16) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.26) (0.28) 
R-squared 0.217 0.26 0.087 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.16 0.25 
F-test 
 
19.72 
 
24.30 
 
12.39 
 
25.50 
Prob > F 
 
0 
 
0 
 
5.39e-10 
 
0 
 
Notes: N=630 (full sample); Title=214; Formal Owner= 485; Non-Titled=415 and Informal/Use rights 
=145. Differences in Differences Estimates. Baseline category: Group 3. Model 1,3,5 and 7, full set of 
socio-demographic, socioeconomic and income controls, Models 2,4,6 and 8 socio-demographic and 
socioeconomic , income controls and length of residence.  Robust Standard errors in 
parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
The evidence offers insights on the incentives to get involved in neighbourhood 
activities for both formal and informal owners during the social interaction stage. 
The results for the intention to treat estimator for legal and formal owners are 
stronger when controlling for individual and contextual characteristics.  
While the first result supports the property rights view of investment in 
neighbourhood-enhancing activities, such as public goods provision, the other two 
results are consistent with tenure security and services incentives on 
neighbourhood participatory efforts. All three results contribute to support the 
internalisation of benefits effects explanation because these groups benefit most 
from neighbourhood improvements. The results, moreover, support the direction 
of internalisation effects extending to residents whose housing rights are not legally 
documented.  
181 
 
Once services are obtained, the post connection effect several years after the 
completion of the co-produced intervention indicates a reduction in participatory 
involvement for both titled residents and formal and non-formal owners, even if 
the effects for these last categories are not robust to all specifications of the 
models. The models reflect the plausibility of the explanation about voluntary 
participation as a mean. All models show no statically significant impact, or at least 
no impact that is robust, except for model (1 and 2) that shows a statistically 
significant impact on legal residents reducing their level of participation. As in 
previous models for this group of legal owners, the contextual effects influence 
their level of participation. In this case, the reduction is lower when they are 
included in the model as controls. Finally, the length of residence for residents 
declaring formal and non-legal ownership is positive and statistically significant in 
several cases. Notably, having one to 5 years of residence suggests a positive 
incremental effect on explaining participatory involvement for residents in these 
groups. 
 
3.3. THE AFTER CONNECTION STAGE (2006-2009) 
In contrast to the boost in participatory involvement reported at the information 
stage for Group 2, the results do not show any significant effect on voluntary 
participation attributable to the post connection stage four years after the 
connection has been obtained in the Group 1 neighbourhoods. The result gives 
more support to the internalisation of benefits motivation for participation, and 
evidence from the literature underscoring the cyclical nature of participation and 
the halt of efforts once services are obtained (Gilbert and Ward, 1984b; Mangin, 
1970; Portes and Walton, 1976). Not only does voluntary social participation not 
change significantly but also the overall membership in organisations decreases at 
this stage. Among the possible explanations, in the literature is the idea that it is 
not costless to participate (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011) since participatory 
involvement may affect the time allocation of low-income residents. It can distort 
familial and working duties. Then, when services have already been obtained either 
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the new economic commitments or the new possibilities of allocation of extra time 
for the improvement of their own houses may substitute for external 
commitments, given the fixed amount of ‘free’ time that residents have. The 
negative sign of all the coefficients for leisure, formal active and formal passive 
organisations, might be indicative of such a constraint. The results are not robust to 
the inclusion of contextual effects.  Then contextual determinants in terms of 
neighbours’ income, migrant origin and length of residence heterogeneity affect 
the likelihood of participation in that type of organised activity in the post-
connection stage for Group 1 (Table 5.7).  
 
4. TRUST  
This section reports the co-produced programme effects on trust at the three 
different stages of implementation. It considers the complete experience effects for 
Group 1 (Section 4.1); then, the information gathering stage in Group 2 (Section 
4.2), and finally, the after  connection stage for Group 1 (Section 4.3).  
4.1. THE COMPLETE EXPERIENCE 
The effects of the co-production intervention complete experience involve the two 
implementation stages together: the gathering of information and the networked 
gas service connection stage in which participants’ houses are provided with piped 
gas. The average effects in 2006 of this “complete experience” stage are presented 
for the two different groups already defined: the first estimates the average 
impacts in the whole group of residents, in addition to their effective enrolment 
(intention to treat variable, ITT) and second, the average effect on those that enrol 
in the co-produced programme to obtain the piped gas connection (local average 
treatment variable, LATE). The results are reported in Table 5.9. 
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TABLE 5.9. THE COMPLETE EXPERIENCE (YEAR 2006) 
Dep. Variable: Trust 
Intention-to-Treat (ITT) 
 
For Complete Experience in OC 
Local Average Treatment Effect 
(LATE) 
For Complete Experience in OC 
  (1)    (2)   (3)   (4)    (5)    (6) 
Generalised Trust    0.0851*** 0.0773** 0.0751** 0.118*** 0.105** 0.102** 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
Trust in CBO  0.200*** 0.208*** 0.207*** 0.277*** 0.283*** 0.281*** 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
Trust in the Family -0.0603** -0.074*** -0.073*** -0.083** -0.101*** -0.099*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Trust in Neighbours 0.018 -0.012 0.003 0.025 -0.017 0.005 
 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) 
Trust in NGO -0.027 -0.035 -0.041 -0.037 -0.048 -0.055 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
Trust in Municipality -0.079*** -0.079** -0.078** -0.110*** -0.109** -0.106** 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
 Trust in Utility 
 
0.0799* 0.0908* 0.111*** 0.111* 0.124** 0.151*** 
  (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Notes: N=630. Models are OLS for the ITT and (IV) 2SLS for LATE. Model 1 and 4, no control 
variables; Model 2 and 5, full set of socio-demographic, socioeconomic controls, length of residence, 
tenure and legality; Models 3 and 6, socio-demographic and socioeconomic controls length of 
residence, tenure and legality; and heterogeneity indices for migrant condition, income, length of 
residence. Columns (1), (4): Standard errors in parentheses. Columns (2), (3), (5) and (6): Robust 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
4.1.1. GENERALISED TRUST 
The survey allowed for an interrogation of residents’ perception of generalised 
trust. When people were asked if the statement “most people can be trusted” is 
true, roughly 20 percent answered “yes” in Group 1, while affirmative answers 
were 12 percent in the control group. The intention to treat estimator suggest an 
increase of eight percent in the positive attitude towards trusting others that is 
attributed to the programme at this stage. The results are robust to the inclusion of 
the socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics, tenure, legal and length 
of residence, and heterogeneity indices that account for contextual effects from the 
nearest neighbours (Columns 2 and 3 for the ITT estimates).  
The complete experience effect on trust becomes larger when it measures the 
impact on residents that participate in the co-production programme and are 
connected to the grid. For example, whereas  the intention to treat estimator 
184 
 
suggest an increase of 7.5 to 8.5 percent on the proportion of respondents that 
report trust in others  (Columns 1 to 3) whereas  it  becomes 10.2 to 11.8  percent 
in LATE estimates (reported in Columns 4 to 6). The positive effect is maintained, 
while the coefficients are slightly reduced, when all the socio-demographic and 
socioeconomic controls, length of residence, legality and tenure and, and 
heterogeneity indices, are included in the estimation.  
It is important to underline that the effect of the “complete experience” inducing 
an increase in the reported levels of generalised trust may be tied to the co-
produced programme’s effects on other dimensions of particularised trust, through 
the “bridging” effect through weak ties.91 As it will be shown, that association holds 
true in this case. The results for the intention to treat estimates indicate that the 
programme induce an increase in the likelihood of reporting higher levels of trust in 
the CBO and the utility firm at this stage while the average effect on the treated 
estimator reports even stronger effects (Table 5.8).  
The second outcome of interest considers the effects elicited by the different 
stages of the intervention on trust in CBO and NGO (in this case, FPVS). In these 
circumstances, it is the track record and the credibility of both intermediate 
organisations that are relevant for promoting residents’ trust in them. The former is 
in charge of locally managing the links among residents and with external actors. 
The latter (FPVS) is territorially based and works across the whole groups of 
neighbourhoods that are considered in the sample. Importantly, the NGO’s role is 
central to strengthen commitments among parties, especially the asymmetric 
information within groups. Financial markets are not framed to include medium- 
and long-term finance instruments tailored to this population. Hence, the 
asymmetric information for external actors is minimised through the support that 
these two organisations provide to ensure that repayment will take place (McLeod 
and Mullard, 2006). It requires overcoming residents’ fears of contractual 
obligations and designing repayment modes to which participants can commit 
realistically and that the utility can enforce. Moreover, they introduce clear 
                                                             
91 The “bridging effect” of social capital, forging connections with other groups (Schuller et al, 2000). 
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guidelines and sanctions, seeking to lower transaction costs among parties, deter 
opportunistic behaviours, and resolve the problem of free riding among residents 
(for example, to strictly control for illegal connections to pipes).  
The intention to treat estimator suggest an increase of 20 percent in the proportion 
of respondents that report a high level of trust in the CBO attributable to the 
programme, and it becomes stronger, to up to 28.3 percent, under the average 
treatment effect estimator. The results are robust to the inclusion of the full set of 
covariates (Row 2, Columns 1 to 6). In addition, there are no significant effects on 
trust in the NGO (FPVS). None of the coefficients – neither ITT nor LATE – is 
statistically significant at conventional significance levels. The control group 
includes Group 2 which at this stage already knew they would receive the 
programme in the near future, and might be inclined to a response bias induced by 
the expectation toward the in-coming programme. The mean for each group helps 
to explain such a fact. In 2006, trust in the NGO reached 46 percent of residents in 
Group 1, while 39 percent in Group 3, and 47 percent in Group 2.  
Regarding trust in the utility firm and the municipality, the results show that the co-
produced service programme induces high levels of trust in the utility firm (Gas 
BAN). The intention to treat estimator is associated with an increase of between 7.9 
and 11 percent in the proportion of residents that report trust in the utility firms 
(Column 1 to 3). These results are stronger for those that participate in the co-
produced scheme. The average effect on the treated estimator suggests an increase 
of 11 to 15.1 percent (Column 4 to 6). All these results are robust to the inclusion of 
controls. Importantly, the inclusions of contextual effects of heterogeneity in the 
model estimations induce an increase in the level of trust in the utility firm that is 
attributed to the programme (Columns 3 and 6). Although in principle in the 
neighbourhoods where the programme was offered the LATE estimator suggest an 
increase of 11.1 percent for the proportion of participants reporting high levels of 
trust in the municipality, it increases to 15.1 percent when all controls are included 
in the model. These results might arise because the level of homogeneity of 
neighbours in the block may facilitate reaching agreement and carrying out all 
administrative processes that eases -and accelerates- obtaining the grid connection 
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for the whole group. In other words, it means that contextual effects are 
considered when respondents report trust to the utility firm, since service access 
cannot be resolved individually in this case.  
However, there are some puzzling results in relation to the effects on residents’ 
trust in the municipality. On the one hand, one might have expected a positive 
effect on the level of trust in the municipality attributable to the complete 
implementation of the co-produced intervention. In order to illustrate trust 
towards the municipality, the mean is 0.12 – for the proportion of respondents 
reporting high and quite high levels of trust in the local government in Group 1, and 
0.22 and 0.18 in the control groups (Groups 2 and 3). The results for the intention 
to treat estimator suggests a decrease of eight percent. That represents almost a 40 
percent decrease in the reported level of trust that can be attributed to the 
complete programme implementation. The effect seems robust across 
specifications, and remained practically unchanged when differences among groups 
are controlled (Columns 2 and 3). Indeed, the average treatment effect on the 
treated estimator suggest a decrease of eleven percent in the proportion of 
respondents reporting trust in the municipality attributable to the programme, 
once the effect on the participants is exclusively estimated (LATE) and 10.6 percent 
when all variables that control for individual and contextual effects are applied 
(Table 5.8, Columns 4 and 6). Then, the results indicate that the programme 
decreases the level of trust in the municipality reported by the residents that 
participate in the programme.  
These results suggest that after programme implementation – information and 
connection stage – the issue of balanced reciprocity at stake in the interaction 
space between residents and the municipality does not generate incremental 
effects on the levels of trust in that institution. In fact, the results are indicative of 
exactly the opposite; that the co-produced model caused a decrease in trust of the 
local government. This is an interesting result since it might have been expected 
that the presence of public sector bodies involved in co-production might have 
motivated incremental levels of increased confidence in the institution. Some 
qualitative insights from residents contribute to understanding that the 
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implementation side of policies, that considers both the expectation based on 
policy decision-making and the actual capacity to deliver, affect the level of trust in 
the municipal public sector.  
There may be some motivation for raising resident expectations prior to 
programme delivery. The offering of the programme to the whole area constitutes 
a first attempt to reverse the absence of municipal attention to this locality and its 
informal settlements. The area was incorporated into municipal jurisdiction in 1993, 
and since that time, very few programmes have been targeted to satisfy the most 
basic demands of residents in these neighbourhoods. As expressed by one a 
resident who has lived in the barrio of Namuncura for over 20 years, “It was a big 
surprise, we were not expecting it. Because of the situation that we are a bit like 
abandoned here. And to say that they will come to the neighbourhood and put in 
gas is an impact”.  
In contrast, respondents expressed greater confidence in the CBO than in the 
municipality, once the connection was granted. As a resident in Alem explained in 
2006: “I think it would be better if the Organised Community moves now to do 
more things here, because the municipality doesn’t do anything, not even street 
repairs ... ”. Therefore, one plausible explanation for the low level of trust in the 
municipality reported during and after programme implementation is related to 
how the municipality performs its duties at these stages. Views expressed refer to 
the capaciy of municipal authorities and officials to be committed and responsible 
to the programme and neighbourhood demands. For example, maintenance of 
public space has been a long-standing municipal duty but has not been carried out. 
This might be indicative that commitments and balanced contributions among 
parties including residents and municipal bodies might have not been enforced as 
expected in order to elicit resident’s trust.92  
The second puzzling result is concerned with trust in the family. This socioeconomic 
institution is one of the most important in almost all societies and has a recognised 
                                                             
92
 Similar qualitative insights were provided by Almansi et al., (2010) in their analysis of another co-
production programme related to water services carried out at that time by the same municipality in 
nearby neighbourhoods. 
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role in economic decisions (Becker, 1974). The results regarding the effects of the 
complete programme experience indicates a decrease in the level of trust in the 
family attributable to this programme stage. The intention to treat estimator 
suggest a decrease of six percent in respondents’ displaying high or quite high 
levels of trust in the family. The result is robust to the inclusion of covariates 
(Columns 2 and 3 in Table 5.9) and gets even stronger for the average treatment 
effect estimator, with a reduction of ten percent in the reported level of trust in the 
family at this stage (Columns 4 to 6). While 88 percent of the respondents in Group 
1 report high or quite high levels of trust in the family, 91 percent and 96 percent in 
Groups 2 and 3 respectively, do so.  
There are two different types of (plausible) explanations related to this result. The 
first involves the impact of long-term decisions inside the family. Involvement in 
long-term financial commitments where they have to share responsibility with 
other neighbours may present families with complex decisions that can affect the 
level of trust among members. This is an issue that is not without internal domestic 
effects in these contexts, when a change in the diffused reciprocity among 
members is introduced by the co-production programme.  The second, as will be 
explained later in this chapter, points to the complementarities between the level 
of generalised trust and trust in the family.  
One of the expected effects of the intervention is associated with trust among 
neighbours. From one side, the exogenous boost in social interactions (among block 
and neighbourhood peers) is expected to facilitate building links that lead to 
increased familiarity and reciprocity, which seem valuable for the generation of 
trusting behaviours among residents. Indeed, the provision of the service is 
obtained through the engagement in reciprocal obligations that change moral 
obligations between peers into economic ones. At this stage, the programme has 
been delivered but still financial commitments to repay are at an early stage of 
enforcement.  However, neither the intention to treat coefficient nor the average 
treatment effect on the treated are statistically significant.  
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At the connection stage, the transition in neighbours’ relations does not facilitate 
the generation of trusting attitudes. The results indicate that the co-produced 
programme has not raised the level of trust among residents at this stage. One 
plausible explanation for that is that the balanced reciprocity among neighbours, 
which now involves transactions and mutual obligations, is not sufficient to 
generate trust. Indeed, it might take more time to develop, since the development 
of interpersonal links involves a production phase as part of the process that leads 
to developing trusting behaviours among peers (Hilber, 2010).  
Some complementary measures can help to illustrate these observations. Only 12 
percent of residents in Group 1 in 2006 consider that their links with neighbours 
have improved, six percent that they have worsened while 82 percent state that 
there has been no change among neighbourhood relations due to the intervention.  
 
4.2. THE INFORMATION GATHERING STAGE  
The next summary of results, considers the effects at the initial stage of the co-
produced programme implementation (Table 5.10). The information gathering 
stage is characterised by the exogenous change in the “invited spaces” for social 
interactions among residents, public and private sectors, NGO and CBO.93  
After the two-year span in which the information gathering stage took place (in 
Group 2), familiarity through the new opportunities for building links and the 
diffusion of information do not appear to affect the level of generalised trust. The 
change in the level and type of interactions among residents and other actors 
developed at this stage – the new invited spaces- are not associated with 
incremental effects on generalised trust. The results are reported in (Table 5.10, 
Columns 4 to 6). None of the intention to treat coefficients is statistically significant 
at conventional significant values. The results provide support for the explanation 
                                                             
93 The results explained here are based on the differences-in-differences estimation for Group 2 
(NUA) compared to control (Group 3, Primavera), during this stage. The differences-in-differences 
estimator allows to remove any unobservable pre-treatment characteristic that would have 
influenced the results. 
190 
 
that the social interactions and information gathering activities do not encourage 
further impact on the likelihood of residents reporting trust in others.  
Importantly, in the neighbourhoods of Group 2, the information gathering and 
social interactions stage has a positive effect on the average level of residents’ trust 
in the NGO (intention to treat estimate). The proportion of respondents reporting a 
higher level of trust in the NGO increased compared to what is reported by 
residents in the control group.94 At this stage, 57 percent of residents in Group 2 
and 25 percent in Group 3 report trust in the NGO. This incremental effect can be 
causally attributed to the interactions supported by the co-production institutional 
scheme through this stage.  In contrast, the positive and significant incremental 
effect on trust in the CBO for Group 2 at this stage is not robust to the inclusion of 
all controls. It suggests that socio-demographic, socioeconomic, and contextual 
effects matter for eliciting trust in the CBO at this stage.  
At the information gathering stage in Group 2 the intention to treat coefficient 
suggest a decrease in the levels of trust in the municipality. Only four percent of 
residents report high or quite high levels of trust in Group 2– a decrease from 22 
percent reported in 2006. Thus the decrease measures a 19.3 percentage point 
negative difference in trust levels compared to the control group reported by the 
ITT model. Interestingly, in 2006 this same group reported a higher level of trust in 
the municipality before implementation started in their neighbourhoods. A feasible 
explanation for this observation is based on expectations generated by the 
forthcoming implementation of the programme in the near future.  
The expectation generated by municipal public policy, based on the perception of a 
renewed interest in informal neighbourhood development, through municipal 
participation in the co-production programme, might boost trust at this preliminary 
stage before the programme is effectively implemented. As this involved the groups 
of residents located in the neighbourhoods targeted in the second phase of co-
production delivery, higher levels of trust at this stage can be indicative of 
expectations of benefits as result of interactions with the public sector. 
                                                             
94 The coefficients are statistically significant and rather stable in all the specifications, although 
marginally decreasing when the full set of covariates is included. 
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Nevertheless, such higher trust levels at a preliminary stage, reduced once the 
programme was effectively implemented and commitment among parties needed 
to be demonstrated. In contrast, in the control group, Group 3, residents´ trust in 
the municipality remained unchanged as there is no effect of the programme, nor 
expectations, since the programme is not targeted to these neighbourhoods.  
The differences-in-differences intention to treat estimators for the measure of trust 
in the family, the results are not robust across specifications since it only appears 
(negative and statistically significant) when the set of individual and contextual 
controls are included in the models. It would have been expected that, given the 
decrease in the level of trust in the family showed at the complete experience 
stage, the information stage would have followed the same trend. This stage is 
when decisions on enrolment have to be made. In fact, during field work, it was 
possible to obtain some qualitative evidence which point to internal 
disappointments among family members, or women convincing their husbands, or 
taking the decision to enrol in the programme on their own responsibility. 
However, the results do not contradict the explanation since it might be feasible to 
consider that all these socio-economic, socio-demographic, tenure, legal and length 
of residence characteristics, and the contextual effects, may affect the level of trust 
that respondents have which respect their family during this stage.  
 
Finally, a look at the effects of the co-produced programme on trust in neighbours, 
the results show that the coefficients on the differences between the residents in 
both groups are not statistically significant at conventional levels. Individuals in the 
group of neighbourhoods where the co-produced stage is implemented are not 
more likely to report trust in their neighbours, a statement which might have been 
consistent with the “familiarity” explanation of social capital accumulation building 
reciprocity at this stage. 
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TABLE 5.10. TRUST: INFORMATION GATHERING AND AFTER  
CONNECTION STAGE (2006-2009) 
Dep. Variables:  
Trust  
  
AFTER CONNECTION STAGE   
(ITT) in OC  
(GROUP 1) 
 INFORMATION GATHERING 
STAGE  (ITT) in NUA  
( GROUP 2) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Generalised Trust -0.064 0.1 0.088 -0.078 -0.055 -0.057 
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) 
Trust in CBO  0.229*** 0.263*** 0.308*** 0.151** 0.132 0.156 
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.11) 
Trust in Family 0.151*** 0.115** 0.096** 0.019 -0.039* -0.075* 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
Trust in 
Neighbours 
0.121** 0.217** 0.244** 0.036 0.094 0.128 
 
(0.08) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.12) 
Trust in NGO  0.155*** 0.212*** 0.250*** 0.189*** 0.161** 0.143* 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) 
Trust in 
Municipality 
-0.027 -0.035 -0.019 -0.17*** -0.19** -0.19** 
 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) 
       
Notes: Differences in Differences Estimates (DD) for the Intention-to- Treat. The first comparison is 
Group 1 and Group 3 neighbourhoods (N= 387), the second Group 2 and Group 3 (N=298). Model 1 
and 4, no control variables; Model 2 and 5, full set of socio-demographic, socioeconomic controls, 
length of residence, tenure and legality; Models 3 and 6, socio-demographic and socioeconomic 
controls length of residence, tenure and legality; and adds heterogeneity indices for migrant 
condition, income, length of residence and tenure.  Columns (1), (4) and (7): Standard errors in 
parentheses. Columns (2), (3), (5) and (6): Robust Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
4.3. THE POST-CONNECTION STAGE  
The results for the post-connection stage are reported in Table 5.10, (Columns 1 to 
3) and Table 5.11. As for the case of generalised trust, the results for the post-
connection stage contribute to the suggestion that there is no incremental effect 
on residents’ reported level of generalised trust attributed to this stage. Aside from 
the higher level of trust displayed by the households which had received the 
complete experience in 2006, all coefficients on the intention to treat estimator are 
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not statistically significant at conventional levels. Importantly, the differences in 
differences estimator indicates an incremental effect of 20 percentage points on 
generalised trust as a result of this stage on non- participants, when compared with 
the control group. There is a positive incremental effect on the level of generalised 
trust displayed by non-participants whereas no significant changes are attributed to 
programme participants at this stage (reported in Table 5.11).  
The results of the differences in differences estimator suggest positive incremental 
effect on the level of trust in neighbours, in associations and in NGO for non- 
participants that is attributed to this stage of the intervention in the 
neighbourhoods. Notably, non-participant families in OC measured against their 
counterparts in control Group 3 display an incremental effect of trust and in most 
cases this increase is higher than the effects attributed to participant families in OC 
when compared with the same control group (Table 5.11, Column 2). This finding is 
extremely relevant from a policy perspective since it seems to indicate the presence 
of strong spillover effects upon non-participant families. It also seems to imply that 
the pace of this spillover is quite slow as compared to the effect on those actually 
treated, given that we observe this increased level almost four years after actual 
implementation of the programme. 
The evidence for the post connection stage indicates a positive incremental effect 
on the level of trust in the NGO and CBO. Comparing the residual effect for the 
intention to treat group (Group 1) against control (Group 3) (Table 5.10, Columns 1 
through 3) these coefficients show positive and statistically significant coefficients. 
Regarding trust in the CBO, the intention to treat differences in differences 
estimator displays a positive increment of 22.9 to 30.8 percentage points over the 
control group mean, whereas trust in the NGO is positively incremented by 12.1 to 
24.4 percentage points. The figures underscore that after a few years of 
programme implementation the balanced reciprocity elicited among residents and 
the organisations has been sustained. This observation may be a relevant matter 
for driving collective capacity and the willingness to undertake other initiatives.  
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By contrast, however, the differences in differences intention to treat estimator is 
not statistically significant at conventional significant levels when measuring trust in 
the municipality. It suggests that there is no change to the level of trust in the 
municipality attributed to this stage when compared to the control group. The 
potential for sustained collective capacity and willingness to undertake future 
initiatives, indicated by the data in the previous paragraph, would appear more 
likely without involvement of the municipality. Future co-production might be 
envisaged as a matter of neighbourhood-NGO and utility company arrangements. 
Trust in the family is associated with positive incremental effects in Group 1 at the 
after connection stage (Table 5.10, Row 3, columns 1 to 3). The differences in 
differences intention to treat estimator suggests a positive incremental effect 
attributed to the programme. The results are robust to the inclusion of the full set 
of covariates. At this stage, the average proportion of respondents that have high 
or quite high levels of trust in the family is 96 percent and 83 percent in the control 
group. The 15 percentage point difference (in the ITT model specification with no 
covariates) is indicative of the positive incremental effect over the control mean. 
The result reverses the lower initial levels of trust in the family that were reported 
at previous stages. Part of this effect can be attributed to non-participants 
displaying a positive incremental effect on trust in the family at this stage. The 
results might be suggesting that trust in the family takes longer to develop. For 
residents with access to the gas network, it may be associated with commitments 
already enforced (financial efforts jointly assumed) and all the benefits that are 
gradually enjoyed by members of the house related to the new facility that 
contributes to comfort in everyday activities, that progressively turn into new 
domestic habits over the passing of time. It is plausible to assume that an improved 
comfort and use value, savings and capitalisation through services might have been 
conducive to increased reciprocity among family members associated with a 
common goal to which they have jointly contributed.95  
                                                             
95
 An additional plausible explanation for the incremental effects on the levels of trust in the family 
reaching non-adherent residents is provided by recent research on the causal inverse association 
between civic engagement and participation and the closeness of family ties (Alesina and Giuliano, 
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The positive incremental effects of the intervention on the level of trust in the 
family can be considered as a substitute for generalised trust. Evidence indicates 
that there is a causal association between residents’ strength of family ties and the 
level of generalised trust (Ermisch and Gambetta, 2010; Alesina and Giuliano, 
2011). Individuals with weak family ties are more likely to display higher levels of 
trust in strangers (Ermisch and Gambetta, 2010). Indeed, higher levels of happiness 
indicators and life satisfaction are all positively associated with greater strength of 
family ties (Alesina and Giuliano, 2010), which makes this effect of the programme 
on trust in the family highly relevant.  
The evidence based on survey and experimental data from developed countries 
indicates that this effect on the family is associated with the degree of “outward 
exposure” (Ermisch and Gambetta, 2010). Then, the limited strength of contact and 
interaction with “others” would decrease individuals’ motivation to be in relation to 
strangers at the same time that it increased their reliance on the family. It is 
plausible to assume that increased levels of reliance on the family due to the 
programme intervention can operate not only through lower effective levels of 
interactions with “others” – for example through lower participation in other 
voluntary leisure activities – but also due to increased comfort in terms of 
protection from extreme temperatures due to a better overall domestic 
environment, which might affect the incentives to stay at home rather than go out. 
Hence the inward exposure may be increased due to a bundle of economic, social 
and physical factors combined.  
While the social interaction and information stage suggests no significant impact of 
the co-produced gas programme on changes in the level of trust among neighbours 
in Group 2, a strong and significant impact on the likelihood of reporting high levels 
of trust among neighbours is in evidence four years after connection. Average levels 
of trust in neighbours rises between 12 to 24 percent in the neighbourhoods were 
the programme was offered (Table 5.10). Notably, both participants and non-
participants report increased levels of trust in their neighbours (18.5 percent when 
                                                                                                                                                                            
2011). Nevertheless, the fact that their level of generalised trust is increased as a residual effect of 
the intervention contradicts the notion of substituting effects among both.  
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programme participants in Group 1 are compared with residents of the control 
group) (Table 5.11, Column 1) and 29.6 percent when non-participants’ level of 
trust in neighbours is contrasted with the average level in the control group 
(Column 2). This result suggests that the programme has been well balanced in 
affecting the level of trust among neighbours after implementation.  
 
TABLE 5.11. TRUST: AFTER-CONNECTION STAGE (2006 -2009)  
PARTICIPANTS AND NON-PARTICIPANTS in AFTER-CONNECTION STAGE IN OC (GROUP 1) 
 
             AFTER-CONNECTION STAGE IN OC 
              (GROUP 1) 
                 (1)                                                   (2) 
   
Dep. Variables 
PARTICIPANTS 
 
NON-
PARTICIPANTS 
 
   Generalised Trust (Trust in Others) 0.127 0.200** 
 
(0.084) (0.091) 
Trust in CBO 0.253*** 0.301*** 
 
(0.062) (0.106) 
Trust in Family 0.0799 0.174** 
 
(0.062) (0.077) 
Trust in Neighbours 0.185** 0.296** 
 
(0.115) (0.153) 
Trust in NGO 0.232*** 0.245*** 
 
(0.050) (0.089) 
Trust in Municipality -0.014 0.020 
 
(0.081) (0.101) 
 
  Notes; N= 630. Models are Differences in Differences Estimates (DD). Comparison is Group 1 and Group 3. All 
models include the full set controls: socio-demographic, socioeconomic variables, length of residence, tenure 
and legality, heterogeneity indicess for migrant condition, income, length of residence and tenure. Robust 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
4.3.1. TRUST AND LEGAL/TENURE STATUS 
Table 5.12 reports the results for the same models that were reported in Table 
5.10, which are now estimated for the four ownership and tenure categories that 
were defined based on legality and tenure. Again, the results are reported for ITT 
and LATE, and the same three different model specifications. The likelihood of 
reporting trust in others is higher for declared formal owners and non-legal owners 
197 
 
in Group 1 (the intention to treat estimates) compared to those holding the same 
tenure and legal status in the control group. In this case, the experience itself and 
the interactions might have contributed to generate higher levels of generalised 
trust for these groups of residents. The coefficients are all positive and significant at 
conventional significant levels. The results are robust to the inclusion of the full set 
of controls and heterogeneity measures. Compared to the control group the 
coefficient for non-titled residents is 0.077 to 0.093 percentage points over the 
control mean. The results are even stronger for the same category when the effects 
on the residents that enrol and were connected to the programme are assessed.96 
In this case, the positive coefficient of the reported agreement with the trust in 
others statement is 0.097 to 0.119 percentage points higher than what is reported 
by the same group of residents in the control group. The likelihood of formal 
owners reporting a positive answer to the generalised question is from 0.098 to 
0.123 percentage points on average higher for respondents that live in the 
neighbourhoods where the complete experience was implemented rather than in 
the control group, depending on the intention to treat model specification. The 
effect is even higher in magnitude when the average effect on formal owner 
“participants” is considered (from 0.147 to 0.182 percentage points over control 
group) and all the estimates are robust to the different specifications of the models.  
These results are consistent with the concept of informal owners – at least non-
legal ones –displaying higer levels of trust in others as a result of the co-produced 
complete experience than their counterparts in the control group. This is in contrast 
to legal owners, from whom the likelihood of reporting trust in others is not 
statistically different than what is displayed by the same group in control 
neighbourhoods. One plausible explanation is that legal rights to property enable 
market transactions that are less dependent on trust among parties to take place.  
 
                                                             
96 The effect on the “treated” residents through the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) estimate.  
198 
 
4.4. TRUST AND LEGAL/TENURE STATUS  
Finally, the sample is split by tenure and document status of residents. The 
coefficients for the effect of the co-production programme -after several years of 
implementation- report positive and statistically significant coefficients for the 
incremental effect on trust in the municipality. This is a residual effect of the 
intervention for the most informal residents only – those that are squatters and 
occupants – but the results are not robust to all the specifications since the 
coefficient loses its significance when adding the contextual effects of 
heterogeneity to the basic estimation. Additionally, positive coefficients on the 
same estimator are reported for non-titled informal residents, and the results are 
robust to all the specifications. The positive incremental effect of the coefficients 
on trust in the municipality ranges from 0.12 to 0.65 percentage points and from 
0.02 to 0.07, for non-formal owners and non-titled residents, respectively.  
These observations can be at least indicative of a differentiated effect of residents’ 
interaction in exchanges with the municipality that provides more reassurance for 
building trust for residents holding more informal rights to property rather than 
formal ones. In the case of residents holding informal rights, the programme 
provides some benefits in terms of allowing for cadastral registration of informal 
subdivisions, and contributing to service access. These would not have been 
achieved without the co-production institutional framework. It is plausible to 
expect that the increase in the level of trust in the public sector can affect the 
incentives to invest in the house for the more informal group of residents in these 
neighbourhoods.  
 
 
TABLE 5.12. TRUST 2006-2009: BY LEGALITY AND TENURE  
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THE AFTER CONNECTION STAGE DIFFERENCES-IN-DIFFERENCES ESTIMATES 
Differences- in- Differences Intention to Treat Estimates - Post-Connection Stage - reduced sample by tenure 
and legal status  
Table 5.12.A           
Dependent variable  
   AFTER CONNECTION STAGE IN OC ( GROUP 1) 
Model  
Legal 
Owners 
Formal           
owners 
 Users Rights  
Non-
Ownership 
Non-Legal 
Owners 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
trust others Model 1  -0.255** -0.118 0.182 0.00191 
    (0.106) (0.0770) (0.203) (0.0993) 
  Model 2  0.0153 -0.0727 -0.354 -0.225 
    (0.178) (0.0956) (0.410) (0.146) 
  Model 3  -0.0877 -0.0841 0.0253 -0.134 
    (0.116) (0.0701) (0.271) (0.118) 
trust neigh Model 1  -0.0547 0.0441 0.0653 0.111 
    (0.139) (0.0977) (0.243) (0.125) 
  Model 2  0.146 0.180 -0.252 0.0531 
    (0.218) (0.125) (0.767) (0.216) 
  Model 3  0.0809 0.102 -0.141 -0.0282 
    (0.172) (0.111) (0.288) (0.178) 
trust family Model 1  0.0144 0.0995* 0.505*** 0.263*** 
    (0.0885) (0.0539) (0.186) (0.0722) 
  Model 2  -0.0535 0.0750* 0.183** 0.164** 
    (0.0989) (0.0557) (0.272) (0.0819) 
  Model 3  -0.0517 0.0870* 0.337** 0.203** 
    (0.102) (0.0560) (0.154) (0.0774) 
trust CBO Model 1  0.367*** 0.228*** 0.230 0.171** 
    (0.104) (0.0631) (0.151) (0.0783) 
  Model 2  0.336*** 0.340*** -0.0144 0.181* 
    (0.120) (0.0651) (0.282) (0.0988) 
  Model 3  0.346*** 0.313*** -0.101 0.196** 
    (0.111) (0.0614) (0.167) (0.0770) 
trust NGO Model 1  0.211** 0.159*** 0.0607 0.143* 
    (0.0878) (0.0555) (0.168) (0.0743) 
  Model 2  0.287*** 0.260*** -0.224 0.282*** 
    (0.0973) (0.0497) (0.331) (0.0832) 
  Model 3  0.239*** 0.241*** -0.155 0.215*** 
    (0.0900) (0.0520) (0.207) (0.0759) 
trust_munic Model 1  -0.116 -0.0646 0.269* 0.0515 
    (0.0961) (0.0596) (0.154) (0.0772) 
  Model 2  -0.114 -0.0515 0.658** 0.0725 
    (0.136) (0.0767) (0.326) (0.118) 
  Model 3  -0.134 -0.0466 0.128 0.0285 
    (0.130) (0.0719) (0.199) (0.0895) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
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THE INFORMATION GATHERING STAGE. DIFFERENCES-IN-DIFFERENCES ESTIMATES 
Differences- in- Differences Intention to Treat Estimates - -Information Gathering Stage -reduced sample by 
tenure and legal status  
Table 5.12.B           
Dependent 
variable  
    INFORMATION GATHERING STAGE in NUA ( GROUP 2)  
Model Legal Owners Formal owners 
Users Rights  Non-
Ownership 
Non-Legal 
Owners 
    (5) (6) (7) (8) 
trust others Model 1  -0.00792 -0.0814 0.131 -0.0340 
    (0.114) (0.0755) (0.203) (0.0997) 
  Model 2  0.279* 0.115 0.0310 0.0165 
    (0.142) (0.0773) (0.309) (0.102) 
  Model 3  0.299** 0.106 0.658 -0.159 
    (0.150) (0.0908) (0.399) (0.145) 
trust neigh Model 1  0.208 0.105 0.170 0.156 
    (0.136) (0.0893) (0.243) (0.118) 
  Model 2  0.251* 0.256** -0.107 0.119 
    (0.144) (0.115) (0.273) (0.157) 
  Model 3  0.218 0.258** 0.593 0.0795 
    (0.150) (0.108) (0.501) (0.185) 
trust family Model 1  -0.140 -0.0138 0.296** 0.134** 
    (0.0899) (0.0575) (0.145) (0.0647) 
  Model 2  -0.119 -0.0778 0.122 -0.00614 
    (0.0994) (0.0667) (0.175) (0.103) 
  Model 3  -0.234* -0.0881 0.00979 0.0864 
    (0.138) (0.0707) (0.357) (0.117) 
trust CBO Model 1  0.216** 0.161** 0.0839 0.0619 
    (0.105) (0.0712) (0.199) (0.0900) 
  Model 2  0.432*** 0.165* -0.435 -0.145 
    (0.145) (0.0880) (0.273) (0.0909) 
  Model 3  0.324* 0.176 -0.808 0.0493 
    (0.193) (0.117) (0.496) (0.120) 
trust NGO Model 1  0.225** 0.212*** 0.0651 0.189** 
    (0.0904) (0.0653) (0.188) (0.0884) 
  Model 2  0.264** 0.161* 0.153 0.0583 
    (0.125) (0.0886) (0.245) (0.112) 
  Model 3  0.258* 0.165* 0.429 0.0580 
    (0.153) (0.0887) (0.586) (0.113) 
trust_munic Model 1  -0.186* -0.212*** 0.103 -0.144 
    (0.108) (0.0720) (0.161) (0.0893) 
  Model 2  -0.231** -0.223** -0.0788 -0.257** 
    (0.109) (0.0902) (0.303) (0.124) 
  Model 3  -0.378** -0.226** 0.153 -0.216 
    (0.150) (0.0983) (0.475) (0.144) 
Robust standard errors in  parentheses        
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
 
When the level of trust in the municipality for titled and formal owner samples is 
compared to control at the social interactions stage, all the coefficients for the 
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different specifications of the model display negative and statistically significant 
coefficients, of 0.22 percentage points (titled residents) and from 0.22 to 0.25 
percentage points for formal owners. The same sample estimators as residual 
effects after several years of implementation are negative as well but non-
significant. Importantly, the results indicate a reduction in the level of trust in the 
municipality for these groups during the initial implementation stage and non-
statistical significant difference from the control group attributable to the 
programme after connection.  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The chapter provides evidence on several points related to co-production, 
participation and trust in informal neighbourhoods before, after and long after 
service provision. It gives strength to notions in the academic literature, such as the 
cycle of participatory efforts in informal settlements, and some quantitative insights 
on the sustainability of participatory efforts. First, the results measuring the 
willingness to undertake a collaborative effort empirically support the assertion of 
development practitioners (and the co-production academic literature) on the 
subject of sustainability of efforts.  The empirical evidence supports the idea of the 
internalisation of benefits from services. Savings obtained from energy 
consumption substitution are central to residents’ enrolment in the programme. 
Despite the specific analysis of tenure, legality and length of permanence 
supporting these investments, the study provides empirical evidence of 
neighbourhood-enhancing individual efforts strongly affected by contextual 
characteristics of neighbours. This notion underscored by the change in the 
statistical significance of the participation coefficients once the neighbourhood 
context is controlled, adds  to other individual determinants and can contribute to 
provide accurate explanations for the internalisation of benefits that drive 
participation in community enhancing social capital, or incentives to free ride on 
the efforts of others. 
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The results are in line with the academic literature that indicates that residents with 
stronger claims to property in informal markets are more likely to participate in 
activities that aim to improve their neighbourhood (Lall et al., 2004; Lanjouw and 
Levy, 2002). However, titled residents are not the only ones to participate, at least 
when the internalisation of benefits from services through the co-produced 
programme support that incentive. Importantly, as the results indicate, the non-
possession of a legal title or being a formal (non-legal owner) does not affect the 
residents’ willingness to get involved in activities that are expected to promote 
neighbourhood consolidation and improvements in overall living standards. In fact, 
as a result of the co-produced programme formal and non-titled residents are more 
likely to participate, an effect that is measurable and attributable to the 
programme. Renters, occupants and squatters have fewer incentives to invest in 
community enhancing social capital, but their participatory involvement – and 
perhaps physical investment as well – might be framed by the internalisation of 
benefits of doing so, such as savings or contextual effects.   
The evidence indicates that co-production institutions are able to frame a 
collaborative capacity that allows other neighbourhood initiatives to develop. At 
the local level, its persistence seems to be tightly related to the role played by the 
CBO, and indeed the institutional framework that supports any cooperative efforts 
as part of programme implementation. At different programme stages, an increase 
in the level of trust in the CBO is attributed to the co-produced programme and the 
effect is greater for the residents that have participated and obtained the gas piped 
connection.  
The results are at least indicative of a positive effect on the level of generalised 
trust as a result of the co-produced programme implementation- the “complete 
experience”- rather than the familiarity and information gathering stages. This 
supports the arguments by scholars and development practitioners in Argentina 
(Fidanza, 2005; Paladino and Blas, 2007; Zavalia-Lagos, 2005) who point to the 
value of co-produced programmes. The results on non-participants generalised 
trust might be taken as preliminary evidence of externalities produced after the 
connection stage of the co-produced programme. In addition, to the study of the 
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CBOs’ role, the chapter provides evidence that average levels of trust in the 
municipality have not increased as result of the intervention. In other words, had 
the programme created a space of interaction between residents and the public 
sector, a positive effect on trust in the municipality would have been expected, at 
least as result of the “complete experience”, once the service was connected to the 
neighbourhoods. In fact, the opposite is true, at each stage of the co-production 
trust in the municipality is negatively associated with programme implementation, 
and it becomes even more negative when the effect of the co-produced 
programme on those that did participate is assessed. In sum, the evidence clarifies 
that co-production efforts which emphasise collaborative schemes and self-help as 
a means to achieve the basic task of providing services should not be expected to 
help promote greater confidence in the public sector, particularly for those 
residents that hold formal rights to their property. One possible explanation lies in 
that individual efforts are substituting for public sector duties that are carried on 
completely by the State in other areas of the cities.  
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CHAPTER 6: PHYSICAL INVESTMENT: HOUSING 
IMPROVEMENTS AND TRUST  
1. INTRODUCTION  
The assessment of the causal effect of the programme on the likelihood of 
residents undertaking housing improvements is reported in this Chapter. The 
premise is the expectation that the network gas programme will have positive 
impacts on a series of construction transformations in the house. The theoretical 
conceptualisation of investments and internalisation of benefits is associated with 
legality and security, and with services improving security and savings (see Chapter 
3). First, there are savings and use value induced by the substitution of more 
expensive energy sources. The availability of a piped service could foster incentives 
to invest in transformations in comfort. For example, the new service may foster 
the opportunity to improve comfort by the installation of a water network inside 
the house, since now it will be possible to have hot water in the bathroom. The 
same can be said about the installation of space heating systems that now can be 
operated at a much lower cost. Indeed, the gas connection itself requires some 
transformations and formalisation of housing construction to cope with gas service 
safety regulations (ENARGAS, 1997). Second, the internalisation of benefits through 
capitalisation of household’s efforts will be greater when the provision of the piped 
service improves overall neighbourhood consolidation status, and houses and 
neighbourhood transformation are capitalised in housing values. Therefore, 
savings, comfort, service provision regulation and capitalisation may affect the 
incentives for housing improvements.  
The analysis of the co-produced programme effects on housing improvements 
takes six matters into consideration, based on the methodological strategy 
explained in Chapter 4. First, it structures the measurement of the two types of 
effects. It compares the level of housing improvements undertaken by residents in 
the participant neighbourhoods to those of residents in the control group, and 
measures the average effect regardless of enrolment in the programme (the 
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intention-to-treat group, ITT). Although full compliance was not usual in this type of 
intervention, it might be expected that spill-overs should affect the non-
participants among the neighbourhood’s groups.  It then presents an estimate of 
the average effect on the households that have decided to participate, and have 
enrolled in the co-produced programme (the local average treatment effect, LATE).  
Second, the effect on physical investment may be diverse at the different 
implementation stages. In this case, the empirical models estimate the effects 
expected from the programme at two different stages: the after-connection stage 
in Group 1 (OC), taking into consideration the 2006 to 2009 timeframe for residents 
that were located in the serviced group of neighbouhoods,97 and the information 
gathering and social interactions stage that was implemented at the same time in 
Group 2 (NUA). Both are individually compared to Group 3 (Primavera), the control 
group, where the co-produced model was not implemented. Since housing 
improvements develop progressively over time, this period of analysis is meaningful 
enough to affect housing transformations. 
Third, there are three different housing improvement variables defined in the 
study: the proportion of houses that undertake improvements (a dummy variable 
that indicates whether the household has undertaken a housing improvement 
during the last year); the number of improvements in the dwelling affecting the 
quality of construction materials, such as walls and plasterwork, ceramic tile floors, 
and an improved roof; and the total number of improvements undertaken to the 
house.  
Fourth, the sample is divided into the four categories of ownership rights and 
tenure as already described in Chapter 4. Two are based on the legality explanation 
for investments (legal titled or non-titled residents) and two are based on tenure 
considerations (declared formal owners and non-owners, such as squatters, 
occupants and renters).  
                                                             
97 Since the housing improvement questions asked about the changes made during the previous 
year, the assessment of the effects extends from 2005 to 2008.  
206 
 
Fifth, there are two types of econometric models used in this section of the study. 
One set of estimations is based on the OLS and 2SLS models for panel data from 
2006 and 2009. The second uses a differences-in-differences methodology.  
Sixth, the analysis examines whether the co-production intervention effect on trust 
might have affected residents’ investment in their houses. Therefore, the models 
provide empirical evidence about the association between investments in the 
house and the dimensions of trust.  
2. EFFECTS OF THE PROGRAMME ON HOUSING 
IMPROVEMENTS  
The strength of property rights as a sole requirement for investment is challenged 
by the contribution of services and savings to housing investments. The results 
indicate that the co-produced intervention is associated with an increase in the 
likelihood of making housing transformations, and that these effects are greater for 
households that have been connected to the network. The first model (Table 6.1) 
examines whether, all else being equal, households in Group 1 (after connection) 
are, on average, more likely to invest in improvements than the households in the 
control group. In this case, the dependent variable is the (dummy) variable that 
indicates whether there was a  housing improvement during the previous year. The 
intention-to-treat estimator, which indicates the average effect of the programme 
in the undertaking of improvements in the neighbourhoods where the programme 
was offered and fully implemented, suggests a strong, positive and statistically 
significant effect attributable to the programme on housing upgrading. The range is 
55 to 56 percent, and nine percent in the neighbourhoods that are in the first stage 
of programme implementation (Group 2), where only the information gathering 
stage was implemented. These effects are all robust to the inclusion of the variables 
that control for the differences in socio-demographic and socioeconomic 
characteristics of the respondent and the household, as well as several housing 
features, such as conditions of overcrowding, number of units on the plot, tenure 
and documents that prove status and length of stay in the house (all detailed in 
Chapter 4). It should be noted that overcrowding, which is correlated with 
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improvements, is included as a socio-demographic control since incentives to invest 
in housing transformations might be driven by any group difference in the 
overcrowding of the housing units.  
TABLE 6.1. HOUSING IMPROVEMENTS (2006-2009).   
    
AFTER CONNECTION AND INFORMATION GATHERING STAGES.  
INTENTION TO TREAT AND LOCAL AVERAGE TREATMENT ESTIMATES. (OLS AND 2SLS) 
 
Dep Var.:                
Housing 
improvements  
 INTENTION TO TREAT ESTIMATES  
LOCAL AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT 
ESTIMATES-  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
                      
intention_to_treat_OC  0.55*** 0.56*** 0.55*** 0.55*** 0.55***           
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.0)           
intention_to_treat_NUA 0.08* 0.09* 0.09** 0.08* 0.08*           
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)           
treatment_1           0.75*** 0.75*** 0.75*** 0.75*** 0.74*** 
            (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.0) (0.07) 
treatment_2           0.14 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.12 
            (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
howlong   -0.01 -0.01       -0.01 -0.01     
    (0.02) (0.02)       (0.02) (0.02)     
                      
socio demographic 
controls 
yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
income and 
employment controls 
yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
tenure and title 
dummies  
no  tenure  title tenure  title no  tenure  title  tenure  title  
howlong dummies        yes  yes        yes  yes  
Constant 0.092 0.184 0.143 0.162 0.15 0.506** 0.630*** 0.592** 0.501** 0.477** 
  (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24) (0.24) 
r2 0.272 0.236 0.296 0.237 0.281 0.242 0.301 0.247 0.284 0.250 
 
Notes: N= 1360. Baseline Category is Group 3 (Control Group) Models specifications reported in columns (1) to (5) are 
intention-to-treat estimates of Group 1 (OC) – the post connection stage- and Group 2 (NUA) compared to Group 3 
(OLS)- the information gathering stage-, columns (6) to (10) are  local average treatment effects of  participants of 
Group 1 (OC) and Group 2 (NUA) compared to Group 3 ( OLS) (2SLS). N= Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
   
All the significant effects in Group 1 for the after connection stage in OC are 
confirmed under the local average treatment effect estimator when the effect on 
the households that enrolled in the programme is considered. Tthe programme 
induced an increase of 75 percent on the decision to undertake housing 
improvements (in Columns 4 to 6). This finding indicates a strong effect of the co-
produced service programme on participants.  
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The strength of the contribution of services and savings to housing investments is 
strongly supported by the results on Group 2.  At the initial stage of the 
implementation – based on social interactions and information gathering – the 
significance of the positive coefficient disappears in the tested specifications for 
participants in Group 2 (row 4). For this group, the decision to undertake 
transformations is caused by the availability of the energy connection in the house. 
 
3. LEGALITY, TENURE AND LEVEL OF INVESTMENTS  
Table 6.2 reports the results for housing improvement but now it provides the 
effects of the programme for residents in four different tenure or legal groups. In 
each case, four different models are displayed: two report the intention-to-treat 
estimation for Group 1 (after connection stage) and Group 2 (information gathering 
stage), compared with the control group, and the other two show the local average 
treatment effect estimation for each of the groups98. The intention-to-treat variable 
reports the results for households where the programme was offered regardless of 
their participation while the local average treatment effect reports the estimated 
effects on participants. 
As mentioned before, the estimates obtained from these models cannot be equally 
interpreted.  The models comparing Group 1 (OC) and control will shed light on the  
incremental effects, if any, that arise on the outcomes under analysis as a result of 
the whole co-production experience and gas network connection after some years 
of its implementation. The models comparing Group 2 (NUA) and Control group will 
inform on the effect of introducing an exogenous source of social interactions 
prompted by the information gathering phase of the co-production intervention.  
The models control for the differences between groups, adding the socio-
demographic controls (education level and age of the head of the household, 
number of children, number of members in the house), the monthly per capita 
                                                             
98 Based on Angrist and Imbems (1994) 
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income, employment of the household head and the set of dummies for the length 
of residence in the house.  
The model examines whether, all else being equal, the effect on housing 
improvements is different between households holding each legal and tenure 
status in Group 1 than the households in the control group. The results provide 
strong evidence that housing improvements increase for households located in the 
neighbourhoods where the service was delivered, regardless of tenure and legality 
status, and this effect is higher when households possess the gas connection in 
their house. The results provide strong evidence that services are a relevant 
incentive for housing improvement and that legality is not a matter of concern 
when the energy service is made available. Investment based on the internalisation 
of services benefits extends beyond a strict legal consideration.  
The probability that a legal and a non-titled owner in Group 1, the OC 
neighbourhoods, undertake housing improvements is 55 percent higher for either 
one of them when compared with legal and non-legal owners located in the control 
group, who have no access to the programme. Second, non-legal owners living in 
houses that were connected to the grid are 76 percent more likely to improve their 
house than the same group in the control neighbourhoods, and titled owners 
connected to the grid are 62 to 63 percent more likely to. Third, legality is not more 
relevant than security for housing improvement: the probability of formal owners 
improving their house is 53 percent higher than the same tenure category group in 
the control neighbourhoods and 66 percent higher for those connected to the gas 
network. Importantly, non-legal owners are more likely to undertake an 
improvement in the house when they are located in the neighbourhoods where the 
gas service is provided.  
Fourth, when the sample is restricted to households that do not hold ownership 
rights (columns 15 and 16), within the group that has participated in the 
programme and was effectively connected to the new service, almost all have made 
transformations in their houses. This result provides evidence that the provision of 
services has been effective in driving investments for this group.  
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TABLE 6.2. HOUSING IMPROVEMENTS. BY LEGALITY AND TENURE  
 
CONNECTION AND INFORMATION GATHERING STAGES.  
INTENTION TO TREAT AND LOCAL AVERAGE TREATMENT ESTIMATES. (OLS AND 2SLS).  
REDUCED SAMPLE  
TABLE 6.2.A.                 
Dep Var.:                           
HOUSING               
IMPROVEMENTS 
LEGAL OWNER FORMAL OWNER                  
Intention-To-Treat  
Effects on 
Participants (LATE) 
Intention-To-Treat  
Effects on Participants 
(LATE) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
intention_to_treat_OC  0.54*** 0.55***     0.53*** 0.53***     
  (0.038) (0.040)     (0.027) (0.027)     
intention_to_treat_NUA 0.028 0.042     0.066** 0.071**     
  (0.038) (0.039)     (0.028) (0.028)     
treatment_OC     0.62*** 0.63***     0.66*** 0.66*** 
      (0.046) (0.047)     (0.038) (0.037) 
treatment_NUA     0.047 0.07     0.142** 0.143** 
      (0.070) (0.071)     (0.070) (0.070) 
howlong1_5   -0.091   0.114   0.068   0.225*** 
    (0.097)   (0.080)   (0.047)   (0.043) 
howlong6_15   0.13***   0.12***   0.008   0.024 
    (0.044)   (0.044)   (0.024)   (0.026) 
howlong23_29   0.100**   0.11***   0.022   0.03 
    (0.040)   (0.040)   (0.026)   (0.028) 
howlong30_more   0.076*   0.097**   -0.02   -0.009 
    (0.042)   (0.047)   (0.030)   (0.035) 
Constant 0.206 0.232 0.158 0.175 0.091 0.103 0.044 0.035 
  (0.148) (0.150) (0.165) (0.167) (0.093) (0.094) (0.105) (0.107) 
r2_w 0.001 0.001 0.012 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.023 0.009 
r2_b 0.313 0.327 0.357 0.364 0.272 0.281 0.277 0.291 
r2_o 0.282 0.293 0.294 0.298 0.243 0.248 0.216 0.227 
TABLE 6.2.B                 
Dep Var.:                           
HOUSING               
IMPROVEMENTS 
NON LEGAL OWNER  
USER RIGHTS                                                     
(NO OWNERSHIP) 
Intention-To-Treat  
Effects on 
Participants (LATE) 
Intention-To-Treat  
Effects on Participants 
(LATE) 
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
                  
intention_to_treat_OC  0.53*** 0.54***     0.64*** 0.65***     
  (0.035) (0.034)     (0.048) (0.051)     
intention_to_treat_NUA 0.11*** 0.13***     0.23*** 0.24***     
  (0.036) (0.036)     (0.053) (0.055)     
treatment_Ooc     0.76*** 0.76***     0.96*** 0.92*** 
      (0.063) (0.061)     (0.207) (0.198) 
treatment_NUA     0.318** 0.32***     0.649** 0.620* 
      (0.129) (0.127)     (0.325) (0.318) 
howlong1_5   0.019   0.180***   -0.087   0.149* 
    (0.040)   (0.042)   (0.064)   (0.083) 
howlong6_15   -0.059   0.001   -0.075   0.120* 
    (0.025)   (0.030)   (0.052)   (0.070) 
howlong23_29   -0.026   0.034   -0.096   0.258** 
    (0.030)   (0.038)   (0.060)   (0.117) 
howlong30_more   -0.047   -0.004   0.044   0.224* 
    (0.041)   (0.048)   (0.074)   (0.117) 
Constant 0.102 0.143 0.021 0.03 -0.128 -0.041 -0.047 0.027 
  (0.107) (0.108) (0.125) (0.127) (0.212) (0.219) (0.291) (0.291) 
r2_w 0.004 0.001 0.048 0.026 0.004 0.001 0.058 0.046 
r2_b 0.223 0.235 0.204 0.215 0.246 0.256 0.163 0.164 
r2_o 0.202 0.210 0.146 0.155 0.208 0.212 0.102 0.102 
                  
Robust standard errors in parentheses           
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1             
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The coefficient of the local average treatment effect estimation, which reports the 
effect of the programme on those who were connected to the energy grid, is on 
average, around 0.95 percentage points higher than the control group. Importantly, 
in this case, length of residence in the neighbourhood is always positively and 
significantly correlated with housing improvements, which indicates that people 
have an incentive to secure their rights through house and service investment 
despite issues of tenure and legality. Security may be one driver for investment but 
services contribute to security.  
There are three main peculiarities that have to be considered in relation to this 
tenure group and housing investments. First, as already noted, there is the 
enrolment, which does not have to be conditioned by legal rights. Second, the 
savings derived from substitution are an incentive to adhere to the service, as long 
as the stability of residence in the house is long enough to generate internalisation 
of benefits. In addition, the consolidation of the neighbourhood itself is an 
incentive for non-participants – informal owners and squatters – to make further 
housing investments. Finally, the service programme and the institutional 
framework of co-production introduce some particularities for service enrolment, 
which forces mainstream views about renters’ and landlords’ behaviours to be 
reconsidered. It is generally argued that renters would not be supportive of 
neighbourhood transformations due to potential increases in their rents. In fact, 
the co-produced model of enrolment provides benefits for both landlords and 
tenants.  
From the tenants’ point of view, a new source of safe energy that generates savings 
in current expenses is attractive when renters and occupants expect to stay in the 
house for a long time. The programme contributes to dissociate use from 
ownership rights when contractual obligations are endorsed by the adult members 
of the household and not tied to ownership of the house. This means that renter 
and landlord responsibilities in the payment for the service can be linked. Renters 
assume responsibilities for paying the instalments out of the savings generated by 
the substitution and any necessary changes to the house are negotiated with the 
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landlord, who capitalises the investments. Yet, from the landlords’ point of view, 
the fact that they generally live in the same neighbourhood – even in the same 
block or plot – provides support for a positive approach to enrolment.   
In addition, since the programme helps in cadastral registration, which means 
greater transfer rights that could decrease the exchange cost if the property were 
sold, the acquisition of the service and subsequent improvements constitute 
another positive outcome of enrolment. As a result, the programme builds on land-
right imbalances within the block to achieve new negotiated outcomes. These 
matters have been established for collective action schemes based on common-
pool resource maintenance and the provision of public goods (Olson, 1965, 1992; 
Ostrom, 1990; Baland and Platteau, 1995, 1997). 
In this case, it is important to acknowledge that tenure in practice is diverse and 
deserves more detailed consideration in our analysis. Indeed, the econometric 
analysis encountered a limitation imposed by a low proportion of residents in each 
of the individual categories, which made it necessary to aggregate them under a 
definition of informality that involved only temporary rights of use, either 
formalised or not. Although the share of renters in the neighbourhoods is very low 
(2 percent, on average), some qualitative insights from a tenant who decided to 
enrol in the programme provided some interesting views about the way in which 
renters feel attracted by the scheme:  
We had decided to have it and told our decision to the landlord, because 
here, we are renting. We are using a carafe [bottled gas] and we are four in 
the family; it’s been a year and a couple of months ... we came on June last 
year. We agreed with him to pay half and half for any additional connection 
charges ... anyway, we pay the rent once a month, and he could discount this 
from the rent (Maria G., 2009).  
Nevertheless, a precarious tenancy (i.e., squatter) or a short length of residence 
may constitute an obstacle because occupants wonder about the responsibility of 
paying the costs of installations and connections when they may have to leave. A 
woman explained this dilemma clearly and in detail:   
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We didn’t participate in this because ... We wanted the gas, but we can’t 
because the house is borrowed, because we can’t buy a plot and, well ...  for 
me, it’s better if I put the gas, but I’m going to lose in all the installation, 
which is more expensive. It wouldn’t be because of the cost of gas and so on, 
but because of the equipment and everything it takes (Juana F., 2009).  
The comments reveal the willingness of occupants and renters to have the 
connection. They do not resist enrolling in the programme; although the landlord’s 
support is required.  
The model also examines whether, all else being equal, households holding 
different legal and tenure status in Group 2 - the neighbouhoods where the 
information stage of the programme was implemented -  are more likely to invest 
in improving the house than the households in the control group. The probability 
that a household improves the dwelling is from 6 to 24 percentage points higher 
than that of the control group. Yet, the likelihood of undertaking improvements in 
the house is higher than those of the control group across all tenure forms, except 
legal owners. Legal owners in Group 2, during the information stage, are no more 
likely to improve the dwelling than the control group. This issue may suggest that, 
for this group, the co-production effects on improvements are exclusively 
determined by the gas connection. For example, houses may require fewer initial 
transformations to comply with gas provision safety measures.  
In addition, the probability that programme participants who are formal owners, 
non-legal owners or non-formal owners will undertake improvements is from 14 
percent to 65 percent higher in Group 2 than in the control group. This may 
indicate that these groups are progressively improving  their houses, in order to 
qualify for the safety connection requirements prescribed by ENARGAS (1997), for 
example by replacing wood walls with concrete or completing windows and 
insulation requirements. The results are all robust to the different model 
specification when all the variables that control the differences in the individual 
socio-demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the respondents, and the 
length of permanent residence in the house, are included.  
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4.  HOUSING IMPROVEMENTS 
I want to turn now to the changes in housing transformation induced by the co-
produced service programme for Groups 1 and 2 in each stage. Differences-in-
differences estimates provide a measure of the changes through time for the three 
different housing-improvement variables. The three model specifications are 
structured in the same way: they compare the average changes in outcomes for the 
whole group of residents – whether they enrol or not (ITT) – in each group, from 
2006 to 2009, to the changes in outcomes for the same period in the control group. 
In Table 6.3, Models 1 to 3 display the results for the dummy variable that indicates 
the undertaking of housing improvements, Models 4 to 6 show the number of 
housing improvements, and the number of them that affected the quality of 
construction materials are reported in Models 7 to 9. All models include the socio-
demographic and other housing characteristics99 that control observable 
differences among groups, added to the length of residence, tenure and legality 
characteristics that may condition investments. These are the basic Models 1, 4 and 
7 (Columns 1, 4 and 7). Models 2, 5 and 8 (Columns 2, 5 and 8) add a set of 
dummies for income and employment, tenure and length of residence in the house, 
which can affect the incentives to invest. Models 3, 6 and 9 (Columns 3, 6 and 9) 
repeat the same models, but the tenure dummies are now replaced by dummies 
for documents held, indicating the legal status of the resident’s ownership rights.  
In general, the results suggest that the co-produced energy programme generated 
a positive and statistically significant incremental effect (at a 1 percent significance 
level) on the likelihood of undertaking housing improvements in the Group 1 
neighbourhoods. These are the neighbourhoods where the service extension has 
already been completed and at least two-thirds of the hosueholds are using piped 
gas in domestic activities. In the case of housing transformations, the coefficient of 
the intention-to-treat estimator, which reports the average effect of the co-
produced programme, on the households located in the neighbourhoods where the 
                                                             
99
 These include: years of education of the household head, age and age square, sex, marital status, 
dependent ratio, number of members in the house, number of houses in the plot and dummies for 
migrant status. 
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program was implemented, is 0.45. This relative change from the control group 
mean of 0.34 represents a 132 percent increase in the proportion of residents 
undertaking transformations in their housing as the result of having obtained the 
gas connection. This effect is meaningful in economic terms, and the coefficients 
increase slightly when the set of income, employment, and tenure and 
documentation controls are included. This means that such differences among 
groups affect investment in housing improvements.  
As discussed earlier in the thesis, progressive housing faces many financial 
constraints (Datta and Jones, 1999).  The data from the Buenos Aires survey 
indicates that upfront costs charged for the introduction of services distort 
investment behaviour. The average effect on households in Group 2 – the intention 
to treat estimates - are all negative and statistically significant at conventional 
significance levels (from 0.08 to 0.09). These results indicate a decrease in the 
number of residents reporting transformations in their houses attributable to the 
co-produced programme, when compared with the equivalent figure for the 
control group during the same time period.  
The explanation for this finding is that planning for an upfront expense affects the 
cycle of progressive transformations (Engelhardt, 1996, Haurin et al., 1996; Dietz 
and Haurin, 2003). Housing construction done progressively depends on savings – 
ranging from monthly income to other sources of informal financial aid – were 
enough for this task. At this stage, the decrease in recorded improvements may 
suggest that residents have to save in advance to acquire the gas service and thus 
forego planned improvements or, decrease their expenditure on housing 
improvements in the short-term in order to undertake consolidation work in the 
future after acquisition of new service. Although the savings generated by the 
substitution of energy should cover the cost of the energy connection, all the 
necessary complementary housing transformations require some additional 
investment. These can include buying a kitchen appliance or heating devices, 
installing an indoor gas connection, or installing water pipes to the bathroom in 
order to accommodate water-heating devices, besides a toilet discharge with 
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running water that may replace the bucket (el balde) that is usually used. As an 
indication that these necessary but unforeseen improvements put pressure on 
domestic financial management, the data show an increase (trend) in the supply of 
labour prior to and during programme enrolment.100    
TABLE 6.3. HOUSING IMPROVEMENTS –  CONNECTION AND INFORMATION 
GATHERING STAGES.   
 
      
 
 
HOUSING IMPROVEMENTS  
NUMBER OF HOUSING 
IMPROVEMENTS  
NUMBER OF HOUSING 
IMPROVEMENTS IN 
CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS 
QUALITY  
    
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
                    
intention_to_treat_OC 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.45*** 0.63*** 0.64*** 0.65*** 0.88*** 0.87*** 0.89*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
intention_to_treat_NUA -0.08*** -0.09*** -0.080*** -0.16*** -0.17*** -0.2*** -0.2*** -0.18*** -0.2*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
howlong 
 
-0.01 -0.01 
 
0.04*** 0.03** 
 
-0.02** -0.02** 
  
 
(0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) 
Socio-demographic controls  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
employment and income   
 
yes yes 
 
yes yes 
 
yes yes 
tenure and documents  
 
tenure doc 
 
tenure doc 
 
tenure doc 
  
         
Constant -0.08 0.55*** 0.41** -0.07 -0.27 -0.16 0.57*** 0.59*** 0.60*** 
  (0.11) (0.18) (0.18) (0.32) (0.34) (0.33) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) 
Observations 550 550 550 550 550 550 550 550 550 
R-squared 0.46 0.52 0.511 0.17 0.19 0.18 0.40 0.40 0.41 
F-test 
 
34.2 2.012 
 
65.8 3.39 
 
13.3 15.2 
Prob > F 
 
0 0.0901 
 
0 0.00882 
 
0.0086 0 
Notes: N=550. Differences in Differences –Intention to Treat Estimator. Model 1, 4, 7 socio-demographic controls. Model 
2,5,8 and 3,6, 9 add the whole set of socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics, employment and income 
covariates, as well as tenure and documents dummies, respectively.Robust Standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
                                                             
100
 During the November 2009 follow-up survey several interviewees stated that non-working adults 
in the house (either the wife or the husband) had sought a job at this stage in order to pay for 
housing improvements. 
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Notes: N=550. Differences in Differences – Intention to Treat Estimator. Model 1, 4, 7 socio-demographic controls. Model 
2,5,8 and 3,6, 9 add the whole set of socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics, employment and income 
covariates, as well as tenure and documents dummies, respectively. Robust Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As expected, the results for the effects on the number of housing improvements  
(Columns 4 to 6), and the number of transformations affecting the quality of 
construction materials (Columns 7 to 9) suggest an incremental effect on 
improvements for those houses located in the neighbourhoods where the 
connection has been granted. The results indicate large and statistically significant 
incremental effects (at a 1 percent significance level). The intention to treat 
estimates, of 0.63 to 0.65, report the average effect on the whole group – besides 
enrolment in the co-produced programme- indicates an incremental effect 
compared to the mean of 0.21 changes in the control group, where the 
intervention was not implemented. Furthermore, the intention to treat estimator 
for the number of improvements affecting quality of construction materials of 0.87 
to 0.89, is also significant. In this case, the relative change, from a mean of 0.33 in 
the control group, also indicates a large incremental effect in the number of 
changes in the quality of the construction materials for households that belong to 
the neighbourhoods connected to the new infrastructure service grid. These effects 
are meaningful in economic terms. It is worth noting that the coefficients increase 
slightly when the set of income employment, tenure and document controls is 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
intention_to_treat_1 0.424*** 0.421*** 0.452*** 0.637*** 0.648*** 0.654*** 0.884*** 0.879*** 0.895***
(0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.041) (0.043) (0.044) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020)
intention_to_treat_2 -0.081*** -0.097*** -0.080*** -0.166*** -0.175*** -0.144*** -0.165*** -0.183*** -0.194***
(0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.040) (0.042) (0.042) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024)
howlong -0.001 -0.001 0.004*** 0.003** -0.002** -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
sociodempgraphic controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
employment and income  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
tenure/documents tenure documents tenure documents tenure documents 
Constant -0.008 0.553*** 0.416** -0.079 -0.279 -0.166 0.573*** 0.596*** 0.602***
(0.114) (0.183) (0.180) (0.324) (0.340) (0.335) (0.177) (0.185) (0.180)
Observations 1,046 1,046 1,046 1,046 1,046 1,046 1,046 1,046 1,046
R-squared 0.466 0.520 0.511 0.179 0.195 0.183 0.404 0.407 0.414
F-test 34.28 2.012 65.81 3.397 13.33 15.24
Prob > F 0 0.0901 0 0.00882 8.61e-11 0
Table 6.3 . Differences in Differences Estimates- Dwelling Improvements 
Dwelling Improvements 
Number of Dwelling 
Improvements 
Number of Improvements 
(construction materials quality) 
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included, which means that differences among groups affect investment in housing 
transformations.  
It is important to notice that the coefficient for “years of residence in the house” is 
always negative and statistically significant in the last two models which have 
“number of housing transformations” as a dependent variable. This means that, as 
expected for these neighbourhoods, the length of residence, which is highly 
correlated to house age, is negatively associated with the incremental number of 
improvements that are undertaken. The result implies that the progressive process 
of housing construction over a longer time frame had allowed the completion of 
more basic features and achieved a greater degree of house consolidation. Notably, 
the programme, and the service, provided a boost in housing transformations for 
the residents that had been living there for a longer period of time. For this group, 
it reversed the negative correlation of the number of housing transformations and 
length of residence. Long-standing residents, who would otherwise be less inclined 
to make changes, became more willing to invest in their houses because of the 
availability of the service intervention.  
In order to capture any particular effect of the programme associated with housing 
age, an interaction term between the intention-to-treat dummies and the age of 
the house is introduced as control (Table 6.4). What is important to note is that the 
independent (positive) effect of the co-produced programme on the number of 
housing improvements is slightly reduced and still statistically significant. Only the 
interaction term that includes the intention-to-treat for Group 1 is positive and 
statistically significant at the one percent level of significance. This means that, 
despite the direct effect of the programme on transformations, the number of 
improvements undertaken among respondents in Group 1 is explained by the 
interaction between the effect of offering the programme and the length of 
permanence in the house. This result provides evidence of a further step towards 
the consolidation of the house, since different transformations are made thanks to 
the new functions that piped gas makes available.  
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TABLE 6.4. NUMBER OF HOUSING IMPROVEMENTS AFFECTING QUALITY 
OF CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS.  
CONNECTION AND INFORMATION GATHERING STAGES. DIFFERENCES IN DIFFERENCES 
ESTIMATES WITH INTERACTION (INTENTION-TO-TREAT AND LENGTH OF RESIDENCE) 
 
Table 6.4. Differences in Differences Estimates - Dependent variable: Number of Housing Improvements 
affecting quality of housing construction materials (without and with interaction intention_to_treat*howlong) 
Dep Var:                        
Number of Improvements 
affecting the quality of 
construction materials  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Diff in Diff Estimates- - withouth 
interaction 
howlong*intention_to_treat  
Diff in Diff Estimates- with interaction 
howlong*intention_to_treat  
intention_to_treat_OC 0.884*** 0.879*** 0.895*** 0.707*** 0.707*** 0.806*** 
  (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.047) (0.050) (0.047) 
intention_to_treat_NUA   -0.165*** -0.183*** -0.194*** -0.280*** -0.305*** -0.243*** 
  (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.060) (0.062) (0.058) 
howlong   -0.001 -0.002** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
inter_howlong_intent_OC       0.005*** 0.005*** 0.003* 
        (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
inter_howlong_intent_NUA       0.003 0.003 0.001 
        (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
title     0.111***     0.112*** 
      (0.024)     (0.024) 
regularized     0.178***     0.176*** 
      (0.033)     (0.034) 
none     0.245***     0.242*** 
      (0.038)     (0.038) 
other     -0.076     -0.070 
      (0.067)     (0.068) 
formal_owner2   0.015     0.028   
    (0.072)     (0.074)   
formal_renter2   0.267***     0.298***   
    (0.076)     (0.079)   
informal_owner2   .160**     0.167**   
    (0.076)     (0.076)   
occupant2   0.123     0.140   
    (0.108)     (0.111)   
socio demographic 
controls 
yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
income and employment 
controls  
no  yes  yes  no  yes  yes  
Constant 0.573*** 0.596*** 0.602*** 0.761*** 0.736*** 0.668*** 
  (0.177) (0.185) (0.180) (0.180) (0.185) (0.179) 
R-squared 0.404 0.407 0.414 0.404 0.408 0.414 
F-test   13.33 15.24   14.09 14.65 
Prob > F   8.61e-11 0   0 0 
Robust standard errors in parentheses           
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*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
          
 
This is an interesting result since it was expected that recently-built houses were 
the ones that needed more changes made to them. In contrast, the new service 
allows an upgrading in investment efforts that are focused on improving other 
functional characteristics that could not be upgraded without the introduction of 
piped services. These include a bathroom with appropriate floor material and 
equipment, or a better kitchen space, where the floor and walls are improved and 
appliances incorporated. New heating devices make heat loss a concern, and can 
lead to improving materials, such as re-plastering walls or replacing windows and 
doors.  
5. LEGALITY, TENURE AND TRENDS ON INVESTMENT 
Table 6.5 reports the differences-in-differences results for the intention-to-treat 
effects on the three variables for housing improvement. Again, these results display 
the average effect of the intervention on the whole group of residents-  have they 
participated in the programme or not.  Here, the sample is divided into the four 
categories that have been already described, considering legality and tenure status. 
Two models are reported for each sample: the first includes the socio-demographic 
and housing characteristics controls; the second includes employment, income per 
capita and dummies for the length of stay in the house as controls that account for 
the differences among samples.  
The effect of the programme on the improvement of the houses shows that 
residents behave differently from the rest of the neighbourhood groups, when 
located in the neighbourhoods that were targeted by the complete co-produced 
programme.    
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TABLE 6.5. HOUSING IMPROVEMENTS. CONNECTION AND INFORMATION 
GATHERING STAGES. BY LEGALITY AND TENURE  
CONNECTION AND INFORMATION GATHERING STAGES. DIFFERENCES IN DIFFERENCES 
ESTIMATES (REDUCED SAMPLE BY TENURE /LEGAL STATUS) 
 
 
Note: N=630 (full sample); Title=214; Formal Owner= 485; Non-Titled=415 and Informal/Use rights =145. Intent-To-Treat 
Difference uses OLS and control for the baseline survey characteristics.  Models in columns 1,3,5,7, 9 and 11 include socio-
demographic controls (sex, primary education, age and age square, marital status, migrant status, number of residents, 
dependent ratio, number of houses per plot, distance to avenue). Models in columns 2, 4, 6,8,10 and 12 add employment 
dummies and logarithm of income per capita, as controls.  
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
intention_to_treat_OC 0.451*** 0.425*** 0.370*** 0.134* 0.874*** 0.850*** 0.466*** 0.420*** 0.594*** 0.579*** 0.892*** 0.900***
(0.020) (0.024) (0.072) (0.080) (0,037) (0,038) (0.013) (0.014) (0.039) (0.050) (0,021) (0,022)
intention_to_treat_NUA -0.107*** -0.107*** -0.007*** -0.040*** -0.133*** "-0.148** -0.068*** -0.055*** -0.094*** -0.072*** -0.213*** -0.219***
(0.016) (0.017) (0.053) (0.064) (0,029) (0,032) (0.014) (0.014) (0.039) (0.045) (0,025) (0,025)
howlong1_5 -0.154*** -1.422*** -0.569***
(0.033) (0.166) (0,115)
howlong6_15 -0,013 0,105 0,001 -0.030** -0.111* -0,029
(0.029) (0.135) -0,064 (0.015) (0.059) (0,043)
howlong23_29 -0,022 0.402*** 0,005 0.019 0.023 0,01
(0.023) (0.073) (0,053) (0.014) (0.055) (0,036)
howlong30_more -0.154*** -0.329*** -0,049 -0.108*** -0.204*** -0,011
(0.020) (0.079) (0,044) (0.017) (0.052) (0,034)
Constant -0.283*** -0,216 -0,373 -0,619 1.099*** 1.180*** 0.135*** 0.107984 -0,315 0,042 0.486** 0.591**
(0.077) (0.139) (0.342) (0.547) (0,218) (0,217) (0.051) (0.086) (0.274) (0.376) (0,234) (0,244)
R-squared 0.249 0.279 0.270 0.366 0,573 0,574 0.278 0.306 0.186 0.232 0,427 0,437
F-test 22.10 34.35 50,23 21.36 23.80 2,513
Prob > F 0 0 0,00124 0 0 1,23E-05
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
intention_to_treat_OC 0.545*** 0.485*** 0.786*** 0.907*** 0.939*** 0.889*** 0.375*** 0.503*** 0.772*** 0.975*** 0.933*** 1.325***
(0.020) (0.021) (0.049) (0.063) (0,029) (0,030) (0.024) (0.053) (0.101) (0.198) (0,068) (0,089)
intention_to_treat_NUA 0,022 -0,004 0,065 0,058 -0.074** -0.125*** -0.116*** 0,024 0.256* 0,101 0,065 0,095
(0.021) (0.021) (0.056) (0.065) (0,037) (0,037) (0.021) (0.047) (0.137) (0.173) (0,099) (0,095)
howlong1_5 -0,025 -0.825*** -0,08 0,023 0.840*** 0.387***
(0.031) (0.145) (0,083) (0.061) (0.183) (0,062)
howlong6_15 0,016 -0,017 0,006 0.196*** 0.555*** -0,081
(0.015) (0.057) (0,043) (0.035) (0.121) (0,060)
howlong23_29 0.031* -0,032 -0,044 -0.137*** -0,056 -0.320***
(0.017) (0.061) (0,040) (0.052) (0.193) (0,080)
howlong30_more -0.091*** -0,078 -0.152*** -0.070* -0,233 -1.121***
(0.022) (0.060) (0,044) (0.042) (0.207) (0,126)
Constant 0.112** 0.312*** 0,217 -0,142 0,177 0,276 -0,013 -0.670*** -0,033 -0.048*** -0,369 -0.541*
(0.057) (0.101) (0.267) (0.404) (0,225) (0,243) (0.116) (0.212) (0.544) (0.764) (0,367) (0,304)
R-squared 0.317 0.331 0.209 0.236 0,381 0,383 0.360 0.468 0.299 0.466 0,397 0,521
F-test 8,5 9,07 4,42 15.46 23.61 50,53
Prob > F 7.31e-07 2.78e-07 0,001 0 0 0,0011
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 6.5.B                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
NON TITLED OWNERS NON FORMAL OWNERSHIP 
Dep. Variables:
Housing 
Improvements 
number of  Housing 
Improvements 
Number of  
Improvements  -
Quality of 
Housing 
Improvements 
number of  Housing 
Improvements 
Number of  
Improvements  -
Quality of 
Dep. Variables:
Housing 
Improvements 
number of  Housing 
Improvements 
Number of  
Improvements  -
Quality of 
Housing 
Improvements 
number of  Housing 
Improvements 
Number of  
Improvements  -
Quality of 
Table 6.5. A                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Dependent Variables : Housing Improvments, Number of Housing Improvements and Number of Quality of Construction Materials Improvements  . Reduced 
Sample by tenure / documents status
TITLED OWNERS FORMAL OWNER 
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The results confirm the evidence that there is a powerful incremental effect on the 
trend of housing investment that is generated by the offer of the service. The 
results certainly indicate that the intervention does not only affect the titled 
residents when it comes to investing (property rights view). Instead, the 
programme induces a positive, incremental effect on housing transformations and 
this effect is not limited to formal legal owners but includes residents holding 
diverse tenures and ownership rights.  
Indeed, the intention-to-treat coefficient for residents across all tenure categories, 
located in the neighbourhoods within Group 1 – either adherents to the service 
programme or non-compliers – reports a considerable, positive and significant 
incremental effect as a residual effect of the programme on all the transformation 
variables, when compared to that of the residents from the control group with the 
same tenure status. The effects are meaningful in quantitative terms. They support 
strongly the argument that services per se constitute a powerful incentive to 
encourage a progressive investment in housing transformations, and that this 
incentive is not conditioned by the presence of property rights.  
In the case of residents who do not hold legal ownership rights, or who declare 
formal tenure, or have use or informal ownership rights over the property, there is 
an incremental effect for each category, when the causal effects of the co-produced 
programme on the number of housing improvements is compared with the 
equivalent level reported by residents in the control group.  
Importantly, the positive and statistically significant sign of the intention-to-treat 
coefficient for the residents within Group 1 that are included in the last tenure 
category (residents whose rights comprise less permanent or temporary 
occupancy) indicates that the benefits from the programme, at the connection 
stage, also motivate a positive, incremental effect on housing transformations for 
this group . This is an unexpected result for informal owners, renters and 
occupants, and arises in two different ways: through enrolment in the programme 
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or through the incentives provided (that is to say, the neighbourhood effects) via 
the consolidation of the neighbourhood once the connection has been provided. 
There is a positive correlation between “permanence of 1 to 5 years” and the 
“number of transformations”, that suggests newcomers in this group may feel more 
encouraged to invest in a greater number of works as a result of the intervention.  
This observation leads to several considerations. First, the academic literature, on 
rural areas especially, has established that informal rights may be enforced by 
investments and housing transformations and, very frequently, have represented a 
well-recognised means of tenure-security enhancement when residents hold 
temporary rights (Brasselle et al., 2002; Sjaastad and Bromley, 1997). Arguably, the 
programme and the service connection have made the area in Buenos Aires more 
attractive. Therefore, squatters will be more inclined to invest to secure their rights, 
and other newcomers may be attracted to the area. In contrast, almost all groups 
of residents (by tenure types) that have been offered the social interaction stage of 
the programme (Group 2) decrease the average number of transformations 
compared to the trend in the control group. This negative effect gets stronger in 
the case of formal owners and those residents with titles to their houses.  
Results are less clear in the case of non-formal owner categories (occupants, 
squatters and renters having temporary-user rights), where non-significant effects 
on changes are shown compared with the trend in transformations made by non-
formal owners within the control group. It means that, for this group of residents, 
this stage of the intervention does not have a clear differential effect on 
transformations; they would have been practically the same had they not been 
offered the programme. This result seems to contradict our a priori hypothesis of 
households planning for an upfront investment, since any restrictions in monthly 
expenses might affect this group of low-income households, too. In the case of 
tenants, it is possible that they are sharing the expenses with their landlords which 
could explain the finding. Nevertheless, the positive and significant effect on the 
number of transformations in construction materials quality once the programme 
has been implemented and the connection granted (in the coefficient for the 
224 
 
intention-to-treat) indicate that the main effects on housing investment for this 
group are determined by the connection stage.  
Finally, the complete results for the differences-in-differences model that 
corresponds to the number of housing transformations as a dependent variable - 
with a full set of controls for the average change in the outcome in Group 1 - are 
reported in Table 6.6. Again, the results seem consistent with the explanation that 
the provision of infrastructure through co-produced intervention induces a process 
of housing upgrading that is not confined to households holding legal ownership 
rights. In these results, it is possible to observe that the provision of infrastructure 
to the neighbourhoods has been successful in stimulating housing investment for all 
tenure groups (row 1, columns 1 to 8). More importantly, when both adherents and 
non-participants are considered, all tenure groups display greater activity in 
housing upgrading than their counterparts in nearby neighbourhoods without the 
piped service.  
The service extension to the neighbourhoods has increased the proportion of 
households undertaking housing improvements, and that effect is very large for 
households holding informal rights to property when compared to those that 
belong to the control group. Importantly, for non-titled residents the number of 
improvements is from 78 to 90 percentage points higher than the control mean 
(columns 5 and 6). The effect on housing improvements for non-formal owners is 
significantly higher in the treatment group; with an estimated effect of 72 to 97 
percentage points difference from the control mean (columns 7 and 8).  
 
TABLE 6.6. HOUSING IMPROVEMENTS. CONNECTION AND INFORMATION 
GATHERING STAGES. BY LEGALITY AND TENURE  
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Number of Housing Improvements. Differences-in-Diffrences Estimates. Reduced Sample by tenure/legality 
De.Var: Number of  
Housing Improvements 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
intention_to_treat_OC 0.370*** 0.134224* 0.594269*** 0.579944*** 0.786575*** 0.907797*** 0.772258*** 0.975153***
(0.072) (0.080) (0.039) (0.050) (0.049) (0.063) (0.101) (0.198)
intention_to_treat_NUA -0.307*** -0.540871***-0.194444***-0.272285***0.065393 0.058094 0.256619* 0.101595
(0.053) (0.064) (0.039) (0.045) (0.056) (0.065) (0.137) (0.173)
sex_dmale 0.342*** 0.732769*** -0.024412 0.018483 -0.158254***-0.251186***-0.285019***-0.643536***
(0.065) (0.070) (0.036) (0.043) (0.041) (0.049) (0.076) (0.108)
edu_prim -0.149*** -0.069758 -0.114203***-0.023282 -0.157342***-0.028450 -0.323669***-0.269329**
(0.049) (0.050) (0.037) (0.043) (0.043) (0.055) (0.075) (0.118)
dwellingperplot -0.174413***0.139358*** 0.029755 0.084045*** 0.131092*** 0.099438*** -0.152854 -0.150749*
(0.054) (0.045) (0.027) (0.024) (0.029) (0.030) (0.095) (0.079)
depend14 0.010578*** 0.011355*** -0.000631 0.004502*** -0.004871***-0.001048 -0.003550 -0.013811***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
age 0.020208* 0.000325 -0.010866 -0.024470** -0.052432***-0.040008***0.012432 0.111217***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.020) (0.024)
age_2 -0.000159 0.000031 0.000200** 0.000309*** 0.000548*** 0.000408*** -0.000438* -0.001118***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
div_sep_wid 0.063272 0.223928*** 0.041390 0.032310 0.298484*** 0.398258*** 0.273754 0.855021***
(0.084) (0.077) (0.051) (0.057) (0.055) (0.062) (0.180) (0.217)
mar_concu 0.161679*** 0.395096*** -0.106641***-0.024357 -0.317233***-0.235462***-0.610266***-0.180319**
(0.058) (0.057) (0.040) (0.040) (0.043) (0.046) (0.075) (0.077)
nat_migrant 0.101628** 0.232118*** 0.125266** 0.217361*** 0.445266*** 0.423180*** 0.824311*** -0.399898***
(0.046) (0.057) (0.049) (0.056) (0.096) (0.092) (0.259) (0.142)
intornat_migrant -0.163706** -0.119414 0.046677 0.095590 0.335992*** 0.246543** 0.321398 -0.283426*
(0.077) (0.082) (0.063) (0.072) (0.102) (0.102) (0.252) (0.145)
n_members -0.134815***-0.146619***-0.043569***-0.078365***0.018361 0.005722 -0.011800 0.050369**
(0.030) (0.033) (0.013) (0.016) (0.011) (0.014) (0.022) (0.024)
unemployed -0.280117** 0.154309* 0.107435 -0.237918
(0.116) (0.086) (0.105) (0.155)
employee -0.781040*** -0.329879*** -0.137982** 0.613943***
(0.071) (0.051) (0.057) (0.142)
retired -0.270946*** -0.210085*** -0.212838***
(0.086) (0.064) (0.080)
employer 0.084410 -0.035473 0.103468 0.639669***
(0.119) (0.109) (0.121) (0.164)
incomepercapita_ln 0.066116 0.024995 0.037880 0.085171
(0.048) (0.030) (0.034) (0.066)
Av3 0.126749** 0.007981 -0.109779* 0.286919*
(0.064) (0.050) (0.058) (0.166)
Av6 0.365051*** 0.004608 -0.005706 0.545806***
(0.070) (0.047) (0.050) (0.106)
Av6more -0.819298*** -0.295314*** -0.356368*** 0.240029**
(0.177) (0.067) (0.067) (0.110)
howlong1_5 -1.422106*** -0.825361*** 0.840287***
(0.166) (0.145) (0.183)
howlong6_15 0.105530 -0.111544* -0.017273 0.555102***
(0.135) (0.059) (0.057) (0.121)
howlong23_29 0.402147*** 0.023585 -0.032306 -0.056938
(0.073) (0.055) (0.061) (0.193)
howlong30_more -0.329890*** -0.204135*** -0.078848 -0.233789
(0.079) (0.052) (0.060) (0.207)
Constant -0.373532 -0.619397 -0.315778 0.042111 0.217506 -0.142461 -0.033956 -3.048401***
(0.342) (0.547) (0.274) (0.376) (0.267) (0.404) (0.544) (0.764)
R-squared 0.270 0.366 0.186 0.232 0.209 0.236 0.299 0.466
F-test 34.35 23.80 9.087 23.61
Prob > F 0 0 2.78e-07 0
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
TITLED OWNERS FORMAL OWNERS NON TITLED OWNERS NON FORMAL OWNERHIP
Robust standard errors in parentheses
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Note: Intent-To-Treat Difference uses OLS and control for the baseline survey characteristics.  Sample sizes of residents are 
Title=214; Formal Owner= 485; Non-Titled=415 and Informal/Use rights =145. Models in columns 1,3,5,7, 9 and 11 include 
socio-demographic controls (sex, primary education, age, marital status, migrant status, number of residents, dependent 
ratio, number of houses per plot, distance to avenue). Models in columns 2, 4, 6,8,10 and 12 add employment dummies and 
logarithm of income per capita, as controls. 
 
Similarly, the number of improvements undertaken by formal owners – not titled – 
in the treatment group is 59 percentage points higher than the control group mean 
(columns 3 and 4). Finally, the number of housing improvements is from 13 to 33 
percentage points higher for titled residents in the treatment group than the 
control mean (columns 1 and 2). The results points to a marginal effect of the 
programme that is greater for non-legal owners than titled ones, underscoring the 
strength of the improvement effect on non-titled and non-formal owners, who 
otherwise would have only completed much lower upgrading activity or at a lower 
path.  
 
6. HOUSING TRANSFORMATIONS AND TRUST  
This section evaluates the association between trust measures and housing 
investment, as an effect of programme implementation, after the connection was 
granted to residents in Group 1 (OC), from 2006 to 2009. This is the group in which 
the co-produced programme has been implemented fully and residents who 
enrolled in the programme have beed connected to the networked gas service.  
 
The interpersonal networks that create trust are relevant assets that contribute to 
support sustainable livelihoods. Relationships of trust and reciprocity in exchanges 
facilitate cooperation and provide for informal social networks as valuable 
resources. This explanation validates the relevance of the main contribution of this 
study in reconceptualising the benefits of interventions, and in considering how 
several dimensions of trust may mutually reinforce complementarities between the 
social and physical dimensions of investments. The suggestion from my research is 
that (exogenous) change in social distance introduced by CPSI may further 
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reciprocity, which facilitates trust-building in two different spaces and levels of 
interaction. First, interactions with neighbours, local associations, and within the 
family, where obligations turn from personal and moral to economic, where there is 
a strict (tacit) obligation to repay (Sahlins, 1974). Second, exchanges in wider social 
spaces, with unknown others, such as the municipal public sector or the utility firm, 
where links and exchanges among those involved contribute to the construction of 
new knowledge across institutional boundaries (Mitlin, 2004).  
The preliminary explanation is based on mainstream social capital literature that 
considers that generalised trust may affect the incentives for housing investment. 
The results in Table 6.6 provide empirical evidence of a negative correlation 
between generalised trust after connection and investment in the house. In 
particular we have already discussed that the probability of reporting a positive 
answer to the generalised trust question was higher after the connection stage of 
the programme, which explains the negative correlation between the “trust in 
others” indicator and the transformations variable.  
Nevertheless, there are other channels upon which the positive effects of the co-
produced intervention on generating trust may affect housing transformations. 
Scholars who write about urban livelihoods claim that this type of “capital” is an 
economically productive asset that affects individuals’ ability to take advantage of 
opportunities to enhance their wellbeing (Moser, 1998; Rakodi, 1999). For example, 
it could be expected that new (informal) connections might allow access to 
(informal) credit sources or the help of neighbours in the practical realisation of 
home improvements. However, the survey does not collect data on access to credit, 
which would have allowed the analysis of these effects. 
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TABLE 6.7. HOUSING IMPROVEMENTS AND TRUST IN THE FAMILY  
(YEARS 2006-2009). CONNECTION STAGE  
 
Table 6.7 reports the results for households in Group 1 compared to the control 
group on the probability of residents undertaking housing transformations, for both 
the average effect on the whole sample and the effect on households that 
participated in the co-produced programme (for the intention-to-treat and local 
average treatment effect on the treated). Now the trust variable is incorporated as 
an independent variable in the model where the dependent is the variable 
Table 6.7. A.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
intention_to_treat_OC 0.521***0.519***0.523*** 0.515*** 0.522***0.523***0.526*** 0.518***
(0.023) (0,025) (0,026) (0,028) (0.026) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028)
trust_family_1 0.090***0.093***0.086*** 0.087***
(0.050) (0.052) (0.051) (0.052)
sociodemographic-income and 
employment 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
tenure/documents dummies tenure documents tenure documents
howlong dummies yes yes yes yes 
Constant 0.294*** -0,172 -0,119 -0.114 -0.241* -0.201*** -0.186 -0.185
(0.022) (0.057) (0.051) (0.067) (0.058) (0.059) (0.101) (0.102)
Observations 1,046 1,046 1,046 1,046 1,046 1,046 1,046 1,046
r2_w . 0.0189 0.0245 0.0349 0.0178 0.0269 0.274 0.0418
r2_b 0.309 0.284 0.311 0.301 0.294 0.301 0.310 0.301
r2_o 0.274 0.275 0.285 0.279 0.277 0.277 0.287 0.281
TABLE 6.7.B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
intention_to_treat_OC 0.758***0.770***0.768*** 0.767*** 0.759***0.771***0.770*** 0.770***
(0.042) (0.048) (0.049) (0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.048) (0.049)
trust_family_1 0.045** 0.041** 0.0451** 0.051**
(0.052) (0.056) (0.057) (0.057)
sociodemographic-income and 
employment 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
tenure/documents dummies tenure documents tenure documents
howlong dummies yes yes yes yes 
Constant 0.296*** -0.193 -0.098 -0.136 0.253*** -0.223 -.132 -0.177
(0.022) (0.058) (0.056) (0.058) (0.051) (0.059) (0.056) (0.073)
Observations 1,046 1,046 1,046 1,046 1,046 1,046 1,046 1,046
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
HOUSING  IMPROVEMENTS 
HOUSING  IMPROVEMENTS                      
AND TRUST IN THE FAMILY 
Connection Stage - Intention to Treat Estimates and Local Average Treatement Effect (OLS and 2SLS).                                                       
Dep. Var:Housing Improvements                
(2006-2009)
HOUSING  IMPROVEMENTS 
HOUSING  IMPROVEMENTS                      
AND TRUST IN THE FAMILY 
CONNECTION STAGE IN OC - LOCAL AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT (2SLS)
Dep. Var:Housing Improvements                
(2006-2009)
CONNECTION STAGE IN OC - INTENTION TO TREAT ESTIMATES (OLS)
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indicating housing improvemts. Throughout, the estimated effect of the co-
production programme on the likelihood of housing improvements is the result of 
its direct effect on the improvements outcome plus its indirect effect on the 
generation of generalised trust. Table 6.8 (Panel A) reports the estimates for the 
whole Group 1 (ITT) and Panel B the estimates on those that participate (LATE). 
TABLE 6.8. HOUSING IMPROVEMENTS AND GENERALISED TRUST 
  
Connection Stage. Intention to Treat Estimates  and Local Average Treatement Effect (OLS and 2SLS) 
                  
Table 6.8. A. CONNECTION STAGE IN OC - INTENTION TO TREAT ESTIMATES (OLS) 
Dep. Var :Housing 
Improvements                (2006-
2009) 
HOUSING  IMPROVEMENTS  
 HOUSING  IMPROVEMENTS                      AND 
TRUST IN THE FAMILY  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
intention_to_treat_OC  0.521*** 0.519*** 0.523*** 0.515*** 0.512*** 0.507*** 0.507*** 0.502*** 
  (0.123) (0.105) (0.106) (0.120) (0.106) (0.106)     
trust_others         -0.068* -0.074** -0.078** -0.076** 
          (0.157) (0.112) (0.114)   
sociodemographic-income and 
employment  
  yes  yes  yes    yes  yes  yes  
tenure/documents dummies     tenure  documents     tenure  documents 
howlong dummies      yes  yes      yes  yes  
                  
Constant 0.294*** -0,172 -0,119 -0.114 -0.260* -0.172 -0.074 -0.116 
  (0.022) (0.057) (0.051) (0.067) (0.058) (0.059) (0.101) (0.102) 
                  
TABLE 6.8.B CONNECTION STAGE IN OC - LOCAL AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT (2SLS) 
Dep. Var :Housing 
Improvements                (2006-
2009) 
HOUSING  IMPROVEMENTS  
 HOUSING  IMPROVEMENTS                      AND 
TRUST IN THE FAMILY  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
intention_to_treat_OC  0.758*** 0.770*** 0.768*** 0.767*** 0.725*** 0.719*** 0.716*** 0.727*** 
  (0.042) (0.048) (0.049) (0.043) (0.046) (0.051) (0.050) (0.051) 
trust_others         -0.069* -0.064 -0.063 -0.062 
          (0.052) (0.056) (0.057) (0.057) 
sociodemographic-income and 
employment  
  yes  yes  yes    yes  yes  yes  
tenure/documents dummies     tenure  documents     tenure  documents 
howlong dummies      yes  yes      yes  yes  
                  
Constant 0.296*** -0.193 -0.098 -0.136 0.260*** -0.108 0.144 -0.095 
  (0.022) (0.058) (0.056) (0.058) (0.026) (0.076) (0.077) (0.073) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.            
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1           
 
 
Notes: Estimations in Panel A are based on Intention-to-Treat (OLS) for panel data (2006 and 2009). In Tablel B 
estimates use the intention-to-treat variable as an instrument for the identification of treatment effects in 2SLS 
(LATE) Dependent Variable. HousingImprovements  (equals 1 if an improvement in the house was done during 
the last year). 
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The four different specifications of the model are similar to those already included 
in previous estimations (in Columns 1 to 4). Columns 5 to 8 reproduce the same 
models but now the trust variable is included as control in each case. Panel B 
reports the results for LATE estimates based on the same frame of models.  
A priori, we would have expected a positive and significant correlation between 
generalised trust and investment. This conceptual association between trust and 
investment is based on the mainstream social capital literature that points to the 
association between the reductions in transaction costs effects of trust and 
exchanges (Arrow, 1969, 1972), as a central feature that determines investment 
behaviour (Zak and Knack, 2001). The results provide evidence of a positive effect 
of the programme on improvements induced by the connection in the 
neighbourhoods while a negative effect correlated to generalised trust. The 
coefficients of generalised trust reported in Columns 5 to 8 in Panels A and B are all 
negatively correlated to the likelihood of housing improvements, both in the 
intention-to-treat (ITT) and the LATE estimations.101  
The same model is now reported, with trust in the family as a social capital variable. 
The variable is defined computing the “high and quite high” category answers to 
the particularised trust survey question. The results are reported in Table 6.9 
(Panels A and B). The effect of the intervention on the level of trust in the family is 
positively associated with the likelihood of undertaking an improvement in the 
house.  
TABLE 6.9. HOUSING IMPROVEMENTS AND TRUST IN THE FAMILY - BY 
LEGALITY AND TENURE  
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: NUMBER OF HOUSING IMPROVEMENTS 
                                                             
101 The coefficients are significant (p value is <0.05) for the ITT estimations and lose their significance 
once LATE estimators are modeled. 
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TABLE 6.9.A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
intention_to_treat_OC 1.186*** 1.218*** 1.218*** 1.171*** 1.211*** 1.212***
(0.123) (0.105) (0.106) (0.120) (0.106) (0.106)
trust_family_1 0,137 0.279** 0.281** 0,227 0,137 0,131
(0.157) (0.112) (0.114) (0.151) (0.140) (0.141)
treatment_OC 1.617*** 1.552*** 1.552*** 1.447*** 1.459*** 1.458***
(0.168) (0.157) (0.158) (0.165) (0.151) (0.152)
sociodemographic-
income and 
employment 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
howlong dummies yes yes yes yes 
Constant 0.537*** -0,038 -0,068 0.432*** -0,274 -0,32 0.537*** 0,233 0,194 0.393** 0,055 0,107
(0.062) (0.057) (0.051) (0.144) (0.059) (0.057) (0.101) (0.608) (0.061) (0.155) (0.061) (0.066)
TABLE 6.9. B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
intention_to_treat_OC 0.756*** 0.689*** 0.687*** 0.759*** 0.705*** 0.702***
(0.074) (0.075) (0.075) (0.073) (0.074) (0.073)
trust_family_1 0.351*** 0.337*** 0.351*** 0.372*** 0.346*** 0.361***
(0.088) (0.120) (0.118) (0.090) (0.103) (0.103)
treatment_OC 1.019*** 0.951*** 0.940*** 0.979*** 0.945*** 0.935***
(0.099) (0.109) (0.108) (0.099) (0.109) (0.108)
sociodemographic-
income and 
employment 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
howlong dummies yes yes yes yes 
Constant 0.742*** 0.181 0.214 0.433*** 0.198 0.185 0.741*** 0.051 0.111 0.615*** -0.210 0.196
(0.059) (0.058) (0.056) (0.058) (0.061) (0.059) (0.056) (0.073) (0.074) (0.059) (0.073) (0.074)
TABLE 6.9.C
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
intention_to_treat_OC 0.533*** 0.547*** 0.557*** 0.532*** 0.544*** 0.556***
(0.079) (0.084) (0.085) (0.078) (0.083) (0.083)
trust_family_1 0.271** 0.289*** 0.310*** 0.191 0.199 0.216
(0.097) (0.113) (0.113) (0.103) (0.120) (0.120)
treatment_OC 0.823*** 0.868*** 0.873*** 0.856*** 0.903*** 0.913***
(0.122) (0.143) (0.142) (0.122) (0.143) (0.142)
sociodemographic-
income and 
employment 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
howlong dummies yes yes yes yes 
Constant 0.925*** -0.180 -0.174 0.882*** -0.290 -0.299 0.925*** -0.341 -0.321 0.891*** -0.450 -0.443
(0.066) (0.366) (0.363) (0.065) (0.373) (0.369) (0.060) (0.430) (0.432) (0.061) (0.431) (0.433)
TABLE 6.9.D
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
intention_to_treat_OC 0.779*** 0.967*** 0.990*** 0.774*** 0.946*** 0.949***
(0.152) (0.168) (0.170) (0.152) (0.171) (0.173)
trust_family_1 0.049 0.021 0.032 -0.325 -0.336 -0.341
(0.173) (0.207) (0.212) (0.155) (0.101) (0.103)
treatment_OC 1.814*** 2.136*** 2.196*** 1.752*** 2.075*** 2.116***
(0.174) (0.127) (0.129) (0.171) (0.133) (0.135)
sociodemographic-
income and 
employment 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
howlong dummies yes yes yes yes 
Constant 0.909*** -1.234**-1.638***0.825*** -1.291**-1.740***0.912*** -1.616 -1.101** 1.202*** -1.046 -1.560*
(0.087) (0.115) (0.143) (0.092) (0.144) (0.155) (0.120) (0.294) (0.125) (0.120) (0.198) (0.128)
 
CONNECTION STAGE - LEGAL OWNERS  
Dep. Var: Number of 
Housing 
improvements  
 CONNECTION STAGE - FORMAL OWNERS 
Dep. Var: Number of 
Housing 
improvements       
INTENTION TO TREAT ESTIMATES  IN OC LOCAL AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT IN OC 
Connection Stage .Intention to Treat Estimates and Local Average Treatement Effect (OLS and 2SLS).                                                                                
Reduced Sample by Legality and Tenure.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
INTENTION TO TREAT ESTIMATES  IN OC LOCAL AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT IN OC 
INTENTION TO TREAT ESTIMATES  IN OC LOCAL AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT IN OC 
INTENTION TO TREAT ESTIMATES  IN OC LOCAL AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT IN OC 
 CONNECTION STAGE - NON FORMAL OWNERSHIP  
Dep. Var: Number of 
Housing 
improvements       
 CONNECTION STAGE - NON LEGAL OWNERS 
Dep. Var: Number of 
Housing 
improvements       
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The coefficients of trust are now positively correlated to housing investment, in 
both ITT and LATE models ( i.e., either for houses that are connected to the grid and 
also as the average effect on residents located in the neighbourhoods where the 
programme was implemented and the gas service was made avilable). The 
coefficients are significant in both cases: p value is <0.10 in the ITT model and p 
value <0.05 in LATE models. This result is relevant since a priori we would have 
expected the social capital argument for trust to hold true, in which the 
household’s choice of investment is positively correlated to generalised trust. In 
contrast, the results provide greater support for domestic economy arguments that 
should be correlated to incentives to invest in the house.  
Table 6.10 reports the same estimations as before but with the number of housing 
improvements as the dependent variable. Trust in family is included in the model in 
the same way as in previous estimations. The sample has been split into the four 
informality categories that are defined based on legality and tenure status. Those 
are reported in Panels A to C of this table. The results again indicate that after the 
gas connection the number of improvements for all groups of residents is higher 
than the control group. As expected, the number of transformations is even greater 
for treated residents. The coefficients for the intention-to-treat and the local 
average treatment effects on the treated are all positive and significant (p values 
<0.01). The number of transformations is positively correlated to trust in the family. 
This coefficient is positive in most of the specifications of the model, for both ITT 
and LATE estimates. The finding applies either when residents declared themselves 
to be formal owners or when they do not have legal documents as proof of their 
ownership rights; it is a positive and statistically significant correlation.  
 
TABLE 6.10. NUMBER OF HOUSING IMPROVEMENTS AND TRUST IN THE 
FAMILY - BY LEGALITY AND TENURE  
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TABLE 6.10.A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
intention_to_treat_OC 1.186***1.218***1.218*** 1.171*** 1.211*** 1.212***
(0.123) (0.105) (0.106) (0.120) (0.106) (0.106)
trust_family_1 0,137 0.279** 0.281** 0,227 0,137 0,131
(0.157) (0.112) (0.114) (0.151) (0.140) (0.141)
treatment_OC 1.617***1.552***1.552***1.447***1.459***1.458***
(0.168) (0.157) (0.158) (0.165) (0.151) (0.152)
sociodemographic-
income and 
employment 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
howlong dummies yes yes yes yes 
Constant 0.537*** -0,038 -0,068 0.432*** -0,274 -0,32 0.537*** 0,233 0,194 0.393** 0,055 0,107
(0.062) (0.057) (0.051) (0.144) (0.059) (0.057) (0.101) (0.608) (0.061) (0.155) (0.061) (0.066)
TABLE 6.10. B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
intention_to_treat_OC 0.756***0.689***0.687*** 0.759*** 0.705*** 0.702***
(0.074) (0.075) (0.075) (0.073) (0.074) (0.073)
trust_family_1 0.351*** 0.337*** 0.351*** 0.372***0.346***0.361***
(0.088) (0.120) (0.118) (0.090) (0.103) (0.103)
treatment_OC 1.019***0.951***0.940***0.979***0.945***0.935***
(0.099) (0.109) (0.108) (0.099) (0.109) (0.108)
sociodemographic-
income and 
employment 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
howlong dummies yes yes yes yes 
Constant 0.742*** 0.181 0.214 0.433*** 0.198 0.185 0.741*** 0.051 0.111 0.615*** -0.210 0.196
(0.059) (0.058) (0.056) (0.058) (0.061) (0.059) (0.056) (0.073) (0.074) (0.059) (0.073) (0.074)
TABLE 6.10.C
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
intention_to_treat_OC 0.533***0.547***0.557*** 0.532*** 0.544*** 0.556***
(0.079) (0.084) (0.085) (0.078) (0.083) (0.083)
trust_family_1 0.271** 0.289*** 0.310*** 0.191 0.199 0.216
(0.097) (0.113) (0.113) (0.103) (0.120) (0.120)
treatment_OC 0.823***0.868***0.873***0.856***0.903***0.913***
(0.122) (0.143) (0.142) (0.122) (0.143) (0.142)
sociodemographic-
income and 
employment 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
howlong dummies yes yes yes yes 
Constant 0.925*** -0.180 -0.174 0.882*** -0.290 -0.299 0.925*** -0.341 -0.321 0.891*** -0.450 -0.443
(0.066) (0.366) (0.363) (0.065) (0.373) (0.369) (0.060) (0.430) (0.432) (0.061) (0.431) (0.433)
TABLE 6.10.D
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
intention_to_treat_OC 0.779***0.967***0.990*** 0.774*** 0.946*** 0.949***
(0.152) (0.168) (0.170) (0.152) (0.171) (0.173)
trust_family_1 0.049 0.021 0.032 -0.325 -0.336 -0.341
(0.173) (0.207) (0.212) (0.155) (0.101) (0.103)
treatment_OC 1.814***2.136***2.196***1.752***2.075***2.116***
(0.174) (0.127) (0.129) (0.171) (0.133) (0.135)
sociodemographic-
income and 
employment 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
howlong dummies yes yes yes yes 
Constant 0.909***-1.234**-1.638***0.825*** -1.291** -1.740***0.912*** -1.616 -1.101**1.202*** -1.046 -1.560*
(0.087) (0.115) (0.143) (0.092) (0.144) (0.155) (0.120) (0.294) (0.125) (0.120) (0.198) (0.128)
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
INTENTION TO TREAT ESTIMATES  IN OC LOCAL AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT IN OC 
INTENTION TO TREAT ESTIMATES  IN OC LOCAL AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT IN OC 
INTENTION TO TREAT ESTIMATES  IN OC LOCAL AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT IN OC 
 CONNECTION STAGE - NON FORMAL OWNERSHIP  
Dep. Var: Number of 
Housing  improvements  
 CONNECTION STAGE - NON LEGAL OWNERS 
Dep. Var: Number of 
Housing Improvements  
 CONNECTION STAGE - FORMAL OWNERS 
Dep. Var: Number of  
Housing improvements  
Connection Stage. Intention to Treat Estimates (OLS) and Local Average Treatement Effect.
 Reduced Sample by Legality and Tenure. 
CONNECTION STAGE - LEGAL OWNERS  
Dep. Var: Number of 
Housing improvements 
INTENTION TO TREAT ESTIMATES  IN OC LOCAL AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT IN OC 
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Regarding the effects within the household, the effects of the programme on trust 
might be associated to households undertaking housing investments on 
improvements. Notably, these results are indicative of a positive correlation 
between the numbers of improvements and trust in the family as an effect of the 
intervention in these Group 1 households. The coefficients for trust in the family 
are positive and significant (p values <0.01) for these two categories of residents 
(Panels B and C), although the LATE coefficient loses its significance in the model for 
untitled residents.  
One plausible explanation for the correlation of trust in the family and investment 
in the house is related to the non-definition of succession rights in untitled parcels. 
The family has relevance in investment decisions because all members are potential 
owners of the asset (succesion rights may not always be well determined). 
Furthermore, among the housing characteristics of the neighbourhoods studied, 
plots had been subdivided and multiple family members shared the same plot. This 
is in contrast to what happens when legal rights are documented to favour one or 
some particular member/s of the family. In such a case, it is plausible to consider 
that decisions will rely less on other family members. 
The results on the intention-to-treat (ITT) and local average treatment effect (LATE) 
for the titled residents sample, report a very high number of transformations  
compared to the control group, and a positive although non-significant coefficient 
of trust in family. Thus, titled residents can dispose of their asset without strong 
family requirements while informal non-legal owners’ ownership rights are more 
diffused, the succession line is not always well defined, which determines a higher 
reliance on the family as the economic unit for home production and housing 
improvements (Ward et al., 2011b). 
The only exception is the coefficient for the participant group of non-formal 
residents, which is negative but statistically non-significant at conventional 
significance levels. In this case, trust in the family is negatively correlated to the 
number of transformations (Panel C, Columns 5 to 8). Renters and occupants can 
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display a higher number of improvements but results suggest that those are 
negatively correlated with trust in the family.102  
The other association between housing improvements and trust focuses on trust in 
neighbours as the explanation. Table 6.11 reports the results for the same model as 
used in the previous analysis when the sample was split into tenure categories. 
Now, the estimated effect of the co-produced programme on outcomes is the 
result of its direct effect on the number of housing improvements plus its indirect 
effect on the generation of trust in neighbours. The number of improvements and 
the likelihood of reporting (high and quite high) trust in neighbours are positively 
correlated for formal owners, both in the whole sample or when the effect on 
participants is estimated in Group 1 compared to control group. The coefficients 
are statistically significant at conventional significance levels (p value <0.01) and 
robust to all the different specifications of the model, either for ITT (average effect 
on all the residents) and LATE (effect on those that participate in the coproduced 
programme and where conneted to the energy grid), as shown in Table 6.8, Panel 
B. In the case of non-formal owners, the number of improvements in the house is 
negatively correlated to the probability of reporting trust in neighbours. The 
coefficients are negative and statistically significant (with p values <0.01). 
Interestingly, no clear pattern of association is displayed for samples related to 
legal rights, either for those who have legal rights or those who do not.  
 
 
TABLE 6.11. NUMBER OF HOUSING IMPROVEMENTS AND TRUST IN 
NEIGHBOURS - BY LEGALITY AND TENURE  
 
                                                             
102 The data do not suggest an obvious explanation of why this might be the case. 
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TABLE 6.11.A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
intention_to_treat_OC 1.186*** 1.218*** 1.218*** 1.180*** 1.225*** 1.224***
(0.123) (0.105) (0.106) (0.120) (0.106) (0.106)
trust_neigh_1 0.204* -0.227 -0.334 0,139 -0,023 -0.028
(0,118) (0,115) (0,115) (0.151) (0.140) (0.141)
treatment_OC 1.617*** 1.552*** 1.552*** 1.455*** 1.478*** 1.477***
(0.168) (0.157) (0.158) (0.165) (0,154) (0,155)
sociodemographic-
income and 
employment 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
howlong dummies yes yes yes yes 
Constant 0.537*** -0,038 -0,068 0.432*** -0,274 -0,32 0.537*** 0,233 0,194 0.393** 0,055 0,107
(0.062) (0.057) (0.051) (0.144) (0.059) (0.057) (0.101) (0.608) (0.061) (0.155) (0.061) (0.066)
TABLE 6.11. B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
intention_to_treat_OC 0.756*** 0.689*** 0.687*** 0.759*** 0.705*** 0.702***
(0.074) (0.075) (0.075) (0.073) (0.074) (0.073)
trust_neigh_1 0.210*** 0.108*** 0.111*** 0.161*** 0.075*** 0.079***
(0.070) (0.74) (0.075) (0.090) (0.103) (0.103)
treatment_OC 1.019*** 0.951*** 0.940*** 0.979*** 0.945*** 0.935***
(0.099) (0.109) (0.108) (0.099) (0.099) (0.097)
sociodemographic-
income and 
employment 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
howlong dummies yes yes yes yes 
Constant 0.742*** 0.181 0.214 0.433*** 0.198 0.185 0.741*** 0.051 0.111 0.615*** -0.210 0.196
(0.059) (0.058) (0.056) (0.058) (0.061) (0.059) (0.056) (0.073) (0.074) (0.059) (0.073) (0.074)
TABLE 6.9.C
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
intention_to_treat_OC 0.533*** 0.547*** 0.557*** 0.532*** 0.544*** 0.556***
(0.079) (0.084) (0.085) (0.078) (0.083) (0.083)
trust_neigh_1 0.271** 0.289*** 0.310*** -0.035 -0.106 -0.093
(0.097) (0.113) (0.113) (0.073) (0.081) (0.081)
treatment_OC 0.823*** 0.868*** 0.873*** 0.844*** 0.833*** 0.895***
(0.122) (0.143) (0.142) (0.122) (0.143) (0.142)
sociodemographic-
income and 
employment 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
howlong dummies yes yes yes yes 
Constant 0.925*** -0.180 -0.174 0.914*** -0.204 -0.187 0.925*** -0.341 -0.321 0.931*** -0.321 -0.298
(0.066) (0.366) (0.363) (0.068) (0.343) (0.350) (0.060) (0.430) (0.432) (0.066) (0.415) (0.417)
TABLE 6.9.D
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
intention_to_treat_OC 0.779*** 0.967*** 0.990*** 0.755*** 0.906*** 0.916**
(0.152) (0.168) (0.170) (0.148) (0.156) (0.156)
trust_neigh_1 -0.339*** -0.486*** -0.510*** -0.387** -0.518*** -0.541***
(0.131) (0.116) (0.115) (0.170) (0.102) (0.103)
treatment_OC 1.814*** 2.136*** 2.196*** 1.735*** 2.018*** 2.043***
(0.174) (0.127) (0.129) (0.189) (0.131) (0.128)
sociodemographic-
income and 
employment 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
howlong dummies yes yes yes yes 
Constant 0.909*** -1.234**-1.638*** 0.825*** -1.291** -1.740*** 0.912*** -1.616 -1.101** 1.202*** -1.046 -1.560*
(0.087) (0.115) (0.143) (0.092) (0.144) (0.155) (0.120) (0.294) (0.125) (0.120) (0.198) (0.128)
Connection Stage .Intention to Treat Estimates and Local Average Treatement Effect (OLS and 2SLS).                                                                                
Reduced Sample by Legality and Tenure.
 
CONNECTION STAGE - LEGAL OWNERS  
Dep. Var: Number of 
Housing 
Improvements 
 CONNECTION STAGE - FORMAL OWNERS 
Dep. Var: Number of 
Housing 
Improvements 
INTENTION TO TREAT ESTIMATES  IN OC LOCAL AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT IN OC 
INTENTION TO TREAT ESTIMATES  IN OC LOCAL AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT IN OC 
INTENTION TO TREAT ESTIMATES  IN OC LOCAL AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT IN OC 
INTENTION TO TREAT ESTIMATES  IN OC LOCAL AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT IN OC 
 CONNECTION STAGE - NON FORMAL OWNERSHIP  
Dep. Var: Number of 
Housing 
Improvements 
 CONNECTION STAGE - NON LEGAL OWNERS 
Dep. Var: Number of 
Housing 
Improvements 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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An alternative measure for trust in neighbours considers exclusively the higher 
responses for the trust question, rather than those related to high and quite high 
responses. The results for declared formal owners are robust to this specification 
only when the differences between groups are controlled, either for ITT or LATE. 
This means that the differences in socio-demographic, employment and income 
characteristics, as well as length of residence, explain the association between trust 
in neighbours and housing improvements. Importantly, for the non-titled group, 
“high” trust in neighbours is positively correlated with the number of 
improvements and statistically significant at p values <0.01 in all the LATE 
specifications of the model. Therefore, for this group only higher levels of trust with 
neighbourhoods explain the association with housing improvements.  
Finally, Table 6.12 reports the results for the same models but with trust defined as 
trust in the municipality. Recall that the programme does not have an incremental 
effect on the average level of trust in the municipality at the information gathering 
stage, nor a number of years after connection. Only in the group anticipating 
implementation of the programme was the likelihood of trusting the municipality 
higher because of this expectation. Nevertheless, there is a positive correlation 
between the number of improvements in the house and the likelihood of trusting 
the municipality for residents who do not have legal ownership rights and for those 
that declared themselves formal owners. The coefficient of trust in the municipality 
is positive and statistically significant in almost all the specifications of the number 
of transformations for the intention-to-treat and local average treatment effects 
estimations on formal owners and non-titled ones (Panels B and C).  
TABLE 6.12. NUMBER OF HOUSING IMPROVEMENTS AND TRUST IN THE 
MUNICIPALITY - BY LEGALITY AND TENURE  
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TABLE 6.12.A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
intention_to_treat_OC 1.305*** 1.276*** 1.281*** 1.312*** 1.276*** 1.280***
(0.120) (0.107) (0.108) (0.122) (0.108) (0.109)
trust_munic_1 -0.184 0.043 0.041 -0.180 0.083 0.077
(0.125) (0.157) (0.158) (0.148) (0.165) (0.166)
treatment_OC 1.617*** 1.552*** 1.552*** 1.626*** 1.550*** 1.550***
(0.168) (0.157) (0.158) (0.168) (0.157) (0.158)
sociodemographic-
income and 
employment 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
how long dummies yes yes yes yes 
Constant 0.458*** -0.059 -0.096 0.489*** -0.064 -0.102 0.458*** 0.197 0.159 0.488*** 0.184 0.145
(0.050) (0.044) (0.049) (0.050) (0.044) (0.050) (0.102) (0.210) (0.219) (0.105) (0.211) (0.221)
TABLE 6.12. B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
intention_to_treat_OC 0.756*** 0.689*** 0.687*** 0.759*** 0.705*** 0.702***
(0.074) (0.075) (0.075) (0.073) (0.074) (0.073)
trust_munic_1 0.151* 0.288** 0.284** 0.134 0.319*** 0.313***
(0.088) (0.120) (0.118) (0.090) (0.103) (0.103)
treatment_OC 1.019*** 0.951*** 0.940*** 1.023*** 0.975*** 0.962***
(0.099) (0.109) (0.108) (0.099) (0.109) (0.108)
sociodemographic-
income and 
employment 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
how long dummies yes yes yes yes 
Constant 0.742*** 0.171 0.214 0.713*** 0.118 0.157 0.741*** 0.051 0.111 0.715*** -0.010 0.046
(0.059) (0.358) (0.356) (0.058) (0.361) (0.359) (0.056) (0.373) (0.374) (0.059) (0.373) (0.374)
TABLE 6.10.C
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
intention_to_treat_OC 0.533*** 0.547*** 0.557*** 0.541*** 0.563*** 0.573***
(0.079) (0.084) (0.085) (0.078) (0.083) (0.083)
trust_munic_1 0.235** 0.338*** 0.350*** 0.186* 0.319*** 0.331***
(0.103) (0.126) (0.124) (0.103) (0.120) (0.120)
treatment_OC 0.823*** 0.868*** 0.873*** 0.834*** 0.892*** 0.898***
(0.122) (0.143) (0.142) (0.122) (0.143) (0.142)
sociodemographic-
income and 
employment 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
how long dummies yes yes yes yes 
Constant 0.925*** -0.180 -0.174 0.882*** -0.290 -0.299 0.925*** -0.341 -0.321 0.891*** -0.450 -0.443
(0.066) (0.366) (0.363) (0.065) (0.373) (0.369) (0.060) (0.430) (0.432) (0.061) (0.431) (0.433)
TABLE 6.12.D
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
intention_to_treat_OC 0.779*** 0.967*** 0.990*** 0.780*** 0.966*** 0.989***
(0.152) (0.168) (0.170) (0.152) (0.171) (0.173)
trust_munic_1 0.049 0.021 0.032 -0.195 -0.322 -0.319
(0.173) (0.207) (0.212) (0.255) (0.301) (0.303)
treatment_OC 1.814*** 2.136*** 2.196*** 1.680*** 2.057*** 2.116***
(0.174) (0.127) (0.129) (0.171) (0.133) (0.135)
sociodemographic-
income and 
employment 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
how long dummies yes yes yes yes 
Constant 0.909*** -1.234**-1.638***0.902*** -1.241**-1.649***0.912*** -1.616 -1.101** 0.939*** -1.442 -1.934*
(0.087) (0.115) (0.143) (0.092) (0.144) (0.155) (0.120) (0.294) (0.125) (0.120) (0.198) (0.128)
Connection Stage. Intention to Treat Estimates (OLS) and Local Average Treatement Effect. 
CONNECTION STAGE - LEGAL OWNERS  
Dep. Var: Number of 
Housing 
improvements      
INTENTION TO TREAT ESTIMATES  IN OC LOCAL AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT IN OC 
Reduced Sample by Legality and Tenure.
 CONNECTION STAGE - FORMAL OWNERS 
Dep. Var: Number of 
Housing 
improvements      
INTENTION TO TREAT ESTIMATES  IN OC LOCAL AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT IN OC 
INTENTION TO TREAT ESTIMATES  IN OC LOCAL AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT IN OC 
 CONNECTION STAGE - NON FORMAL OWNERSHIP  
Dep. Var: Number of 
Housing 
improvements      
INTENTION TO TREAT ESTIMATES  IN OC LOCAL AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT IN OC 
 CONNECTION STAGE - NON LEGAL OWNERS 
Dep. Var: Number of 
Housing 
improvements      
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Significance is even stronger when the set of controls are added to the models, 
reaching p values <0.01, which means that the individual and housing differences 
among groups are relevant in these cases. The exchanges among formal and non-
titled owners and the municipal public sector contribute to the construction of new 
knowledge across institutional boundaries (Mitlin, 2004), and in the urban 
livelihood sense of interactions among physical and social capital (Moser, 1998). 
Finally, there is no clear pattern of association between the number of 
transformations and the coefficient of trust in the municipality when the sample is 
reduced to residents who have legal rights to their property. 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
The results of the analysis of housing improvements outlined in this chapter are 
broadly consistent with the claim that the gas service extension programme fosters 
a boost to investment. In line with the preliminary study by Strassmann (1984), it is 
absolutely clear that service introduction causes high investment in the house. Four 
main results can be drawn out from the econometric analysis. 
First, these results show that the implementation of the programme and the 
connection to the gas service have a significant and positive effect on the number 
and occurrence of housing improvements. Specifically, once houses were 
connected, the co-produced programme induced an increase by 75 percent in the 
occurrence of housing improvements. The strong, positive effects are found for all 
residents in the neighbourhoods, which indicate a high social return from the 
intervention. This finding in turn suggests the presence of neighbourhood effects 
on investment attributable to the programme. 
Second, the results support the predictions forwarded in the academic literature 
concerning infrastructure as an incentive for investment that is not constrained by a 
lack of legal ownership rights.103 The chapter considers results that the programme 
                                                             
103
 Estimated by OLS and 2SLS, the intention to treat and LATE coefficients for group 1 are positive 
and significant for all tenure categories, at conventional significance levels (p values always below 
0.01). 
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does not provide title-holders alone with incentives to invest, as one might argue 
from a strict property rights perspective. Rather, all residents across the diverse 
tenure and legal status categories are shown to invest once services are provided. 
When the residents’ ability to invest in the improvement of housing considers 
different legality and tenure characteristics of residents’ ownership rights, almost 
all the groups display higher average levels of housing improvements  attributed to 
the after connection stage of the programme. The co-produced intervention is 
associated with a higher probability of non-legal, declared formal owners and 
informal (tenure status) residents undertaking changes to housing when compared 
with reports by residents in a control group (for whom service connection was not 
made available). This effect is greater for residents with the individual service 
connection. An important result on this point shows the complementarity between 
savings and capitalisation in the relation between landlords and tenants, when 
savings from energy substitution complement landlord capitalisation incentives. 
However, the results suggest distortions in the cycle of investment in the 
improvement of the house. The decrease in the implementation of housing 
improvements at the information stage of the programme indicates that 
households have had to adjust their plans for future expenditures to take in to 
account potentially costly consolidation works to their houses. 
Third, both those connected to services and non-participants may benefit. The 
chapter has proposed that this result might be explained because of the 
household’s internalisation of benefits generated by the substitution of the energy 
source, and through capitalisation from savings and neighbourhood transformation. 
In the period under study the programme has been effective at raising substantially 
overall housing upgrading in the targeted area when investments extend from 
housing formalisation requirements and savings to increased security and positive 
externalities elicited by the provision of services to the neighbourhoods.  
However, housing improvements are also associated with trust generated through 
the process of co-producing services. Trust in this context is considered an asset 
that provides utility to residents through the reduction of transaction costs 
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increasing the rate of investment (Arrow, 1969, 1972; Zak and Knack, 2001). Yet, 
the interesting fact is that generalised trust is not correlated with the undertaking 
of progressive improvements to people’s houses. Notably, the results support 
arguments associating particularised dimensions of trust to physical investments, 
such as trust in the family, neighbours and the municipality, which are positively 
associated with the occurrence and number of housing improvements.  
Fourth, the results indicate that investments and trust work together when 
residents lack legal rights. These results provide some evidence that contribute to 
stress the urban livelihood viewpoint of interactions among physical and social 
capital (Moser, 1998). Indeed, the results indicate that this association is stronger 
when households declare formal ownership or non-legal ownership rights, and 
extends to residents who have decided to enrol to obtain the connection.  
The results on trust in the family are interesting and require explanation. One 
plausible explanation might be associated with a certain level of complementarity 
between ownership without holding legal rights and family decision to invest and to 
capitalise their investments through housing improvements. Improvements in the 
house require higher levels of reliance within   the family in the case of informal 
non-legal owners, whose ownership rights are diffused; that is,the succession line in 
the family structure is not always well defined (Ward et al., 2011b). In contrast, 
titled residents can dispose of their asset without strong family oversight.  
Trust in the municipality is positively associated to housing consolidation. 
Importantly, the results provide evidence that the trust in the municipal public 
sector is associated to an increase in housing improvements by formal owners or 
residents that do not have legal rights, but not for legal owners, nor for occupants 
and renters, who only have use rights.  
Finally, while only high levels of trust with neighbours explain the association with 
housing improvements for the non-titled group, the contextual effects are 
especially relevant to explain the association between trust in neighbours and 
housing improvements.  
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In sum, the empirical evidence contributes to underline the association between 
trust and investments in informal neighbourhoods. The results provide strong 
evidence of the boost of housing improvements that are not circumscribed to legal 
owners but extend to all tenure choices. Then, the internalisation of benefits – 
through savings and capitalisation, and greater security, provided by the new 
energy service induces a significant change in household’s investment in their 
house.   
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS 
1. CONCLUSIONS  
The thesis presents a comprehensive institutional theoretical approach in order to 
reappraise the consolidation efforts of residents in informal settlements of Buenos 
Aires. The research focused in particular on the social and physical dimensions of 
people’s investments; that is, how they associated with others and how they 
conducted house improvements. It did so by use of a natural experiment that was 
constructed around the extension of a gas pipeline and domestic connections to 
three groups of neighbourhoods. One group has received the service, another was 
in the process of obtaining the service and a third had not been offered the service. 
The research could therefore control for service effects and it could also do so over 
time by drawing from two surveys, in 2006 and 2009, as well as earlier benchmark 
surveys. The gas programme itself conformed to what is often referred to as a co-
production; the programme relied upon explicit cooperation and coordination 
between households, CSOs, NGOs, the municipality and the utility company. This 
Chapter outlines the thesis conclusions. It summarises the eight key issues that 
emerge from the empirical research, frames the main contributions to the 
academic literature on informality and suggests some ways in which new research 
and policy directions can extend from it.  
First, and a relatively new dimension to understanding household decisions that 
emerges from this thesis, is that it extends knowledge of the internalisation of 
benefits, explaining residents’ participation, enrolment in the service programme 
and housing investments.104 It contrasts the conventional institutional wisdom that 
grounds the causal association between legal title and investment, to provide 
evidence on services – and savings – as important to household behaviours towards 
investment. The research provides empirical evidence on the importance of the 
capitalisation of savings: the internalisation of benefits starts with savings from the 
                                                             
104 There are also cultural issues related to having a networked source of infrastructure service, since 
people associate having gas with a particular sense of ‘making it’and even of  being ‘citizens’.   
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substitution of the cheaper and more reliable piped service for expensive bottled 
gas, includes the new service use value, and the full capitalisation when all 
installation costs are covered. A boost to dwelling improvements is made possible 
by the availability of the new energy source that allows for the capitalisation of 
savings from substitution (energy savings amount to 2.3 percent of the average 
monthly income). Households for whom the savings from substitution do not offset 
the enrolment costs, in time and money, have lower incentives to participate. At 
the same time, all households experienced the possibility of internalised benefits 
from neighbourhood improvement that created incentives to improve their 
dwellings as well.  
Second, the research was interested in the association of dwelling improvements 
with the possession of legal property rights. This view has become a dominant 
paradigm in a great deal of international policy and research. In Chapters 2 and 3 I 
outlined why this view is simplistic; it adopts a narrow legal-illegal position on 
informality, and has a limited appreciation of how people understand their tenure, 
security and status. In Buenos Aires, titleholders are not the only ones who are able 
to internalise the benefits from programme participation. Households whose 
property has been regularised, have other documents or are unclear about the 
documentation, are not statistically associated with lower enrolment in the 
programme. One-third of the households that hold no dwelling documentation to 
assert their rights, had enrolled in the programme. Moreover, in regard to tenure, 
residents declaring formal ownership rights are not more likely to participate than 
those who report being informal owners (owners of the dwelling but not of the 
plot). Nor is renting a deterrent to participation since landlords’ and renters’ 
internalisation of benefits from the connection are complementary, as long as 
tenants’ length of permanent residence is long enough to capitalise – in terms of 
use value and savings – the cost of investment. Data on non-formal owners show 
that as the result of the specific co-produced programme institutional framework, 
residents enrol in the programme through internalising the benefits from use and 
savings and landlords can reap the benefits from capitalisation and cadastral 
registration. Stability through length of residence in the dwelling is correlated with 
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participatory voluntary involvement for this group. But it is also shown that 
occupants have fewer incentives to engage in costly infrastructure improvements 
when their expectation of future residency is uncertain.  
As a related point, a third central finding of this study is that neither legal status nor 
income are significant constraints on accessing services. Length of permanent 
residence in the neighbourhood is a good predictor of the households’ 
internalisation of benefits through participation. It increases the probability of 
enrolment, as compared with those families that have been living in the 
neighbourhood for less than five years. Tenure and documents are significant, while 
length of permanent residence is central for participation of those residents who 
are categorised as informal, and for whom the transaction cost of moving is a 
significant predictor for participation in the co-produced programme. In this sense, 
the results of this study follow the homeownership urban economic literature that 
emphasises transaction costs of moving and immobility, beyond capitalisation, as 
powerful incentives for investment in the provision of public goods and services (Di 
Pasquale and Glaeser, 1999; Hilber, 2010). Furthermore, the internalisation of 
benefits from involvement is not determined by tenure nor legal or permanence 
considerations, but is also due to contextual heterogeneity effects. The research is 
therefore consistent with findings that heterogeneity among the contextual 
environment of nearby residents frames the marginal benefits from individual 
efforts (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000; Baland and Platteau, 1997).  
Fourth, the co-production programme provided a boost to housing changes in low-
income neighbourhoods of BAMA. The data are fairly clear that a higher investment 
in the dwelling is caused by the introduction of the service. Indeed, all residents – 
and the diverse tenure and legal status of the dwellings – are inclined toward 
investing once the services are provided. This idea in which formal, legal title is not 
necessary to boost neighbourhood consolidation efforts complements other studies 
(De Souza, 2001; Gilbert, 2002; Gilbert and Ward, 1985; Payne, 1989; Razzaz, 1993; 
Varley, 1987). This thesis provides quantitative evidence of the residents’ ability to 
invest in the improvement of their housing unit, where almost all the groups display 
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higher average levels of dwelling transformations, attributable to the programme, 
when compared with the control group. Importantly, it was found that the financial 
contributions required as part of the programme motivate an ‘adjustment’ in 
household investment behaviours. Such adjustments distort the ‘normal’ cycle of 
dwelling transformations and increase labour-force participation.  
Fifth, the study tackles the issue of voluntary participation in informal settlements, 
a long-standing subject in Latin American informality research. Participatory 
involvement is shown to have increased when it is required by the co-produced 
model even when fewer than one-third of respondents report being involved in 
community organisations and other arrangements, and decreases after the 
connection is obtained. The research provides evidence that participatory 
involvement in the co-production programme is tightly associated with the 
internalisation of benefits. Residents increase their participation when it is required 
and when benefits are internalised, and reduce it when such motivations cease. 
There are two more detailed and important observations that can also be drawn 
out from this discussion. First, the data give strong support to the hitherto widely 
observed trend in Latin America that participatory involvement is a means to an 
end, increased when involvement is needed and ending once services are obtained. 
Indeed, as Gilbert and Ward (1984b), and Portes and Walton (1976) suggest, the 
average level of participatory involvement in neighbourhood voluntary activities is 
very low. The opening of spaces for interaction “through invitation” are not enough 
to ensure effective and sustained participatory efforts (Cornwall, 2008). Here is 
where the internalisation of benefits and the costs and benefits notion becomes 
relevant. At the information stage, titled (legal) owners, declared formal owners 
and informal (non-titled) owners, are more likely to report participatory 
involvement, since they are more able to reap the direct benefits of an improved 
neighbourhood through capitalisation. More specifically, longer permanence of 
residence is highly correlated to participatory involvement. It indicates that stability 
has a powerful significant impact on increasing participation in voluntary 
neighbourhood activities despite the tenure condition of these groups. 
Furthermore, almost all of the households that participated in the programme and 
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were effectively connected to the new gas service, would be willing to participate in 
a new collective intervention in their neighbourhood.  
The second sub-point concerns people’s willingness to collaborate. The co-
produced programme induces an increase in the willingness to collaborate: an 
increase by 21.1 to 24.4 percent in the proportion of respondents that report such 
disposition attributable to the co-produced programme, whereas the average effect 
on the treated estimator reports stronger effects, with an increase of 29 to 32.4 
percent. Collaboration increases despite tenure and legal status of residents but the 
effects seem less robust for titled owners and non-formal owners, whose 
willingness to collaborate is determined by contextual effects of the 
heterogeneity/homogeneity of the group.  
The sixth contribution of the research is to examine and measure whether the 
effect of the intervention on investment in the dwelling might be affected by the 
generation of trust. The findings indicate that the links of balanced reciprocity have 
contributed to levelling investments in the dwelling. The effects can be related to 
the social capital and transaction cost literature (Zak and Knack, 2001; Arrow, 1972, 
respectively) that emphasises the economic impact of trust on the residents’ 
incentives to invest when uncertainties are reduced in exchanges. What I have 
called the “complete experience” is shown to have had positive effects on several 
dimensions of residents’ trust.  
In contrast, the association of trust and investments does not fit to the strict social 
capital conceptualisation. Instead, the empirical evidence supports the argument of 
the reliance on the family as an economic unit, which seems from the analysis to be 
especially the case for dwellings with non-legal rights to property (formal owners 
and non-titled ones). Since trust among family members appears to be strongly 
associated with investment in the dwellings within these settlements, particularly 
for residents who are not entitled with legal rights, the results provide evidence of 
complementarities between decisions on dwelling improvements and trust in the 
family. Importantly, when legal rights are documented favouring a particular 
member(s) of the family, there is no effect on decisions on dwelling investments 
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associated with trust that are attributable to the entire co-produced service 
experience. This observation may be related to the non-definition of succession 
rights in untitled parcels, where the family has greater reliance in investment 
decisions because more adult members may be potential holders of the asset. The 
evidence for the titled residents’ sample, reporting very high number of 
transformations – although none are associated with trust in the family – provides 
support for this explanation. This information can be associated with the succession 
and inheritance research on informal settlements and extends the relevance of 
such relationships among household members, the dwelling and investments 
(Ward et al., 2011b).  
The number of dwelling improvements for the non-titled residents enrolled in the 
programme is positively correlated with the links of reciprocity involving very high 
levels of trust in neighbours. In this case, the association holds true only when 
residents report the highest measurement option of this particularised dimension 
of trust. Furthermore, there is a positive correlation between the number of 
improvements in the dwelling and the level of trust in the municipality for formal 
owners and non-titled ones, and even more for those who are enrolled in the co-
produced scheme. However, there is no clear pattern of association between the 
level of trust in the municipality and the number of dwelling improvements when 
residents have legal rights to their property. Therefore, the evidence can be taken 
to indicate that informal institutions are  complementary to formal ones, at the 
time of forging the configuration of incentives for investment. Legal ownership – 
through property rights – seems to enable lower reliance on social capital to 
transact or exchange.  
There are several interesting insights regarding the effects of the engagement in 
reciprocal obligations that change moral obligations between neighbours or family 
members into economic ones. Overall, these indicate that a rise in the level of trust 
among residents or family members is a process that takes time to develop, at least 
until the programme has been delivered and financial commitments to repay are 
enforced. A strong and significant impact on the likelihood of reporting high levels 
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of trust among neighbours is evidenced four years after connection. However, the 
results indicate that the programme decreases the level of trust in the municipality 
reported by the residents and the effect is stronger for participants. Nevertheless, 
expectations were high before co-production implementation. Although these 
results cannot be generalised, the interaction space between residents and the 
municipality was not able to positively affect the levels of trust in that institution. 
Instead, the results are indicative of exactly the opposite; that the co-produced 
model caused a decrease in trust of the local government.  
 
2. FUTURE RESEARCH AGENDA AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
As Rodgers, et al. (2012) state, research on informality may be improved when 
drawing out connections across disciplinary contributions. This research opens up a 
number of new matters, questions and issues for the research agenda on 
informality. It also suggests topics and approaches around which the urban 
economics literature can open a broader dialogue with development studies and 
informality research. I would like to underscore three possible areas of future 
research that could contribute to deepening the understanding of neighbourhood 
consolidation and also address the issue of different scales: the macro aspects of 
urban policy, neighbourhood governance, the block and the family.  
First, future research could be designed to take a closer look at family structure and 
decision-making in contexts of socioeconomic uncertainty and different pressures 
for collaborative efforts through, for example, service or regularisation 
programmes. Dwelling investments and consolidation are correlated to trust in the 
family, but the study describes both increases and decline in trust among members. 
Moreover, throughout the study, a clear substitution for generalised trust by trust 
in the family is suggested at different stages of programme implementation. It will 
be valuable to deepen our knowledge of this association, which has recently been 
addressed in other contexts, indicating the role of the family as an interesting 
avenue of research (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011; Ermisch and Gambetta, 2010), 
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since trust among family members appears to be strongly associated with 
investment in dwellings within these settlements, particularly for residents who are 
not entitled with legal rights.  
Second, the natural experiment introduces the presence of “neighbourhood 
effects”. This topic is not addressed by much of the urban studies literature but is 
not new in the urban economics scholarship that has been interested in the spatial 
effects of neighbourhood relations. This study starts to challenge the rigidity of 
disciplinary conceptualisations of legality and tenure associated with investment by 
introducing a topic of contextual neighbourhood effects. This strand of research can 
be advanced to provide useful insights for measuring contextual or endogenous 
effects and behavioural externalities that arise in the proximate geographical and 
social space (i.e. that particular and constrained spatiality of neighbourhood and 
family interaction).  For example, further studies might investigate a random 
sample within blocks – rather than few or one plot per block – to facilitate the 
analysis of interactions among member’ decisions at the block level. Given the 
importance that the block has as the unit of social organisation that channels 
coordination matters in programme implementation, it should constitute a specific 
subject of neighbourhood studies.  
Third my research strengthens scholarly arguments that request that we pay 
greater attention to the temporal dimension of urban processes (Kemper, 2002, 
cited in Rodgers et al., 2012). This view stresses the need for extensive research and 
to devise a “new public policy agenda” that contemplates the specificities of 
consolidation processes within long-standing irregular settlements in Latin America 
today (Ward, 2012a; 2012b). My research contributes to this claim because our 
general knowledge of the effects of interventions on informality is usually based on 
case-studies where results are assessed in cross-section analysis, at one point in 
time. By taking a temporal frame of four years, which involves the different stages 
of a co-production intervention, the longitudinal dimension determined by the 
intervention is addressed in this study. The main rationale is that several processes 
must take time to develop. This makes possible the isolation of the effects of social 
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interaction, the connection to the service phase of implementation, and the 
residual effect several years after connection. This, in turn, helps consider the 
causal effects of the physical and social investment processes, as part of the 
“consolidation ladder” of settlements. In short, in order to sustain and extend many 
of the progressive claims made by social science, which have direct bearing on 
policy, we need more research that considers change over time in complex 
scenarios and adopts methods that allow for the collection and analysis of robust 
data.  
I would like to identify three avenues for extending research into urban policy. First, 
this thesis sheds light on some topics missing from the empirical literature on 
informal neighbourhoods, but at the same time it introduces a vision for “another 
path” on neighbourhood consolidation efforts. This thesis gives support to a more 
holistic approach embracing services, housing finance and community and social 
organisational development, when considering the process of neighbourhood 
consolidation. This approach is supported by the urban development literature that 
explains the analytical oversimplification of the “legal” diagnosis of the issues at 
stake in informality (Royston, 2006; Gilbert, 2002; Marx, 2009; Sjaastad and 
Cousins, 2008). The study contests the idea that legality is mandatory in service 
provision policies, challenging the usual legality-illegality dichotomy (Varley, 1987) 
that constrains access to services through market mechanisms. Since it is well 
accepted that services provide “quasi legal status” (Arnott, 2009), services such gas, 
through its rigorous registration process and the payment slip, constitute a suitable 
way for co-produced efforts to extend to cadastral registration and land 
regularisation over time. Indeed, it is worthwhile to discuss the potential to reverse 
the conventional cycle of legality of tenure preceding access to services, and 
consider whether, in circumstances of co-producing services, the more valuable 
approach for States to adopt is for the provision of services to lead to legalisation.  
Second, the co-production programme introduces a boost to housing 
improvements in the context of low-income neighbourhoods of BAMA. Considering 
the demands for services and dwelling improvements that all of these 
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neighbourhoods face, the study demonstrates that co-production is suitable for 
inducing consolidation efforts. However, the study underlines an incipient path for 
institutional change that cannot be broadly generalised, since it is strongly 
determined by the macro institutional considerations guiding service provision. This 
means the programme introduces an institutional frame that minimises the costs of 
obtaining public goods and services – otherwise difficult to obtain by individual 
means within State constraints. The constraints identified in Chapter 2 are attached 
to the menu of political agendas. How can we ensure that a conducive environment 
to consolidation through neighbourhood organisations is attainable without 
marginalising the value and role of local government actions? In this context, it is 
important to note that, surrounded by greater expectations, the level of trust in the 
municipal public sector had not increased as the result of any of the 
implementation stages of the co-produced programme. Nevertheless, co-produced 
programmes do not excuse the state from contemplating the residents’ requests of 
commitment on its part (Mitlin, 2008), or its broader responsibility for protecting 
lower-income groups (Jones and Ward, 1994: 9). The fact that dwelling investment 
incentives for formal and non-titled owners are positively correlated to increased 
levels of trust in the municipality strongly supports this recommendation, since this 
group has certainly benefited from a new way to access services under normative 
(regulatory) constraints.  
Finally, the evidence should contribute to making clear that the emphasis on 
collaborative schemes and self-help in the policy discourse may help in the basic 
task of providing services. However, these policies may not contribute to promoting 
more confidence in the public sector, particularly among those residents that hold 
formal rights to their properties. One possible explanation lies in the fact that 
individual efforts are substituting public sector duties, when such duties are 
certainly undertaken by the State in other areas of the city. It also points to the fact 
that municipal officials cannot divest themselves from their responsibility to protect 
lower income groups (Jones and Ward, 1994: 9). From one side, the State 
avoidance of responsibilities and mandatory duties in terms of infrastructure 
provision is balanced by the higher level of willingness to collaborate in practical 
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matters in all neighbourhoods (treated and non-treated). Nevertheless, by handing 
on greater responsibilities in finance and implementation to residents, the trust in 
the CBO expressed at each implementation stage (and confidence in the NGO) is 
almost always positive and greater than that expressed for the municipality. The 
research therefore lends support for co-production but should not be interpreted 
as meaning an abandonment of such responsibilities by the municipal State but 
rather a call to find new ways for the State to conceptualise and legitimise its role. 
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APPENDICES 
 
1. Variable List and Definitions  
age Age of respondent 
sex_male Equals one if respondent is male  
no_educ 
Equals one if respondent has not completed the primary education level. Equals zero 
otherwise 
compl_prim Equals one if respondent has primary education completed. Equals zero otherwise 
compl_secun Equals one if respondent has secondary education completed. Equals zero otherwise 
single Equals one if respondent is single. Equals zero otherwise. 
married_cohabitant Equals one if respondent is married or cohabitant. Equals zero otherwise. 
divorced_separated or widowed Equals one if respondent is divorced, separated or widowed. Equals zero otherwise. 
Houses_perplot Number of houses in the plot of land 
depend14 Ratio of dependency: adults per number of children under 14 years 
n_residents Number residents in the house  
n_households Number of households per house 
n_children Number of children below 14 years in the house  
work Equals one if respondent is working. Equals zero otherwise. 
int_migrant 
Equals one if the respondent is an immigrant coming from another country. Equals zero 
otherwise  
nat_migrant 
Equals one if respondent is a domestic migrant for another province. Equals zero 
otherwise  
intornat_migrant 
Equals one if the respondent is a domestic migrant from Buenos Aires Metro Area Equals 
zero otherwise  
formal_owner 
Equals one if declares to be the owner of both the house and the plot of land. Equals 
zero otherwise. 
formal_renter Equals one if declares to rent the house. Equals zero otherwise. 
informal_owner Equals one if declares to be the owner only of the housedwelling. Equals zero otherwise. 
occupant 
Equals one if declares to be an occupant with permission or paying taxes. Equals zero 
otherwise. 
squatter Equals one if declares to be an occupant without permission. Equals zero otherwise. 
other_tenure_rights 
Equals one if respondent gives other answer or the person doesn't know. Equals zero 
otherwise. 
title Equals one if declares to have ownership legal rights. Equals zero other wise 
conveyance 
Equals one if respondent has a conveyance or receipt that shows ownership. Equals zero 
otherwise. 
regularised 
Equals one if respondent declares to having a precarious revocable permit or regularized 
deed. Equals zero otherwise 
none Equals one if respondent has no document as prove of ownership. Equals zero otherwise. 
other Equals one if respondent declares having other type of document. Equals zero otherwise. 
unknown Equals one if respondent does not know his tenure situation. Equals zero otherwise. 
howlong Number of years the household has been living in the house. 
howlong1_5 Equals one if he/she has been living in the house for 1 to 5 years. Equals zero otherwise. 
howlong6_15 Equals one if he/she has been living in the house for 6 to 15 years. Equals zero otherwise. 
howlong16_22 
Equals one if he/she has been living in the house for 16 to 22 years. Equals zero 
otherwise. 
howlong23_29 
Equals one if he/she has been living n the house for 23 to 29 years. Equals zero 
otherwise. 
howlong30_more 
Equals one if he/she has been living in the house  for more than 30 years. Equals zero 
otherwise. 
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howold Age (in years) of the house 
howold 0_5 Equals one if the house is 1 to 5 years old. Equals zero otherwise. 
howold6_15 Equals one if the house is 6 to 15 years old. Equals zero otherwise. 
howold16_22 Equals one if the house is 16 to 22 years old. Equals zero otherwise. 
howold23_29 Equals one if the house is 23 to 29 years old. Equals zero otherwise. 
howold30_more Equals one if the house is more than 30 years old. Equals zero otherwise. 
unemployed Equals one if respondent is inactive or unemployed. Equals zero otherwise. 
temp_job Equals one if respondent has temporary job. Equals zero otherwise. 
social_plan_benef Equals one if respondent is a social plan beneficiary. Equals zero otherwise. 
freelancer  
Equals one if respondent is freelancer worker -no stable formal occupation. Equals zero 
otherwise. 
housewife Equals one if respondent undertakes domestic occupations. Equals zero otherwise. 
employee Equals one if respondent is an employee. Equals zero otherwise. 
student Equals one if respondent is a student. Equals zero otherwise. 
retired Equals one if respondent is retired and pensioner. Equals zero otherwise. 
employer Equals one if respondent is an employer. Equals zero otherwise. 
formal_worker Equals one if respondent has social security contributions. Equals zero otherwise. 
informal_worker 
Equals one if respondent do not have social security contributions. Equals zero 
otherwise. 
dw_1 House that has standard conditions  
dw_2 Precarious House (called rancho) 
dw_3 House  is a shack (called casilla) 
generalised trust (trust_others) 
Equals one if respondent declares that most people can be trusted. Equals zero 
otherwise. 
trust_family_1 
Equals one if respondent has a high to quite high level of trust towards the family. Equals 
zero otherwise. 
trust_family_2 
Equals one if respondent has a high level of trust towards the family. Equals zero 
otherwise. 
trust_neigh_1 
Equals one if respondent has a high to quite high level of trust towards neighbours. 
Equals zero otherwise. 
trust_neigh_2 
Equals one if respondent has a high level of trust towards neighbours. Equals zero 
otherwise. 
trust_NGO _1 
Equals one if respondent has a high to quite high level of trust towards NGO. Equals zero 
otherwise. 
trust_NGO_2 Equals one if respondent has a high level of trust towards NGO. Equals zero otherwise. 
trust_gasban_1 
Equals one if respondent has a high to quite high level of trust towards Utility. Equals 
zero otherwise. 
trust_gasban_2 
Equals one if respondent has a high to level of trust towards Utility. Equals zero 
otherwise. 
trust_CBO_1 
Equals one if respondent has a high to quite high level of trust towards Organized 
Communities. Equals zero otherwise. 
trust_CBO_2 
Equals one if respondent has a high level of trust towards Organized Communities. 
Equals zero otherwise. 
trust_munic_1 
Equals one if respondent has a high to quite high level of trust towards Local Municipal 
Government (Municipio). Equals zero otherwise. 
trust_munic_2 
Equals one if respondent has a high level of trust towards Local Municipal Government 
(Municipal). Equals zero otherwise. 
part_neighbourhood_org  equals 1 if respondent participates in neighbourhood organisations and 0 otherwise 
Q_orgs Number of organizations and activities in which respondent participates  
voluntary_active _social_org  
equals 1 if respondent participates in an humanitarian and / or neighbourhood (vecinal) 
organization, or others and 0 otherwise  
voluntary_leisure_org equals 1 if respondent participates in an art or sports organisation, and 0 otherwise   
formal_organisations_active  equals 1 if respondent participates in religious, political, labour union, and 0 otherwise  
formal_organisations_passive  
equals 1 if respondent participates in  professional, consumers or environmental 
organisations and 0 otherwise  
collective_part 
Equals one if responded answers affirmatively that would definitely participate in 
collaborative project   
income_p_capita average monthly income per family member  
intention_to_treat_OC Equals 1 if the house is located in Group 1 (the neighbourhoods where the programme 
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was completely implemented). Equals 0 if the house is located in Control Group 3 
intention_to_treat_NUA 
Equals 1 if the house is located in Group 2 (the neighbourhoods where the programme 
implementation has started). Equals 0 if the houseis located in Control Group 3 
intention_to_treat 
Equals 1 if the house is located in Group 1 (the neighbourhoods where the programme 
was completely implemented). Equals 0 if the house is located in Control Groups 2 and 3 
treated_OC 
Equals 1 if the house is located in neighbourhoods from Group 1 (where the programme 
was implemented in first place) and the house was connected to the energy grid. Equals 
0 otherwise 
treated_NUA 
Equals 1 if the house is located in the neighbourhoods from Group 2 (where the 
programme was implementation started) and decided to enrol in the programme. Equals 
0 otherwise 
distance to avenue Distance to main avenue (in meters) 
distance to network  Distance to gas network (in meters)  
service_index Average number of services (from 5 in total)  
goods_index Average number of goods (from 5 in total) 
Housing_improvements Equals 1 if improvements in the house have been made in the last 12 months 
n_improvements Number of housing improvements made in the last 12 months 
n_improvements_calmat 
Number of housing improvements affecting the quality of construction/materials of the 
house, made in the last 12 months 
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2. Econometric Models  
The expected effects of the programme are related to: i) participatory involvement, 
ii) trust and iii) housing improvements. The measure of the effects of the 
programme on these potential outcomes (Y) is estimated by econometric models of 
the different variables related to each of these outcomes. Those were detailed in 
the methodology explanation included in Chapter 4, Section 3.1.  For a proper 
identification of the causality of the programme, the identification strategy controls 
for the existence of pre-treatment differences between the treatment and the 
control groups, as explained in Chapter 4, Section 4.  
Since there is a common trade-off involved in the choice of these controls  in order 
to avoid post-treatment bias, caused by adjusting for variables that are themselves 
affected by the programme, (Rosenbaum, 1984, 2002)  observable characteristics 
that are statistically different among groups and that may not be directly affected 
by the programme are included as controls in the models.  
Consequently, two different sets of control variables are incorporated. The first one 
consists of both the residents and housing characteristics already described (see 
Chapter 4, Sections 4.1 and 4.3) which are accounting for differences in observable 
features among groups.105 Three groups of variables are identified as relevant 
controls for characteristics of the household’s head, the household  and the houses: 
i) socio-demographic controls include age (and age squared), sex, primary 
education (for the highest educational level completed), marital status (married, 
widowed and divorced), national and local migrant status; ii) employment and 
income controls include “retired” as the main occupational status of the 
respondent who is the household head, income per capita and ratio of dependency, 
and iii) housing characteristics controls are: number of houses in the plot and 
number of members in the house, plus the corresponding dummies for 
tenure/documents and length of permanence.    
                                                             
105 Results were not changed if these were introduced fully factorised to avoid functional form 
assumptions.   
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The intention-to-treat specification of the econometric model is defined as follows: 
Yit = α + γ. sample_dummy + β. X it +               (1) 
Where Y is one of the potential outcome variables (a dummy variable for all 
participation, trust and occurrence of housing improvements-related variables ( and 
a continuous variable for the number of housing improvements and those related 
to the quality of construction materials ), γ is the parameter of interest that 
captures the effect of the programme; sample_dummy is the dummy variable with 
value 1 for observations in the treatment group (i.e. households in the group of 
neighbourhoods where the programme was offered regardless of their 
participation, also called intention-to-treat variable) and 0 for observations in the 
control group (i.e. households in the neighbourhoods where the programme was 
not offered); X is the vector of control variables already described, and ε is the 
error term.  
The estimated models are OLS.  I use an instrumental variable specification (2SLS) in 
order to estimate the causal effect of the programme on those households who 
were effectively connected to the piped gas service through the co-produced 
programme implementation. In this case, I include a treatment-dummy that has   
value 1 for those who are programme participants, and 0 to indicate the opposite, 
while the intention-to-treat variable is used as the instrument. 
The second econometric specification that is used to estimate the effect of the 
intervention in the different outcomes of interest is differences-in-differences (DD). 
It compares the difference in outcomes after and before the intervention for 
neighbourhoods affected by the programme implementation to the same 
difference for unaffected neighbourhoods. The similarities in neighbourhoods’ 
origin and trends previous to the co-produced program introduction in the region, 
described in Chapter 4, indicates that the average outcome for the treated and the 
untreated groups would have experienced the same variation in case the 
intervention would not have been offered to the residents in CO.106 Thus, since 
                                                             
106 Usually known as   “parallel trend” (Abadie, 2005). 
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treatment and control groups  are unbalanced in some variables  that are thought 
to be associated with the dynamics of the outcomes under study, the DD model 
allows the use of pre-treatment control variables based that take this fact into 
account.107 Under the Differences in Differences estimator with covariates, a series 
of different specifications of the model are computed to shed light on the effects of 
the offering of the co-production programme. As previously indicated, among 
control variables those will be related to the individual characteristics of 
households and their houses. 
In a regression framework, this is equivalent to indicate the following specification:  
Yit = αi + λt + β. sample dummy it + y. Xit +                                     (2) 
where λt is the effect of time common to all households, Xit is a vector of observed 
control variables that may vary over time and with households, sample dummy it is 
the treatment indicator (equal to 1 if the programme has been offered to the 
neighbourhoods and 0 if not), αi is the fixed effect by household that captures all 
the observable characteristics and those non-observable and constant over time, 
and β is the effect of the co-production intervention. The main rationale behind 
fixed effects models is the removal of those non-observable factors αi by means of 
exploding the panel aspects of the data.  
 
 
  
                                                             
107 It guarantees that the parallel trend holds, though now conditional on cofounders. 
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3. Heterogeneity Index  
Following the discussion in Chapter 4, Section 4.3, two different sets of control 
variables are included. The first one includes the household and housing level 
characteristics already described, accounting for differences in observable 
characteristics. The second group includes heterogeneity measures, an important 
factor related to the differences among the different neighbourhood’s groups.  
Thus, the heterogeneity indices are measures constructed to control for contextual 
effects related to a selected set of characteristics from nearby neighbours. The 
definition of nearby houses includes those that are at a distance of 200 metres or 
less from each other, to account for what could be a reasonable social and 
geographical space of daily interactions.108  
The heterogeneity characteristics are: i) income index (computed using household 
income from the different surveys) to measure levels of income inequality; ii) the 
(migrant) origin heterogeneity index (that takes into consideration nationality and 
province of origin); iii) the education heterogeneity index; iv) the tenure 
heterogeneity index; v) housing heterogeneity index, and, finally; vi) the length of 
permanence heterogeneity index. The heterogeneity indices are calculated taking 
into account all categories within each characteristic and using a version of the 
Herfindahl index109 by which:  
Hetero_ index=1- ai
2
i
å  
Where αi is the share of the category of the variable of interest within the group 
and I identifies the category. Therefore, this index is bounded between 0 and 1, 
being 0 maximum level of heterogeneity and 1 perfect homogeneity.  
 
 
                                                             
108
 Robustness checks for different sizes of clusters were conducted finding no substantial 
differences in results.  
109 Described in Hirschman (1964).   
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